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Abstract
This thesis analyses alternative models for the provision of micro-credit, with a 
particular focus on the role of solidarity. It produces a critique of the lending 
model developed by the Grameen Bank and copied in many parts of the world. 
The critique focuses on the claim that such schemes are well suited for delivering 
micro-credit in a sustainable, ie self-financing manner. I argue group solidarity is 
not an essential component of successful micro-credit schemes, and that lending to 
individuals can be at least as efficient.
I argue that solidarity groups do not perform economic exchange on the basis of 
ad hoc contracts, as existing literature implies. Rather, solidarity groups are 
institutions; as such, they are costly. Groups, therefore, require resource input 
from their members as well as regulations. These findings are shown to be 
relevant both for informal rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) and 
solidarity groups of formal micro-lenders.
A case study of a South African, Grameen-type lender illustrates that the staff- 
intensive group interaction implies a cost structure that cannot be supported by the 
interest income from its micro-credit portfolio. A second case study of a micro­
lender giving credit to individuals finds that sustainability has been achieved with 
innovative lending technology. Self-selection and cost-saving measures are shown 
to be effective. The importance of innovation, finding its expression in reduced
2
unit costs rather than enhanced solidarity, leads to a particular perspective on 
micro-finance: rather than viewing micro-finance as an issue for donor-funded, 
isolated development projects, micro-finance is seen as part of the financial 
system.
The thesis concludes by pointing out that these findings may be relevant in other 
fields of development practice. Participatory project design involves costs, not 
only in micro-credit. However, such costs depend on the specific social 
environment and may well be justified if they contribute to desirable social 
processes which are not adequately captured by criteria of self-sustainability.
3
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Preface
Currently, a paradigm is developing that proclaims solidaristic group credit 
schemes as the foremost solution to problems of credit rationing in the context of 
poor entrepreneurs in developing countries. Government and donor policy is 
increasingly influenced by this thinking. My research finds flaws in the underlying 
theory and refutes the conclusions of this paradigm in application to South Africa 
on the basis of two case studies. This thesis hopes to provoke the development 
community into rethinking the premises of policy on micro-credit, and especially 
group-based schemes.
Chapter 1 introduces the theme by discussing the role of micro-finance in 
development policy in general, and its role against the background of 
discrimination in South Africa specifically. It also outlines the conceptional 
approach of this study. Chapter 2 sets out features of micro-lending technology, 
with specific emphasis on linkages with commercial banks. It describes the 
tension between the demands for professionalism and efficiency and those for 
compassion in lending to the poor, which leads to two different ‘philosophies’ in 
micro-lending. Chapter 3 discusses the history and roots of solidaristic financial 
institutions, starting with informal groups, moving on to formalised self-help 
institutions from the Raiffeisen Banks to modem Grameen-type lenders. It then 
discusses the recent history of formal solidaristic finance in South Africa. Chapter 
4 sets out my main critique of group credit schemes, which focuses on the
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conditions and costs of group solidarity. It argues that solidarity is a costly 
intermediate good, created to facilitate joint production of credit and 
creditworthiness. Chapter 5 serves as an introduction to the field of micro-finance 
in South Africa. It outlines the economic legacy of Apartheid and the challenges 
in the phase of political transition, and provides an overview of the financial 
landscape in South Africa with particular weight on development and micro­
finance institutions. Chapter 6 illustrates the theoretical insights of chapter 4 
through a case study of a group lender. This micro-lender is found to be non- 
sustainable due to its resource-intensive group credit approach. Chapter 7 
demonstrates that a ‘mass-minimalist’ lending approach enables a individualistic 
lender to save the costs of solidarity and operate profitably. Chapter 8 discusses 
the social impact of mass-minimalist lending in the context of the results of a 
small survey. Finally, chapter 9 concludes by comparing the results with evidence 
from international micro-lenders, reconsidering the future of micro-credit and 
identifying three fields for further research.
On several occasions, preliminary results were published independently. Chapter 2 
is based on two papers which, though originally written for presentation at 
conferences, are now published in the Bank of Botswana Research Bulletin and in 
a recent volume on micro-finance (Appui a Develloppement Autonome, Micro­
finance - Banking sector: a challenge, 1997, Luxembourg), respectively. Chapter 
6 is based on a shortened version of a paper forthcoming in Development and 
Change, and chapter 7 on a paper recently published in the Journal o f
8
Development Studies (Vol. 34, No. 3). Ideas and analysis presented in an earlier 
article, “Alternative Models for Micro-Credit in South Africa - Theoretical 
Foundations and two Case Studies” (Savings and Development, Vol. 20, No.3, pp. 
269-83), influenced the writing of chapters 1 and 3. Editors and referees of these 
journals provided valuable comments and helped to improve not only the papers 
already published, but, by implication, this thesis.
My greatest thanks are reserved for my supervisors who guided my research with 
dedication and patience. All remaining errors, in fact or in judgement, are of 
course mine.
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1. Introduction
Micro-credit is now one of the most popular forms of development assistance, a 
prime tool for poverty alleviation. Rather than hand-outs, credit, so is the 
perception, promises to enable poor people to ‘take charge of their own destiny’. It 
seeks to empower the powerless, and, as market-oriented policies are the core of 
current wisdom, the entrepreneurial flavour of micro-enterprise credit adds the 
appropriate business-mindedness to poverty alleviation. However, if markets are 
efficient, why are people denied access to financial services - credit - in the first 
place and how does it influence their choices as ‘responsible individuals’? Why is 
the exclusion from financial services a concern for policy-makers and aid officials 
the world over?
Financial services provide a mirror-like image of the real economy; structures and 
decisions within the financial sector shape the economy at large. Exclusion from 
financial intermediation, and specifically from access to credit, is quite different, 
and more important, than rationing in most other markets: it does not deny access 
to a single good, but to the medium for intertemporal economic transaction. 
Exchange in all markets is constrained; without venture capital entrepreneurial 
skills and industrialism may never see the light of the market; without saving and 
loan facilities individuals are constrained in markets such as housing and 
insurance. This thesis develops a critique of the most popular solution for micro­
lending: the group credit approach inspired and instituted by the Grameen Bank in
10
Bangladesh, and it focuses specifically on the inability of this approach to deliver 
its promises to the 'unbankable' in South Africa.
Section 1.1 explains the importance of credit in development thinking and the rise 
of micro-credit to its current status in development policy. Section 1.2 sets this in 
the specific context of South Africa. Section 1.3 sets out the conceptual approach 
for the rest of the thesis.
1.1 Micro-credit in development policy
The importance of credit as a developmental tool stems from the perception of 
credit rationing as a socio-political evil. Credit rationing diminishes the ‘life 
chances’ of those affected, thereby undermining the foundations of democratic, 
equitable societies. It is accused of being blatantly unjust because it affects those 
who are least able to deal with it: those who possess least resources, least 
opportunities. Especially in South Africa, it has been linked with racism. It is 
based on previous injustice, and punishes again those who were yesterday's losers. 
Credit rationing stirs emotions as it hurts the poor, the rural, and the unemployed, 
while the suave and urban and educated are unaffected. Hence, it has been accused 
of aggravating social imbalance, hastening the decline of disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods, holding ambitious and able people in permanent disadvantage 
and poverty.
11
Rationing seems incompatible with rational allocation in reasonably free markets.
Rational lenders, however, refuse to lend if risks are not measurable, loan
contracts are not enforceable, markets are unknown, or information not available.
Banks may not lend without collateral, mortgages cannot be secured by non-
marketable property. Credit rationing, from this perspective, does not constitute a
case of discrimination; merely, credit criteria are applied equally and justly to 
1
whoever applies. The allocation of credit, therefore, reflects the pattern of 
economic and social advantage and disadvantage in society. This mechanism leads 
to the fact that poor, disadvantaged people have less access to credit. Access to 
credit constitutes an opportunity, and the exclusion from credit markets further 
reduces the economic mobility of poor people. The observation of this pattern is 
typically called ‘credit rationing’, although others may argue that it only 
constitutes uneven access to credit.
Credit rationing has sparked academic debates, policy measures and private sector 
action for a long times. Credit rationing as a concept is relatively new, yet the
The definition of rationing is far from clear; in many instances, rationing appears to be confused 
with non-availability or unaffordability. A simple example could illustrate the conceptual 
problem: if  a person wants to fly, and is willing to part with the amount of money that is 
equivalent to the price of an airticket, but the plane is fully booked, then the person is rationed. If 
the person wants to fly in a private jet, but is in possession only of enough money for an economy 
fare ticket, she is not rationed, but maintains desires beyond her means. If that person, however, 
has enough money to hire a plane, but has no pilot license, she may still be refused access because 
she does not fulfil the non-monetary conditions of this transaction. Similarly, ‘[c]redit rationing is 
a condition of loan markets in which the lender supply o f funds is less than borrower demand at 
the quoted contract terms’ (Jaffee, 1987, p.719). As in the example o f planes, non-monetary 
factors influence those ‘quoted contract terms’ because ‘[t]he price o f a loan consists of the 
interest rate and possibly the non-rate terms such as collateral requirements’ (ibid.). Therefore, it 
appears not fully adequate to label the exclusion of poor people from formal credit markets as 
‘rationing’ (Neary, 1987). However, the term is now in wide use so that, keeping in mind the 
difference between exclusion and rationing, I will use the term in this thesis.
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problem already existed before the establishment of modem financial markets. 
Mediaeval guilds sought to provide credit to their members on a mutual help 
basis, because craftsmen did not have access to the moneylenders who served the 
then dominant economic class, the feudals. Rural co-operatives in 19th-century 
Germany are sometimes claimed to constitute the earliest model of modem mutual 
banks.
Because credit rationing does not affect a random cross-section of a society, it is 
also important to understand who is affected, and why. In South Africa, credit 
rationing mainly affects blacks who have been marginalised by Apartheid policies 
in the past. Credit rationing, therefore, appears as the long arm of Apartheid, a 
vicious cycle that perpetuates black poverty even after the abolition of racial 
legislation. Accordingly, there is the need for conscious policy to overcome the 
effects of previous, unjust policy - its mere abolition does not suffice.
Economic research has not offered a sufficient explanation for credit rationing, nor
has research yielded generally accepted policy recommendations for overcoming
unequal access to credit. The most accepted 'classical' analysis finds credit
markets hampered by asymmetric information. Proponents of this approach argue 
2
that adverse selection on the credit market may constrain the price of credit to 
assume its market clearing level, and excess demand was possible (Stiglitz and
2
Adverse selection denotes a change of the composition of borrowers dependent on the interest 
rate, ie the higher the interest rate the bank sets, the higher is the share of bad risks', due to self 
selection.
13
Weiss, 1981). They base their analysis on the assumption that lenders cannot 
distinguish between potential borrowers and thus ration randomly. Hence, such an 
analysis is not applicable to systematic patterns of rationing as found in South 
Africa and elsewhere. Credit rationing is a political subject precisely because it is 
not random: it is the black, the poor, the disadvantaged who are affected. Poor 
entrepreneurs are credit rationed because of visible characteristics distinguishing 
them from other borrowers: they want to borrow small amounts, lack collateral
3
and business documentation, and are vulnerable to variation in their cash-flow.
Fried and Howitt (1980) have used 'customer relationship' as a rationing criterion. 
Such analysis is aimed at questions of rationing in corporate America, not 
informal sector Africa. While it is obvious to observers that the communication 
between aspiring borrowers and bankers is a critical condition as it may remove 
information deficiencies and suspicion, such contact is not an option for poor 
people in developing countries. Duca and Rosenthal (1993) provide a quantitative 
assessment of credit availability against the background of the redlining debate in
4
the USA. Based on survey data of American households, they find that race is a
3
Bester (1985) argues that in a model following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) no rationing could 
occur if  credit applicants were not constrained by collateral. Therefore, access to collateral, ie 
wealth, would determine access to credit markets. Basu (1997) shows that institutional credit does 
not reach the rural poor in India because of their lack of assets for use as collateral and their 
specific relationship with landlords.
4
Redlining describes the alleged practice of American banks to discriminate against minorities, 
and inner cities, by rationing credit and mortgage. Legislation has been passed to enforce 'fair' 
lending. Various positions in the continuing debate are captured in Squires (1992). Similar 
campaigns were fought between township residents and mortgage lenders in South Africa, 
specifically in Gauteng. Banks argue that violence and lawlessness inhibits the repossession of 
houses and this prevents the enforcement of contracts; residents felt victimised and pointed out
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significant variable for explaining why households have their credit applications 
turned down. This finding suggests that ‘irrational’ credit rationing may exist in 
addition to rationally explicable exclusion. However, their approach precludes the 
analyses of the economic rationale, and possible remedies, of the rationing they 
observe.
Despite the failure of mainstream economic theory to arrive at a convincing 
analysis and solution, credit rationing of poor people can only be understood 
adequately if the focus is on the systematic exclusion of poor people, rather than 
the random or irrational rationing discussed in mainstream literature. Systematic 
rationing is common fact for poor people in developing countries, and it is 
accepted as a policy problem (Aryeetey, 1997). It is perceivable that each credit 
transaction by a formal sector bank causes fixed costs; these are usually related to 
handling a credit application and making a decision. As poor people would 
borrow small amounts, the returns for the bank are too small to cover the up-front 
costs. Therefore, banks act rationally if they refuse to even consider credit
5
applications from ‘unbankable’ people.
that mortgage lending in ‘white’ suburbs was often scarcely profitable, but favoured by white 
bankers for reasons of cultural affinity and prejudice.
5
In addition to the fixed costs of credit, the costs o f collecting information and the lack of 
enforceable contracts are often singled out. Section 1.3 discusses the transaction costs approach in 
greater detail.
15
In the first decades of development economics and policy, three options were
followed for overcoming the ‘finance gap’ of credit rationing to poor, rural
6
people. In developing countries with a nationalised banking system, the 
profitability of banks was accepted as secondary to credit extension. Hence, bank 
branches were established in rural areas where they could not be profitable. 
Lending - not only to rural smallholders, but to projects in industry - was viewed 
as a development tool and therefore not relegated to commercial, market-related 
decision-making. Countries with private or mixed banking sectors emulated those 
policies by imposing regulatory conditions on their banking. These usually 
comprised lending quotas which stipulate minimum lending to small industries 
and rural borrowers, and a distribution of branch network and lending volumes to 
favour regional equity. Anecdotal evidence portrays how banks and their 
customers tried, often with good success, to circumvent such regulation. Both 
bank nationalisation and regulatory intervention sought to fill the finance gap by 
cross-subsidising ‘development credit’ from the returns of mainstream lending, or 
from general government income. Finally, in addition to both approaches, many 
developing countries established specialised institutions for providing finance to 
rural borrowers and small industry. These were often established by national 
development banks and received support from foreign donors.
Lending to poor, urban people was not seen as a policy objective. This is mainly due to the fact 
that at this time urbanisation and urban poverty were only starting to pose a challenge.
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These approaches were discredited first by their dismal performance. Then, from 
the early 1980s, several economists - many of them based at the Ohio State 
University - started to develop a critique of subsidised and directed credit (Adams 
et al, 1984; Tybout, 1984). The critique focuses on the fact that the credit policies 
resulted in less equitable access than anticipated, as institutional constraints 
invited lending practices favouring well-off borrowers (Kane, 1977). Further, 
repayment rates were extremely poor as subsidised credit was perceived as 
government service and repayment seen as optional. Hugh losses ensued and led 
to limitations of credit extension, as subsidies and grants were exhausted quicker, 
following fewer loans, than planned. While subsidised credit was thus more costly 
and less productive than hoped, the Ohio School economists also argued that such 
credit hindered the development of viable, private credit markets in rural areas of 
poor countries.
As a result, the focus in lending policy shifted to emphasising cost recovery of 
lending. At the same time, poverty alleviation assumed greater importance in the 
agenda of international development agencies, owing to the fact that official 
development assistance over two decades had achieved little for the poorest 
people in developing countries. Also, it became accepted that poor people were 
able to uplift themselves, if provided with appropriate opportunities and 
implements (Adams and Nazarea-Sandoval, 1992; Alfonso et al, 1992).
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Also, during that time, the view of the informal economy changed. Previously the 
perception had been dominated by a dualistic perspective, viewing informal sector 
activities as pre-modem and a relic of traditional society that would be overcome 
by industrialisation. New research started to present it rather as a rational, modem 
form of business in an environment with many constraints, many of which were 
caused by undesired effects and poor implementation of modernising development 
policy (Ghate, 1986; Lamberte, 1988). Specifically on informal finance, the view 
changed from one of undercover crooks to legitimate and important small-scale 
bankers. The provision of subsidised rural credit was partially explained by the 
usurious nature of client-lender relationships in informal markets, from which 
subsidies were meant to offer an escape. When policy-makers realised the true 
costs of subsidised credit programmes, moneylenders looked less usurious. This 
change in perception owes, arguably, also much to the Financial Repression 
paradigm, which holds that financial policy in developing countries retarded 
savings, investment, and institutional development in the financial sector through 
interest rate ceilings and regulatory burdens, including those aimed at making 
credit available to rural target groups (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Fry, 1982, 
1987).
Then, in a climate increasingly less welcoming to cheap credit policies, came 
reports about the successes of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Similar 
institutions mushroomed all over the developing world, first in Asia and Latin 
America, and now also in Africa. The services of these institutions came to be
18
known as micro-credit as they sought to target the very poor, lending very small 
amounts of money.
The rise of micro-finance in international development circles was not 
unchallenged. In the late 1980s the increased popularity of supposedly self- 
sustainable lending models in the donor community led to criticism focusing on 
their reductionism, ie the assumption that social intervention could be reduced to 
the provision of credit alone. In 1989, a provocative study by ACCION 
International, the inter-American micro-finance institution, posed the rise of ‘new 
wave’ micro-finance institutions as a challenge for non-profit organisations
7
(Otero, 1989; see also Drake and Otero, 1992). Others, like the case studies of the
GEMINI project, reported about financially successful lending schemes in
Indonesia (Boomgard and Angell, 1990; Rhyne, 1991), Latin America (Alfonso et
al, 1992; Fischer et al, 1992; Boomgard et al, 1992) and Africa (Ashe et al, 1992)
and thus heightened the stakes in the competition between different approaches 
8
and their proponents. The GEMINI project produced over 100 case studies and
7
Maria Otero is a director of ACCION International (a prominent micro-credit NGO based in 
Boston and working mainly in projects in Latin America) and has worked as an economist for 
USAID. She is one of the individuals most closely associated with the rise o f micro-finance in 
development circles.
8
GEMINI stands for Growth and Equity through Microenterprise Investments and Institutions. It 
was a project for conducting research and publication activities and was sponsored by USAID. 
GEMINI was based at the offices o f Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), a development NGO 
now in Bethesda near Washington DC. DAI still maintains close links both to ACCION 
International and USAID. These three institutions have had a profound influence on the 
development of debates around micro-finance, and in after-dinner discussions in micro-finance 
circles they are sometimes referred to as ‘the Mafia’. DAI and USAED cooperate the 
Microenterprise Best Practices Project, which makes advice available to development practitioners 
and publishes a newsletter.
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technical notes (issue-oriented reports such as Weidemann, 1992) between 1989 
and its termination in 1996, including many on finance schemes. Mostly written 
by development consultants, the most significant GEMINI reports have since 
been included in publications such as Otero and Rhyne (1994), while its initial 
insights were further developed by more recent research such as Hulme and 
Mosley (1996) and Johnson and Rogaly (1997). GEMINI studies were, arguably, 
rather partisan but contributed to getting micro-finance institutions on the 
international stage. Berenbach and Guzman (1994) trace the origins of the debate 
between ‘minimalist’ and ‘integrated’ approaches to the early 1990s, when 
GEMINI was most active.
9
Much of this debate centred around the best approach to enterprise development. 
NGOs which focus at enterprise development in the informal or micro-enterprise 
sector and which follow the integrated approach usually run training programmes 
both for appropriate production skills as well as business acumen. NGOs which 
primarily focus on poverty issues tend to cover health and basic education issues 
as well as social ‘empowerment’. The precise nature of intervention of ‘integrated’ 
institutions depends on the nature of their objectives, the characteristics of the 
target group and the constraints of their environment. Integrated institutions will 
in all cases, though, use a mix of tools, and they tend to organise localised projects
However, there are both integrated and minimalist institutions whose objectives are related to 
poverty alleviation. Although enterprise development and poverty alleviation are often seen as 
closely related and mutually supportive objectives, one of them inevitably dominants the agenda 
of NGOs.
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which are responsive to local needs and constraints. This portfolio of intervention
10
tools may involve credit, and integrated lenders sometimes use credit in kind. 
However, the credit function remains subordinated to the more ‘holistic’ nature of 
their activities.
In contrast, minimalist programmes design their intervention around credit. They 
usually also offer some limited training, but this would be in direct relevance to 
their lending function. They pursue a profit objective which casts them as a 
financial institution although ‘profits are seen as essential to long-run 
sustainability and expansion, but not as ends in themselves’ (Otero, 1994, p. 102).
From the mid-1990s onwards, this debate has mostly abated. In 1994, Berenbach 
and Guzman conclude that the ‘correct balance of specialisation and 
diversification is specific to each organisation, reflecting the existing 
organisational capacity, management talent, and judgements of the board of 
directors’ (p. 139). In policy terms, the debate was solved by identifying two 
different, but compatible and often mutually supportive roles for different 
approaches. Institutions following the ‘integrated’ line continue to offer mostly 
non-credit services, from training to business mentoring. Out of the ‘minimalist’ 
approach developed the modem micro-finance sector. Micro-finance institutions
10
A typical example is the scheme run by the Triple Tmst Organisation in South Africa where 
some clients receive training in sewing and financial planning, and are then loaned a sewing 
machine and material. The loan agreement is similar to a hire-purchase arrangement, but is 
directly related to the training programme. Following the inception of clients’ sewing enterprises, 
they receive further training and mentoring as required.
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focus on credit and specialise on a narrow set of functions by emphasising their
11
role as financial institutions.
The most important difference is that micro-finance institutions accept that their
role as subsidy-receiving NGOs is temporary. By aiming for financial
sustainability, they develop their capacity as the ‘demand among the poor for
financial services is so great that it requires a more effective response than small
programs that depend on outside funds’ (Otero, 1994, p. 94). Micro-finance
institutions therefore develop visions of turning themselves into commercial
12
banks, non-profit mutual banks, or foundations and trust. Whatever form they 
choose, it assumes a business-minded approach to their own development and a 
market-related rate of return.
This development is illustrated by the of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP),
‘a multi-donor effort to systematically increase resources in micro-finance to broaden and deepen
the success o f the work done by pioneering institutions in this field’ (CGAP, 1996a, p. 1),
financed by major bilateral and international donors. CGAP was constituted in 1995, and soon
started to dominate international debates jointly with its partner organisation, the World Bank.
Since earlier debates about the general direction of development finance have levelled off, CGAP
discusses issues mostly of a technical nature, such as interest rate determination (CGAP, 1996b),
access to commercial capital markets and the role of savings (CGAP, 1997). The rise of CGAP
was, one could conclude, the final stamp of approval by international donors for the micro-finance
movement.
12
Whether their legal form is profit or non-profit making, they will in all cases need to achieve 
commercial rates of return on their capital in order to gain access to commercial capital markets. 
Access to capital markets is essential in order to expand the loan portfolio. Institutions offering 
savings services also need to offer sufficiently attractive returns. In fact, financial sustainability 
has come to be seen as a market-oriented return on assets (Mosley, 1996).
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The active pursuit of profits in development finance was a novelty. Micro-credit 
has an expansionist agenda and needs to account for its subsidies. Long-term 
sustainability and expansion capacity is therefore linked to producing positive 
returns. Yaron (1991) formulated a Subsidy Dependency Index that takes into 
account the implicit subsidy of low-interest loans, grants and free seed capital. 
Mosley (1996) shows that financial sustainability is not equivalent to showing 
profits in the annual audit. In fact, the strict definition of financial sustainability, 
which is now universally accepted in the micro-finance field, means that all assets 
under a micro-finance institution’s control yield real market-related returns even 
when the actual costs of some assets is low because of low-interest loans and 
grants.
‘Integrated’ institutions, in contrast, are NGOs with a charitable role and a 
redistributive agenda. They will measure sustainability not in financial, but in
14
institutional terms. Sustainable micro-lending does not constitute a redistribution 
of wealth. By definition, a financially sustainable micro-finance institution does 
not administer a flow of resources from rich donors to poor recipients, as the
Rotating credit funds, equipped with free seed capital, could survive with a rate of return 
equalling the inflation rate, thus holding their net endowment constant. This would make them 
institutionally sustainable, but unable to expand. Free seed capital represents a permanent subsidy, 
as the rotating credit fund does not account for the opportunity costs o f its capital endowment.
14
Rashid mentions institutional sustainability (‘willingness and capacity of the organisation to take 
full responsibility to continuing positive changes’), behavioural sustainability (‘demonstrated 
knowledge or skill developed as a result o f organisational involvement’) and policy sustainability 
(‘acceptance and replication of policy by other organisations, such as government, donors and 
other national or international institutions’) as measure of the sustainability o f integrated NGOs 
(1997, pp. 200-1).
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recipients are paying for the services they receive. However, the rise of the micro- 
finance industry to prominence in development practice was accompanied by 
significant donor commitments. Financial sustainability is an objective of NGOs 
in micro-finance, but only a minority have attained this status yet. The expansion 
of micro-finance requires large amounts of additional funding, and potentially 
squeezes the funding available for other forms of development intervention.
Truly staggering amounts of funding are earmarked for micro-credit. At a well- 
publicised world summit for micro-credit in Washington, DC, in February 1997, 
the ‘human right to credit’ was announced, the aim ‘to reach about 100m of the 
world’s poorest families, by the year 2005* (Financial Times, 6 February 1997) 
was accepted by delegates who included senior representatives of donor 
governments and NGOs. Further, it was estimated that US$ 21.5 billion of grants, 
concessional loans and commercial capital would be needed to reach this target 
(Financial Times, 31 January 1997). The United Nations Development 
Programme used the occasion to unveil a programme, including the commitment 
of US$ 41 million, for micro-finance initiatives, and other bilateral donors 
pledged further funding the establishment and portfolio expansion of micro­
lenders (Business Day, 6 February 1997). All major donors now run micro-credit
15
schemes; in the few remaining developmg countries where such schemes do not
15
Although USAID and GTZ are perhaps the most visible donors in micro-finance projects, the 
official aid agencies of all major donor countries, including for instance the British DFID, the 
Swedish SIDA and the Danish DANIDA, support this sector as well. Further, many well-known 
private development NGOs from donor countries, such as Oxfam, provide support for micro­
finance institutions. Further support is available from charitable as well as political foundations, 
including for example the Ford Foundation and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Especially in
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yet exist, donors scramble to implement them. Invariably, micro-credit is under 
pressure to deliver; expectations are very high.
Such expectations, combined with the large resources reserved for micro-credit,
have drawn criticism. Some have argued that the focus on sustainability, and
earning a return on credit portfolios for covering costs, undermines the good
characteristics of development NGOs; according to this view, NGOs derive their
most valuable characteristics from their nature as non-business, non-profit
organisations which allows them to take a more holistic, all-encompassing view
16
on development (Dichter, 1996). Others have argued that current thinking and 
policy on micro-credit puts rather too much faith into credit; access to credit alone 
will not establish entrepreneurs nor reduce poverty (Buckley, 1997). In fact, in the 
scramble for ever larger, more self-sufficient micro-credit schemes, good
17
judgement is sometimes lacking. This rejection, though, must be seen in the 
context of overstretched expectations. While micro-credit alone will not solve the
South Africa, but also in other developing countries, wealthy individuals and large companies 
contribute finance. In South Africa, the Anglo American Chairman’s Fund donates to a variety of 
charitable causes, including micro-finance, while ADEMI, a sophisticated micro-finance 
institution in the Dominican Republic, was set-up by the initiative of wealthy local business 
people. Various Bolivian micro-lenders have also benefited from sizeable private donations.
16
Dichter does not criticise the development of the micro-credit sector as such, but finds it 
regrettable that all major NGOs now seek to initiate micro-credit schemes in order to look 
‘modem’. The focus on financial objectives in micro-finance projects and the scramble for setting 
them up, inspired by donor pressure in many cases, leads to undesirable changes in NGOs internal 
culture. It is difficult not to agree with this critique.
17
At a recent workshop in Mozambique, to which I was invited as a resource person, someone 
asked me how micro-credit schemes could be implemented in the northern provinces of 
Mozambique where there are no roads, school or any other physical infrastructure. My advice to 
build roads and primary schools first was not taken seriously.
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problem of poverty, establishing access to credit has clear welfare-enhancing 
effects and may help some poor people to move out of poverty by investing in 
income-earning assets. Given its right place, credit for poor people can be a 
valuable development tool, but not a panacea. Difficult questions about the social 
return of lending - the developmental effect that should be paid for by donors - are 
a priority only if such subsidies are assumed to persist. Then, the good of credit 
must be weighed against the good of subsidising education, health, and the 
provision infrastructure, all of which are part of donors’ portfolio. If, however, 
micro-credit fulfils its promise of offering credit to poor people in a self-financing 
manner, then such choices are no longer required, and donors and NGOs should 
indeed be advised to concentrate on other, less commercial activities. This study 
will find that micro-credit can be self-financing, even profitable, albeit only with 
initial grant support. Therefore, micro-credit remains an issue for donors and 
NGOs - to the extent that micro-credit leads to better lives for poor people - as 
long as micro-credit remains experimental and in need of ‘infant industry’ 
support.
1.2 Micro-finance in South Africa: giving credit to Apartheid’s victims
The process of introducing credit to people beyond the outreach of mainstream 
banks is of political and economic importance in all developing countries. South 
Africa occupies a high place on the agenda due to its history of apartheid, which 
marginalised black people economically. Though financial dualism in South
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Africa is often understood as a consequence of apartheid, financial markets were
never explicitly racially divided, and are certainly not so today. The indirect
exclusion of apartheid's victims has to be attributed to the discriminatory practices
in other fields of policy. The Group Areas Act, Job Reservation systems for
whites, and discriminatory education and training reinforced the income gap
existent between the races in South Africa (Porter, 1984), and indirectly moulded
financial markets. Blacks are more likely to be denied finance because they were
18
denied education, employment, income opportunities, and property rights before.
Regulation of financial institutions strengthened the dynamic of innovation that 
concentrated on the white, First World sector (Munro, 1988; Jones, 1992). By 
setting cartel prices, and allowing a high level of concentration, price competition 
was sacrificed, instead competition aimed at modernising high-margin 'white 
banking' (South Africa, 1985). The outcome is that South Africa has one of the 
most modem financial systems of the world, but before the 1994 elections bankers
19
considered 70% of its population 'unbankable'. Also, it has since been argued in 
many debates that it was absurd for financial institutions to continue administering
Black South Africans were not allowed to own land in townships, because these were, 
according to Group Areas Act legislation, ‘white’ areas. As citizens o f ‘independent’ or 
autonomous homelands, their right to own land was restricted to those ‘black’ areas (for a biased 
exposition of this policy and its motivation, see Bureau for Economic Research re Bantu 
Development, 1976). Therefore, almost all buildings in townships were owned by the government, 
and the residents were supposed to pay rent. This led to the politically induced rent boycotts, 
starting in the 1980s. The lack of property ownership, and subsequent difficulty of establishing 
credible and enforceable ownership and transfer rights, resulted in restricted access to mortgages 
and property-secured credit. Chapter 5 sets out the political context in greater detail.
19
During preliminary fieldwork in 1993, several bankers stated that figure as the percentage of 
individuals in the South African population who they considered ‘unbankable’. On this point, 
there was remarkable consistency across numerous banks.
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a net capital flow from black to white - as black people deposited substantial 
savings but had virtually no access to credit from the same institutions - 
considering the relatively low saving capacity of poor people, their hunger for 
capital, and the low profitability of the formal, and predominantly white, industrial 
sector.
The end of Apartheid in South Africa accordingly determines the agenda for 
economic reform: while a systematic lack of opportunity has created a racially 
skewed income distribution and black poverty, policy now seeks to extend 
opportunities to the previous disadvantaged. Though an important reservoir of 
labour, the majority of blacks existed on the margin of white economic 
development. The real measure of successful democratic transition is increasingly 
taken to be the full integration of all South Africans into mainstream economic 
life. First and foremost, this means increased employment, including self- 
employment, and a credible commitment to individual economic and social 
upward mobility. Yet the traditional providers of employment and income are 
overburdened: mining is the traditional backbone of the South African economy. 
Though remaining important, the mining industry experiences problems of its own 
and is more likely to shed workers than to expand its workforce. Manufacturing 
industry - much of it import-substituting - will be hard pressed to maintain present 
employment levels in the face of trade liberalisation. Foreign direct investment 
remains sluggish. Land reform remains half-hearted (see chapter 5) and 
agricultural production has seen sharp decreases recently. Between 1990 and
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1995, formal non-agricultural sector employment has declined by 6.6% and has 
continued to fall further since (South African Reserve Bank, 1997).
The stimulation of a vibrant, indigenous private sector is the single most important 
potential source of future employment and income. Entrepreneurship, self- 
employment and township enterprises are often the only avenues open for the 
disenfranchised urban poor. Yet entrepreneurs need venture capital. When 
emerging from the isolation of the Apartheid years, South Africa's financial 
system was notoriously unprepared for these demands (Munro, 1988). The ANC- 
led government understood the importance of credit, and other forms of support, 
for entrepreneurs. This led to the formation of a small enterprise division in the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, a national conference in February 1995 and the 
subsequent White Paper on the ‘National Strategy for the Development and 
Promotion of Small Business in South Africa’ (Kirsten, 1997).
This demonstrates that policy-makers understood that exclusion from formal 
finance is, in South Africa, heavily politically induced. Earnest political reform set 
out to address the racial injustice embedded in market structures, supported by the 
NGO sector and foreign donors. This is reflected in the discussions around the
financial marketplace: bankers, regulators, and donors became engaged in the
20negotiation of changes of the financial system aimed at the 'hitherto unbanked'.
20
Main positions from that time are outlined in: 'Blazing new Trail', Executive, October 1992 (new 
institutions in the struggle for 'unbanked classes'); 'Banking in the new South Africa' (discussion 
with Liebenberg, of Nedcor, who subsequently become Minister of Finance), Banking World, 
October 1993; 'Reconstruct - Making homes affordable' (discussion of housing finance and policy)
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Since then, a new policy framework has been put in place. Most important in the 
field that this thesis addresses, Khula Enterprise Finance was set up as a national 
retailer for financing micro-credit institutions and other forms of small enterprise 
credit.
In the initial phase of democratic change - before the 1994 elections - several new 
forms of credit extension to ‘unbankable’ people were tried out. Some of them 
focused on business lending, others on housing or on a full range of banking 
services. These schemes did not adopt a micro-credit approach, but were first 
steps in changing the frontier of banking in an apartheid-determined economy. 
Members of the South Africa Black Taxi Association (SABTA) experienced a 
business boom after liberalisation of the public transport business in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s (Bank, 1991). Subsequently, the sector experienced sharp capital 
scarcity. As entrepreneurs from low-income backgrounds, informally operating 
‘taximen’ were clearly beyond the frontier for the formal market of venture 
capital: they had no proven financial record, no collateral and vehicle finance 
companies had no experience in dealing with taxi entrepreneurs. However, as 
entrepreneurs with a firm economic base, little capital and a stable and proven 
customer base, they constituted an obvious market potential (Khosa, 1991).
Work in Progress, September/October 1993; 'Reconstruction and Development - Where does the 
money come from?' (Mboweni outlines ANC position towards financing social expenditure), 
Mayibuye, November 1993.
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Hence SABTA, itself a formal and established institution, operated a scheme with 
Wesbank through which it opened access to vehicle finance to its members: 
SABTA screened and selected its members, aided by its superior knowledge 
compared to Wesbank, guaranteed their repayments of loans on a group basis and 
maintained the enforceability of contracts through the leverage it had on its 
members, and the members on each other. The formal loan contract between
financial intermediary and borrower was facilitated through the information and
21enforcement power generated from informal economic activity. Hence the 'best
of both worlds' was combined, extending the reach of formal capital markets,
22thereby extending Wesbank's market share. However, third-party transaction 
costs applied because SABTA acted as a broker of information and provider of 
screening and insurance services, and commanded a fee for doing so.
Another early and bold attempt to combine formal and informal financial 
technologies was the Community Bank, which opened for business in 1994. Its 
concept combined, in house, different technologies. It sought to be, 
simultaneously, a commercial bank and a formalised player aimed at 
intermediation beyond the frontier. This plan entailed the development of parallel 
channels for intermediation of both types, like different branches employing 
different screening methods and selling different types of contracts. However,
21
The scheme started in the mid-1980s suggesting that moral suasion was not a relevant 
determinant of Wesbank's involvement. At the end of 1989 Wesbank had financed R100 million 
(Barolsky, 1990).
22
Wesbank was then in the process of re-orienting itself towards the core business, aggressively 
seeking co-operation with the motor trade (Jones and Scott, 1991).
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both channels were meant to benefit from supplementing each other. Because the 
Community Bank was capitalised through a foundation, it was thought that it 
could afford to cross-subsidise the administration costs of the soft-loan arm.
However, the Community Bank implemented standard banking practices in 
inappropriate conditions. It established large banking branches in politically 
correct, but unremunerative locations, employed large numbers of staff in shiny 
but idle banking halls, and discovered that their target group of clients was not as 
eager to open accounts and queue at tellers as anticipated. The combination of 
high costs and small customer base with low profitability led to financial 
difficulties. The Community Bank went into receivership in 1996 and attempts 
were made by the trustees to sell it to a commercial bank.
Other examples of relatively old developments include the Seven Buildings 
Project and the Permanent Building Society. The former allowed the occupants of 
seven blocks of flats in Hillbrow to secure mortgages to buy out their buildings; 
their repayment contracts were guaranteed by peer enforcement. The Permanent 
Building Society engaged itself in the low-income housing market, but did so in a 
rather traditional manner. Peer-based technology, in the strict sense, was not 
applied; ‘the Perm’ rather attempted to create a progressive and community- 
oriented image of its activities in order to gain legitimacy. Part of the image 
campaign was the opening of ‘club accounts’ aimed at traditional savings clubs.
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The current owner, one of the large commercial banks in South Africa, claims this 
approach was not viable.
The model of the Grameen Bank is the most popular for formalising group credit, 
but the older example of local credit unions also falls into the solidaristic category. 
Both ideas had repercussions in South Africa. ROSCAs, locally known as 
'stokvels', are organised in the 'National Stokvel Association of South Africa' 
(NASASA) that makes formal finance available, currently in conjunction with 
First National Bank of South Africa and with support from USAID. Credit Unions 
are organised in the Credit Union League of South Africa which pools credit funds 
nationwide and acts as an international fund-raiser. Many other financial 
organisations have instituted group credit schemes, among them the Group Credit 
Company (Cape Town) and the Small Enterprise Foundation (Tzaneen, Northern 
Province).
1.3 Methodology and Scope
My research aims to tackle deficiencies in economic theory. Policy-makers, 
bankers and aid workers struggle with it, as the redlining debate, banks' small 
business schemes and NGO involvement in credit programmes testify, but credit 
rationing has not yet been analysed in a fashion applicable to the experience 
•beyond the frontier'.
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Notably, the issue of transaction costs - and banking technology - has not been 
given sufficient prominence in banking theory, although the technology of 
producing financial services determines and shapes financial markets and defines 
access to credit. Mainstream theory has not illuminated why formal banks ‘ration’ 
poor customers while informal lenders manage to lend profitably to them. Some 
have argued that financial innovation implies that formal financial institutions 
learn from informal lending practices, adapt and imitate their comparative 
advantages in low-income client bases. Vermeulen (1989), writing about the 
formal banks' dealings with poor entrepreneurs, asserts that 'the formal sector has 
to educate itself about how the informal sector works' (p. 12). Studies setting out to 
explain the difference tend to focus on those institutions’ transaction costs, or 
aspects of transaction technology with relevance to information, contract 
enforcement, and defaults. However, this body of research has a practical 
development focus and generally lacks coherence. Outside the eclectic field of
development theorists, the problems of transaction costs constitute 'one area where
)
analytical rigour so far has not caught up with economic insight' (Niehans, 1992,
p. 686).
Within the theory of the banking firm, there are two distinct approaches: First, 
there are those who see the bank mainly as a place for exchanging liabilities and 
claims, and second, there are those who see the banking firm as a production unit 
for financial services (Santomero, 1984). Rationing does not exist in models of the 
first version, such as that developed by Pyle (1971). He understands the financial
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intermediary as a holder of financial liabilities and claims, ie deposits and 
outstanding loans respectively. The banking firm engages in intermediation when 
there is a positive spread of real expected interest rates. Intermediation, in this 
model, can be characterised as arbitrage. Baltensperger (1972, 1980) views banks 
as producing firms and finds that Pyle’s approach does not represent the actual 
production process, ie the combination of resources through which the firm 
produces value. The production process of financial intermediaries consists of
, . . 23organising transactions, and implies transaction costs. Including transaction 
costs into Pyle’s model precludes intermediation if transaction costs are not 
outweighed by interest spread. In the traditional view, credit is ‘allocated’ by 
intermediaries according to interest rates. Understanding financial intermediation 
as the production process of services, rather than mere ‘allocation’ of capital, 
allows a different view of exclusion from credit; costs and affordability of credit, 
and other financial services, determine its distribution. Information costs and 
contract enforceability are important factors in the production function of credit; 
the costs may thus give rise to perceived ‘rationing’ where these factors vary.
In financial markets, 'informational asymmetries are the most basic form of 
transaction costs' (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993, p. 8). However, there exists 
some confusion in the literature about the 'labelling' of cost components: 
transaction costs are to encompass production, information, enforcement costs and
23
Because banks production process consists o f ‘intermediation’, the difference between 
production and transaction costs is blurred. This is different from manufacturing firms, where 
production costs would describe the resource costs of physical manufacturing. Banks, like other 
service sector firms, have the facilitation of transactions at the core of their production process.
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risk (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985), all of which overlap. At issue are all those 
costs which would not arise if a certain expenditure was self-financed, but which
24do arise when borrowing is involved (Diamond, 1984). Hence transaction costs 
encompass two categories of costs. There are, first, real resource costs involved in 
acquiring, screening, selecting and enforcing contracts, in gathering relevant 
information, and, second, costs which materialise when bounded rationality, moral 
hazard and opportunism could not be averted which shows in a (higher) default 
rate, the subjective riskiness of lending.
Transaction technology determines the costs to individual intermediaries. It 
'specifies what resource inputs are required to achieve a given transfer' (Niehans, 
1992, p. 683). The internal management and decision structure, and the level of 
appropriate skills, are the crucial inputs. In most credit market situations, 
technology also encompasses experience, trust and 'instinctive knowledge' of 
customers and markets, because they determine the lender's subjective evaluation 
of risk. Factors beyond the influence of individual intermediaries are also 
important: the legal system and its efficiency, regulation, and unwritten 'rules of 
conduct'. In this study, technology is taken to denote the institutional construct, 
decision-making processes and product choices of a lender. Hence a frontier exists 
which denotes the limit of the market activities of formal financial institutions:
24
Diaz-Alejandro (1985) illustrated the peculiarity of credit markets by comparing them with the 
transaction between a butcher and a 'cash carrying customer' (p. 2). Before the term 'transaction 
costs' became known, Schumpeter wrote that 'the banker must not only know what the transaction 
is which he is asked to finance [...], but he must also know the customer, his business and even his 
private habits, and get, by frequently 'talking things over with him' a clear picture o f his situation 
(1939, p.l 16). In today's terminology, information costs arise.
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Poor entrepreneurs are rationed - behind the frontier - because formal lenders find 
it too expensive to process small transactions, because the absence of collateral 
and legally enforceable contracts prohibits normal banking procedures, and 
because lenders have incomplete information about informal sector activities. It is 
important to understand that these characteristics impose specific transaction costs 
on lenders to poor entrepreneurs. These costs are the reason for credit rationing, 
and not necessarily the commercial banks' malpractice.
This view implies that banks, including micro-lenders, should be seen as ‘firms’. 
As financial firms, they produce services such as credit and savings facilities; 
different firms may produce different products, although these products are likely 
to be close substitutes in many cases. The technology these firms apply 
determines their production function and thus their unit costs. Hence a frontier 
exists beyond which arbitrage would be possible if there were only negligible real 
resource costs (in the spirit of Pyle), but the available banking technology 
prevents the exploitation of this opportunity through the transaction costs it 
imposes. In this thesis, 'frontier' means the limit of the market activities of formal 
financial institutions (Von Pischke, 1991). This limit is defined by the 
technological and institutional organisation of their activity, and by the regulatory 
framework they are subjected to. The introduction of innovative technology seeks
25
to lower the real resource costs of financial production. In this process
25
This analysis is relevant to all firms, not only banks. Micro-lenders seek to make credit available 
to people who were, previously, too poor to afford credit. This mirrors the process of industrial 
development, during which the costs of producing many consumer products declines so that poor 
people can afford them, thus raising their net welfare. Probably the most remarkable example is
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'unbankable' entrepreneurs become viably bankable. 'The more transaction costs 
decline under the pressure of financial innovation, the more highly developed will 
be the division of labour in financial services' (Niehans, 1992, p.685) including 
the proliferation of specialised lenders beyond the frontier. This view does not 
understand micro-finance as mere aid projects; rather, innovation stemming from 
the development of micro-finance is seen as interdependent with macro-economic 
financial policy and development (Townsend, 1995).
This thesis finds that the paradigm that proclaims participatory financial 
institutions as the solution to ‘banking the unbankable’ offers no viable solution 
for banking the poor. Participatory principles inhibit the scale economies needed 
to make credit affordable. Community-oriented banking technology is staff­
intensive and its unit costs remain high. Therefore, the ‘group credit’ approach 
falls more easily into the category of subsidy-dependent development services 
than into market-enlarging ‘Fordist’ innovation. The critique of the paradigm, 
developed in chapter 4, is derived from theoretical considerations and is thus 
relevant independent of location. The empirical evidence in support of this 
critique is discussed in chapter 5, while chapter 6 draws on a non-participatory 
lender to demonstrate the potential of ‘lean lending’. In the spirit of ‘Fordism’, the 
focus of the analysis is on the unit costs of credit provision - the costs per period 
of time of servicing one client with micro-credit services - in relation to the
the introduction of Taylorist production methods, including simplified tasks and division of 
labour, in the factories of the Ford Motor Corporation, which sparked the mass motorisation in the 
USA. Micro-credit could lead to a Fordist revolution in the production of standardised, mass- 
produced financial services.
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revenue-generating capacities of micro-loan portfolios. The unit costs of micro- 
credit production include both the real resource costs of micro-lenders and the 
portfolio shrinkage due to default. The study shows that group credit is not the 
innovative panacea for making lending affordable. However, the study also points 
out that lending to groups and lending to individuals do not create identical micro­
credit products. Although micro-loans of various kinds are close substitutes, non­
economic factors may influence the choice of lending technology in a 
developmental context.
While important insights of this study are relevant to micro-credit everywhere, the 
institutional and social environment of the institutions analysed in chapters 5 and 
6 is specific to South Africa. Several commentators have pointed out that ‘guilt 
money’ - which is mentioned as a source of funding in chapter 6 - from ‘white’ 
corporations is a source of funding only in South Africa. However, it would 
probably be misleading to conclude that access to funding was unusually easy in 
South Africa. The fashion of micro-credit led to a shock wave of funding in all 
developing countries; some cynics have argued that it is excessive funding that 
plagues the sector, because inefficient micro-lenders are not weeded out. Funding 
for micro-credit projects may be more competitive in countries with a larger 
number of functioning lenders. In much of Africa, where micro-credit is not as
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well established as in Latin America and Asia, donors are rather chasing projects
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than the other way round.
One important factor that hinders group credit schemes in South Africa from 
reaching a large part of the poor is crime and violence, especially in urban areas. It 
is not possible, within this study, to evaluate the effect of crime on micro-lending, 
nor to compare it with other developing countries. However, several 
commentators have suggested that Africans are more individualistic than Asians 
(such comparisons often aim at Bangladesh, the mecca of group credit) and thus 
not as easily organised in formal credit groups with rules and penalties (Hyuha et 
al, 1990). Again, evidence is scarce and this study does not attempt to quantify 
any such cultural factors. Further, most commentators point to large differences of 
attitude within Asia and Africa, even within countries, and warn that vague 
cultural stereotypes should not be overemphasised.
There is one factor, however, that does set Africa apart especially from South and 
Southeast Asian countries with successful micro-credit institutions: delivery 
mechanisms for micro-credit services are more expensive in Africa. One reason 
for the difference is that the population density is much lower than in Asia, 
making communication more costly, which is also often aggravated by poor
26
Notably, Aburgre (1993) and Buckley (1997) are critical about the role and success of micro­
credit in Africa.
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physical infrastructure. Further, the costs of extension staff and loan officers are 
higher in Africa. Wages at the relevant educational level - credit officers need 
good numerical and writing skills - are noticeably lower in Asian countries. This 
factor is important for the analysis presented in chapter 5. However, it also means 
that most African countries share the problem of finding delivery mechanisms that 
promote low-cost production and are efficient in serving poor clients. In response 
to this problem, micro-lenders in Africa seek to co-operate with the commercial 
banking sector in order to benefit from its branch network, transmission systems 
and deposit facilities. South Africa is in a good position in this regard as the 
country is endowed with a comprehensive, modem and competitive banking 
system.
For this reason, the explanations given by Yaron (1994) for the success of rural financial 
institutions in Asia have only limited relevance in Africa, and he emphasises that great caution is 
warranted when planning to transplant lending technologies to other social environments.
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2. Micro-finance and micro-lenders
The previous chapter has outlined the development of the micro-credit movement 
and the role micro-credit could play in addressing the development needs of South 
Africa. Although the importance of small-scale entrepreneurs in Africa has been 
emphasised for decades (Katzin, 1964), Africa has been a laggard in the global 
development of micro-finance, and regional micro-credit institutions are neither as 
large nor as advanced as in Asia and Latin America (Morewagae et al, 1995; 
World Bank, 1996; Pal, 1997). Policy-makers and NGOs neither agree on a 
common understanding of the meaning of micro-credit, nor is there a common 
understanding of the technology choices for the production of micro-credit.
This chapter suggests that conflicting demands for financial rectitude and moral 
compassion lead donors and micro-lenders to adopt dual roles with conflicting 
objectives. While proclaiming their intention to achieve financial sustainability, 
many mainstream micro-lenders see themselves as agents of social change. Micro­
credit technology, however, is inevitably conceived with either objective as the 
priority. In the first section of this chapter, various alternative micro-lending 
designs and structures are identified, giving rise, in the next section, to a broad 
categorisation of micro-lenders into compassionate agents of development and 
financially prudent market-makers. This categorisation is reflected in the choice of 
case studies in chapters 5 and 6. In the final section of this chapter, the roles of 
commercial banks as partners of micro-lenders are discussed; this not only
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highlights an important part in the development of micro-lending technology, but 
the form of linkage between micro-lenders and banks has a profound influence on 
the balance between sustainability and compassion.
2.1 Objectives and Characteristics of Micro-credit
Micro-credit describes seemingly very different forms of financial services offered 
by equally dissimilar organisations. However, micro-credit always refers to credit 
extended by formal institutions to individuals or informal groups. Such formal 
institutions have been set up by donor aid and usually continue to receive support 
for many years. Very few micro-credit institutions have been transformed into for- 
profit organisations, and none have been successfully set up as for-profit. Micro­
credit concerns very small amounts; in South Africa initial loan amounts vary 
between R200 and R600. Although business development is often a major 
rationale behind micro-credit programmes, micro-credit is also used for 
construction, emergency consumption, education and social expenditure.
As an intertemporal financial transaction, micro-credit is subject to the problems 
of asymmetric information, bounded rationality and opportunism. However, 
micro-credit also faces the problem of delivery costs, which are usually neglected 
in models of financial intermediation in established financial markets. Micro­
credit deals with small loan amounts, tiny, but frequent repayments, and rapid 
loan roll-over; therefore, the unit costs of making, receiving and recording
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payments are an important determinant of total lending costs, and cost-efficient 
delivery systems assume great importance. Because micro-credit is a 
developmental tool, the social dimension is sometimes seen as equally important, 
or even paramount, in decisions of programme design and technology 
development.
Selecting and benefiting a target group
Micro-lenders are not established merely through the need of poor people, but by 
the decision-making of donors who first identify a social or developmental 
objective. Such an objective usually makes reference to the need for credit 
amongst a specific group of people. In broad terms, the beneficiaries of micro­
credit are thought of as ‘the poor* or ‘the disadvantaged’. However, there are 
important sub-divisions, and there may be problems in reaching the target group.
Some lenders specifically target micro-credit at women. Women are usually seen 
as economically less independent than men in the same social group, and benefits 
from their economic empowerment are argued to extend more directly to their 
children. Therefore, women are often seen as more desirable borrowers, from a 
social equity point of view, than men, and there is a large number of micro-lenders 
who explicitly aim at the empowerment of women. Another important group at 
which micro-credit is sometimes targeted is young people. With high youth 
unemployment and insufficient job creation by the formal sector, school-leavers 
face disillusion and an unemployed, impoverished youth may well be seen as a
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threat to the social fabric of society. Alternative target groups may comprise rural 
people, because they are seen as unable to benefit from development and 
employment creation in cities and towns. In fact, much of the debate about micro­
credit takes place under the title of rural finance, although the two are not 
necessarily the same.1 Finally, other social criteria for selecting a target group may 
be factors such as ethnic identity or nationality, or factors of social disadvantage 
like a physical disability.
Targeting specific sections of the population has not only social but also economic 
implications. There are two sides to it: first, different groups may be variably 
efficient in utilising micro-credit in creating viable enterprises, and second, 
different groups typically have different repayment patterns, thus affecting the 
sustainability of micro-lenders. Therefore, the social desirability of lending to a 
specific group of people does not imply the financial sustainability of lending to 
them.
In most credit schemes it is found that women are better repayers: they pay more 
punctually, and they default less often than men. Hence, the targeting of women 
appears not only socially desirable, but also furthers financial objectives. Lending 
to youth, though, is different. Young borrowers typically have lower repayment 
rates than older borrowers. So, while it may be seen as socially desirable to lend to
1 The Ohio School economists, who were influential in preparing the ground for the micro-finance 
movement, addressed themselves to rural finance (Von Pischke et al, 1981). Still today, micro­
finance is more often directed at rural than at urban people, although the latter are often easier to 
reach.
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youth, there is a specific risk premium attached. And not only is it more expensive 
to lend to youth, they also appear to be less successful in using the loans for 
setting up viable enterprises. Reaching the rural poor is difficult: it is expensive to 
maintain outreach structures in rural settings with poor infrastructure and low 
population density. However, some research has argued that higher social stability 
in rural communities aids the reliability of financial relationships. Similar 
considerations must be applied to any other potential target group that may be 
identified: Why is it desirable to lend to them, and what are the social and 
economic effects of targeting them? How does a specific target group affect the 
sustainability of lending programmes?
Identifying a target group is only the first step in securing its access to credit. In 
many cases, targeted credit has missed its intended beneficiaries as it was abused 
by those in positions of power. Some micro-lenders restrict their services to 
women, or youth, or rural communities; such targeting can become the victim of 
fronting, the practice of presenting a loan application not through the intended 
loan user (Goetz and Gupta, 1996). Other lenders structure a programme so that it 
primarily appeals to their intended target group but does not explicitly exclude 
others. In this case, there is likely to be a leakage, an outflow of lending capital to 
non-target group borrowers, as non-members of the target group participate.
Some credit schemes do not seek to target their loans to any specific use, 
assuming that poor people themselves know best how to better themselves, and
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that some apparently consumptive expenditures may well have investment 
properties. Others allow borrowing only for income-generating purposes and seek 
to control loan use through strict follow-up procedures. The view and objectives 
of donors often determine the choice, but it is important to emphasise that follow- 
up procedures are costly. Therefore, verifying the supposedly socially desirable 
form of loan utilisation could potentially undermine the viability of micro-lending.
More controversial, generally, is the question whether specific sectors are more 
promising for the establishment of small enterprises, and whether loan availability 
should be made conditional on the sector identified in business proposals. Many 
new business ventures at the micro-level are in fact based on trading activities, 
either hawking or operating tuck shops. Arguably, the establishment of more 
trading enterprises in specific locations does not increase the purchasing power of 
their clientele and offers few developmental benefits. More traders thus imply 
reduced profits for those already in business, and potentially undermine the 
viability of all. Therefore, so the common argument goes, micro-credit should be 
directed away from trading activities. Opponents of this view hold that trading is 
often the start of a more creative enterprise; trading profits can be reinvested into 
manufacturing equipment. Empirical evidence suggests that such transformation 
does indeed take place. Following such a decision about the desirability of
2 Some micro-lenders start, however, from the explicit objective of furthering manufacturing or 
skills-based economic activity. While trading may be fully acceptable as a survivalist activity, it is 
less compatible with industrial policy motives that may underlie micro-lending. Therefore, the 
objective o f the lender should inform the decision concerning the sectoral targeting of credit.
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directing credit, it should be considered whether it is also feasible: especially in 
micro-lending to the very poor, it is difficult to vet business proposals and to 
follow up loan use. In these cases, targeting could be inefficient due to the 
practical problems of enforcing compliance.
In many micro-credit programmes, there is an intimate linkage between training 
and credit.3 The benefits of linking credit with training are many; from the 
perspective of micro-lenders the most important effects are self-selection and 
capacity building. While many people will want to borrow, fewer are prepared to 
undergo training in order to become eligible for credit. Those who are, arguably, 
are those more determined to run their business, and to run it well. Further, most 
entrepreneurs are unaware of their skills deficiencies, and therefore they are 
unlikely to seek training voluntarily (Briscoe, 1995). When access to credit is 
conditional on undergoing training, many come to appreciate its value (see chapter 
8). However, training is costly both for borrowers and lenders. In order to benefit 
poor people, training needs to be subsidised, which requires resources either from 
micro-lenders’ donor or interest income, or direct support from government or 
international aid. The decisions on financial support for enterprise training are 
usually taken with the benefits of training in mind, not micro-credit. Further, 
training is costly for potential borrowers if they value their time. Especially
3 Training can be offered basically in two forms: there is vocational training to equip entrepreneurs 
with the technical skills needed for running a service or manufacturing enterprise, and there is 
business training to help entrepreneurs to cope with the managerial aspect of running their own 
enterprise. Technical skills training requires more generous funding and typically takes much 
longer. Business skills training can be fruitful on a very basic level, and is often urgently needed 
prior to set-up.
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business owners may find it difficult to allocate their time to not directly 
productive activities.4 Training, on the other hand, makes it administratively easier 
to target and benefit a specific target group than credit as it does not involve 
fungible assets - human capital is not transferable and can neither be stolen nor 
appropriated.
Technical details: Loan size, interest rates and savings requirements 
Many NGO officers tend to argue that loan size follows the decision of the target 
audience: if the very poor are aimed at, then loans should be very small. If the 
capital requirement of entrepreneurs is high, loans need to be large. This view 
defines loan size from the perceived loan needs of the borrowers. However, this 
misses one fact: many successful micro-credit institutions control access to future 
credit to enforce repayment. Access to future larger loans is made dependent on 
punctual and full repayment of small initial loans. Such staging requires that 
entrepreneurs are kept hungry for capital.5
Mainstream micro-lending literature agrees that charges and interest rates need to 
be set high enough to cover costs (Robinson, 1996). Theoretically, most micro­
4 In response, some lenders have organised very short training courses, some taking as little as two 
hours. The benefit of very short training will be much reduced, both in terms o f self-selection 
effects and learning. But it may still pass on basic business knowledge, especially when concepts 
such as interest, capital, credit and repayment need some explanation.
5 Loan staging in micro-credit is similar to the assessment used by credit-card companies which 
base overdraft limits, partially, on repayment history. Generally, loan decisions in the micro-field 
are more similar to those in consumer lending than those in formal business finance. Lenders 
should not assess the debt - ie repayment - capacity of their clients through analysis o f their loan 
application or their business; rather, debt should be made available according to repayment 
capability based on current income.
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lenders agree, yet few follow this general rule. Obviously, inefficient lenders 
could experience problems if they tried to charge interest rates reflecting their true 
cost level. However, there is no efficient market yet in Southern Africa for the 
provision of credit to the poor. Hence price determination depends on a variety of 
factors, including concepts of ‘fairness’ (Dichter, 1996). Redistributional 
objectives sometimes influence the level of interest rates, or the range of services 
offered. Although even large and supposedly successful institutions subsidise their 
interest rates, the paradigm on cost-recovery persists. Finally, it should be noted 
that several countries legislate interest rate levels, or usury laws set a maximum 
interest rate that is legally chargeable. Financial liberalisation has removed such 
limits in most countries, or micro-credit has been exempted from such legislation.6
Charges, such as membership fees, can be used to disguise interest rates. 
However, most micro-credit programmes offer more than merely loans; typically, 
business advisory services are available free of charge, some schemes offer 
insurance or bonus payments, and some even more extensive support relating to 
social and economic issues (Fuglesang and Chandler, 1986; Von Pischke, 1991). 
Micro-lenders may then argue that charges and high nominal interest rates contain 
payment for these non-credit services and are not usurious. In any case, the 
determination of the ‘real’ interest rate, relating to the costs of credit only, is 
methodologically difficult. Also, micro-lenders may generate income from non­
6 Loans below R6000 are exempted from the usury act in South Africa. In Mozambique, the 
central bank does not enforce regulation that could hinder micro-lenders, while in many other 
Southern African countries lending does not require administrative approval.
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credit services, for example by selling business implements to their clientele. 
Some institutions have used such lines of business successfully to establish their 
viability.
Many micro-lenders require their clientele to accumulate savings both prior to 
borrowing, but also during borrowing. Savings can perform various functions: 
people who save may be more prudent, so arguably they make more reliable 
borrowers; savings behaviour helps to determine their debt capacity; and savings 
can be used as 'collateral'. Thus, self-selection, screening, and enforcement may be 
aided by savings accumulation. However, savings requirements have 
disadvantages: they exclude potential borrowers, they slow the expansion of credit 
extension, and they seem to contradict the very logic of micro-lending. One 
important question, fought over with vigour in South Africa, is whether savings 
should be used to 'hide' real interest rates. Especially when savings are pledged as 
collateral, the difference of deposit and lending interest rates provide arbitrage 
profits for the lender. There is an unresolved discussion whether such profits are a 
justified means for making micro-lending schemes viable.
Although many micro-lenders incorporate into their lending strategy a compulsory 
savings component, only few operate discretionary savings schemes; no major 
micro-lender in Southern Africa offers discretionary savings services. Such 
schemes can appear desirable as savings mobilisation and the development of full 
financial intermediaries are higher policy objectives than the formation of mere
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subsidised lenders (Frimpong-Ansah and Ingham, 1992). However, discretionary 
savings schemes are relatively expensive to run and may not be easily compatible 
with the demands on an efficient micro-lender, although micro-lenders may use 
their clients’ deposits as loan funds. Besides regulatory implications, this is an 
important factor for the viability of a micro-lender (Chaves and Gonzales-Vega, 
1994). Some institutions claim that their savings scheme provides a low-cost 
source of funds for their lending operation (Lepp, 1996). However, micro-finance 
schemes with substantial savings business tend to operate in densely settled parts 
of Asia, where low-cost educated labour is available for staffing branches or 
mobile savings collections (Scheepens, 1974; Winterhalder, 1992; Robinson, 
1994). In Africa, micro-savings services are generally expensive to produce in the 
formal sector, and informal savings collectors continue to enjoy a comparative 
advantage (Hyuha, 1983; Seibel and Marx, 1987; Gurgand et al, 1996). Unless 
alternative funding is prohibitively expensive, it seems the economically 
preferable alternative to concentrate on lending. The costs of operating savings 
schemes, therefore, need to be justified within the context of savings policy, not 
micro-credit.
2.2 Groups, moneylenders, and the character of micro-lending NGOs
For many participants in the debate on sustainable lending to the poor, micro­
credit and group credit have became almost synonymous. Especially 
sustainability, high repayment rate, and outreach became associated with terms
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such as solidarity and peer pressure. This association is arguably attributable to 
the well-publicised successes of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (Hossain, 
1988). Individualistic credit is often neglected as compared with solidaristic 
models. However, international experience is more diverse; evidence suggests that 
sustainability and cost efficiency may be achieved without the so-called ‘group 
methodology’ (Chaves and Gonzales-Vega, 1996). In fact, the decision of 
adopting a group-based, Grameen-style lending method or lending to individuals 
is probably the most important factor in determining the lending technology of 
micro-lenders.
Group lenders have extensive relationships with their clientele. Often, they offer 
advice and support that is quite unrelated to enterprise development. Social 
empowerment, even health matters, are often discussed, and sometimes social 
gatherings - parties - are part of their working procedures. Frequent meetings are 
an important part of group lending schemes: they are crucial to the transparency 
and information sharing on which joint liability depends. Meetings are usually 
fortnightly, with an attendance of around six borrower groups, usually around 
thirty borrowers, and are attended by a credit officer. The function of meetings, 
and other forms of social interaction, in group credit schemes is not purely 
economic; while meetings are part of the credit operation, they also have a social 
role. Group credit schemes have, therefore, more functions than credit extension 
alone. Both their organisational form and their social function indicate the origin 
of group credit schemes in informal, communal institutions. Most important,
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ROSCAs are the model for the grassroots groups organised by Grameen-type 
lenders.
While group credit schemes tend to follow the Grameen Bank model, micro­
lenders which offer credit to individual borrowers are more diverse. In the absence 
of group discipline, they seek to find sufficient security for repayments in other 
forms, including identifying collateral, requiring training, establishing a savings
n
record, or formal third party repayment guarantees. Individual lending emulates 
the lending strategies and the diversity of informal moneylenders. Platteau and 
Abraham (1987, p. 461) define this type of lender as a 'credit-giver [...] who aims 
at earning regular income from lending his money at profitable rates of interest’. 
Adams notes that “[m]ost moneylenders operate on a small scale, extend loans 
mainly out of their own funds, and restrict lending to less than a hundred or so 
individuals” (Adams, 1991, p. 31). Moneylenders, as opposed to informal self- 
help groups, are motivated by profits and thus subject to criticism about 
exploitation of power and dependence.
The observation of high interest rate has given rise to arguments of 'usury' and to 
the 'default hypothesis' (Bhaduri, 1977). Both claim that borrowers on
7 Several credit schemes now exist that do lend to individuals with great success. The safeguards 
they apply range from training requirements to credit rationing; some require that borrowers 
pledge savings as security; others tap local knowledge by requesting 'character certificates' from 
local worthies who are compensated according to the performance of their flock. Through various 
mechanisms, these mles create an incentive structure that penalises default, forced withdrawal, 
from the scheme. Several studies show that micro-lenders that apply such safeguards for lending 
to individuals extend credit efficiently, taking into account both administrative costs and defaults 
(see chapter 6).
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underdeveloped financial markets are exploited through monopolistic structures, 
and the class character of surrounding polities. In general, more recent authors 
tend to argue against the 'usury' allegation, pointing out that interest rates in small- 
scale, informal lending are high because lending costs are high (Bouman, 1980; 
Adams, 1980; World Bank, 1989). However, the argument points to the 
importance of the social environment in which financial markets operate, and on 
which peer banking depends. Harriss (1980) reports that competing moneylenders 
share information about 'bad risks' between them, but finds no further co­
ordination or collusion. In fact, she encountered lively competition between 
various types of moneylenders based in villages and market towns, and between 
credit from full-time lenders and trade finance offered by merchants.8 Such 
competition could benefit potential borrowers, if they are geographically and 
personally flexible to seek credit from the most competitive lender. Otherwise, the 
existence of multiple forms of moneylenders may not lead to effective 
competition, and ‘usurious’ interest rates could extract a monopoly rent from 
borrowers. A number of reports from South Africa support the notion that 
informal moneylenders are actively competing.9 In other countries, though, rural 
communities are characterised by extensive patron-client relationships. This may
8 On the other hand, Adams (1991) reports about moneylenders who never acquired new 
customers, had inherited old ones together with the business from their fathers, hence never had to 
evaluate new risks.
9 Preston-Whyte (1991) writes about small-scale female traders with access to multiple financial 
arrangements, Khosa (1991) makes the point with regard to venture capital, including informal 
lending by whites, van Rooyen (1995) lists the many options of poor people in the Western Cape 
for borrowing both formal and informal sources.
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limit the choice of poor people to select their lender, and thus position the 
borrower in a disadvantaged power situation.10
However, in an environment where efficient markets are absent, and information 
is available only through informal, personal channels, such patron-client 
relationships may have positive effects on credit availability. Credit in informal 
markets is sometimes extended as part of a wider bundle ’in which two or more 
interdependent exchanges are simultaneously agreed upon' (Basu 1984, p. 149), 
similar to trade credit in formal markets. The interlinking of different transactions 
has been analysed as a means of reducing both risk and real resource costs, as 
merchants, employers, and landlords may posses information and leverage about 
their clients. In the absence of such skewed power relationships, credit could be 
rationed rather than offered at ‘usurious’ terms. Arguably, the ability to borrow at 
‘usurious’ rates is preferable to not being able to borrow at all.
The same rationale underlies the defence of high levels of interest rates of micro- 
credit. Micro-lenders are compassionate institutions, but at the same time the 
current paradigm holds that social objectives are best achieved with cost-covering
10 Similar debates are taking place in South Africa around formalised types of moneylenders: 
loan-sharks. Although grouped in the ‘Association of Micro-lenders’, these firms offer small scale 
credit that would not normally be described as micro-credit. They typically lend to people in 
financial distress at very high interest rates, up to 30% per month. These micro-lenders only lend 
to formal sector employees who have bank accounts and ATM cards. When applying for credit, 
borrowers have to show their last three wage slips and have to surrender their ATM card and PIN 
number. On pay-day, the lender withdraws repayment directly from the accounts o f borrowers. 
This form of lending is commercial loan sharking. This thesis does not pass a verdict on loan 
sharks and their benefit to society, but it is concerned with developmental lenders, who design 
their lending programme with a view to poverty eradication, not merely profit.
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interest rates (Robinson, 1996). This view is supported by the argument that many 
small-scale entrepreneurs are more concerned about access to credit than about its 
costs. In addition, group lenders need to consider that social interaction is time- 
consuming, both for borrowers and for credit officers. Therefore, group credit is 
more expensive than nominal interest rates suggest if borrowers value their time. 
Also, and maybe even more important, the time-consuming nature of interaction 
between borrowers and credit officers limits the number of borrowers who can be 
served by a credit officer, but preserves a personal relationship between micro­
lender and borrower.
While most recent literature is optimistic about solidaristic institutions, there are 
few reports about innovative, individualistic institutions.11 For both types of 
micro-lenders alike, strategic choices relate to the level and kind of customer 
contact, the screening of credit applicants, the use of computers, automated teller 
machines (ATMs) and branch networks. The products can, for example, be tailor- 
made or standardised, they can be provided at the customer's doorstep in the local 
language or by telephone in English. Answers to these choices give rise to one of 
two concepts of poor people’s banking; these concepts define two alternative 
technologies for the 'production' of micro-credit.
11 One of the few is the excellent account of the 'Syndicate Bank' by Bhatt (1989). He correctly 
places this Indian 'poor people's bank' in the context of financial innovation. The Syndicate Bank 
does not rely on credit groups, but on the willingness of individual customers to build up a 
financial record, based on regular savings, prior to their first loan. Screening and enforcement was 
based on motivated locally based bank employees, thus altering the nature of the 'peer' relationship 
and incorporating it in the bank structure. Another important contribution reports about viable and 
efficient lenders in Indonesia (Chaves and Gonzales-Vega, 1996). Government owned banks there 
lend to poor people in the basis o f savings record and local knowledge of staff at branches. They 
identify as important the incentive structure that rewards local loan officers for good performance.
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• There are those who see 'banking for development' as a requirement for a full 
support structure that enables disadvantaged communities to gain confidence 
with financial matters. Their banking technology typically encompasses 
educational aspects, their approach would be personal, supportive, community 
oriented.
• The opposite strategy focuses on economic viability. It would seek to provide 
some crucial service at minimal costs and accepts the need for standardised 
procedures.
The division is one between a full-service, high-cost lender and a standard-service, 
low-cost lender. Ideologically, the difference is between proponents of a 
development service that poor people are entitled to, and providers of a market- 
making product that enhances the efficiency of the national economy (Cotter, 
1996). Group credit schemes are, by the nature of their operation, caring 
organisations with a human touch. Lending to individuals can be designed in a 
‘Fordist’ manner, because extensive personal contact and social relations between 
borrowers and lenders are not an intrinsic part of their technology.
In fact, some commentators have suggested differentiated roles for these two types 
of micro-finance models. According to this line of thought, group credit is better 
suited for poverty-oriented programmes while individual lending is for the less 
poor and the development of their enterprises. Kesterton argues that ‘group 
methodology appears to be highly suitable for poverty alleviation, [but] it would
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appear to constrain the budding entrepreneur for whom individual lending 
becomes more appropriate* (1994, p. 37). Buckley, summarising the lessons from 
two Kenyan lenders, contends that ‘it is necessary for micro-enterprise lenders to 
segment the market correctly for their loans and to determine their primary 
objective, which could be poverty alleviation or business growth’ (1996a, p.327). 
Seibel finds, on the basis of Asian experiences, that ‘[b]y adopting group 
technologies, microfinance institutions may greatly increase their outreach, 
particular to low-income people’ (1998, p. 1). In practice, the choice of lending 
technology is rarely determined by the focus on either poverty alleviation or 
micro-enterprise development. ‘Many programmes assumed that in making credit 
available for income-generating activities they were both alleviating poverty and
creating enterprise’ (Kesterton, 1994, p. 33) and thus often fail to prioritise one
12with sufficient clarity.
The differentiation between fiill-service and low-cost lenders has similarities to an 
earlier debate in development circles about the appropriate approach to credit for 
poor people, the integrated versus minimalist debate. Centred on the policy 
objectives around poverty alleviation and eradication, proponents of an integrated 
approach argue for the need to extend credit only as a component in a wider 
bundle of social services, and have sometimes used related arguments in favour of 
full-service micro-credit (Sharif, 1997). Sometimes, such a strategy is cast in a
12 The most notable exception are those schemes that combine a group credit programme for their 
poorest clients with a individual lending programme for more mature borrowers. One such 
scheme, the Rural Finance Facility, is discussed in chapter 5.
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class-oriented perspective, favouring the social mobilisation of the poor and the 
politicisation of credit (Sobhan, 1997).
To many in today’s micro-finance movement such an approach sounds unfamiliar 
and sometimes even rebellious. However, there is historical precedence for the 
integrated, or ‘radical’, approach. Both the rural German co-operative movement 
in the 19th century as well as the credit union movement (both discussed in 
greater detail in chapter 3.2) had clear emancipatory objectives and emphasised 
social mobilisation as a means. However, neither had a class-oriented political 
agenda.
However, in modem development practice holistic institutions, or schemes, exist 
which combine mentoring, training, marketing and financing support to small 
enterprises. Because of the close contact of their staff with their beneficiaries, 
lending decisions are taken in a context jointly with other interaction. From the 
perspective of integrated organisations, group lending appears ‘large-scale’ credit 
delivery, because the close interaction between support staff and beneficiary is 
replaced by the weekly meeting and peer support. Hence group-lending, which I 
classified as ‘full service’, is being criticised for not including the support of the 
integrated package and for reducing support to ‘optional extras’ around credit 
delivery.
60
The weakness of the integrated approach lies mainly in its difficulty of defining its 
desirable form of credit extension. Criticising any institution that sees credit as its 
core contribution to poverty eradication, and reduces other functions to ancillary 
roles, proponents of the integrated approach find fault with ‘full-service’ 
institutions such as the Grameen Bank. Chiding its reliance on credit, and its 
objective of achieving financial sustainability, they would at the same time 
applaud its community development focus, and its participatory empowerment 
ethos. In fact, the diverse schools of thought representing the integrated approach 
appear, at times, uncertain whether group credit could be counted as integrated. 
Group credit institutions have sometimes invoked the integrated rhetoric to justify 
their persistent reliance on donor funding. Berenbach and Guzman write that 
‘some programs have used the minimalist debate as a veil to divert attention away 
from their own highly cumbersome and inefficient operations’ (1994, p. 138).
All major institutions involved with micro-finance today - both internationally and 
in South Africa - fail to pass the strict integrated criteria.13 Micro-finance 
institutions typically strive for financial sustainability and accept that their status 
as a donor-dependent NGO is temporary. They see themselves as financial 
institutions and expect their lending programmes to stand up to economic criteria, 
although non-economic benefits are to be achieved through their lending.
13 One integrated organisation in South Africa, the Triple Trust Organisation, is discussed in 
chapter 5. It describes its activities as ‘training and support for emerging enterprises’ and sees its 
loan scheme as a subordinate function. It is insignificant as a micro-lender, but constitutes the 
‘old’ model of development lender prior to the rise of micro-credit. Several critics of ‘new’ micro- 
finance approaches have argued that this old model represents a different, but still valid approach 
to enterprise development (Dichter, 1996).
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Prominent micro-lenders have transformed themselves into banks or other types of 
private-sector, independent organisations (see section 2.3).
There are, though, a number of institutions which, mostly for historical reasons, 
focus on emergency relief or social mobilisation and which extend credit as one of 
their many functional objectives. These institutions do not see themselves as 
financial institutions, and they are not operating on the same logic. In 
consequence, welfare-oriented NGOs would be advised not to venture into credit 
without good reason (Dichter, 1996). The literature on micro-finance mostly 
agrees that credit extension and other financial services are best separated from 
other services (Robinson, 1996). As these organisations do not intend to become 
part of the financial system, nor have a significant impact on credit extension, they 
are better understood in the context of poverty alleviation and enterprise 
promotion than in comparison with aspiring financial firms.
The problems encountered in the micro-finance literature in locating group-credit 
micro-lenders decisively in either the integrated or the minimalist camp 
demonstrates one fact: micro-finance institutions have laid claim to the moral 
values of traditional NGOs and also to the financial rectitude of private sector 
financial institutions. All modem micro-finance institutions are trying to combine 
the seemingly incompatible. However, the demands and expectations of donors 
and policy-makers, who see micro-credit as both a development tool and a form of 
viable intermediary, leads to a clear distinction between two types of micro­
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lenders: those who provide a business service in an infant industry situation, and 
thus focus on financial viability, and those who see themselves as a 
comprehensive development and empowerment agency, and thus emphasise social 
change. With appropriate arguments, both approaches can be justified. However, 
many donors and micro-lenders hold on to unreasonably optimistic hopes of being 
able to combine the best of business mindedness with charity and compassion. 
Therefore, donors as well as lenders evade some hard choices; this may explain 
why many micro-credit schemes in Southern Africa promise to deliver on 
conflicting objectives.
2.3 Micro-credit and financial markets - linkages and technology
In the search for sustainable, market-oriented models for micro-enterprise credit, 
the traditional relationship of credit-giving NGOs with donors is increasingly 
supplemented, sometimes superseded, by another: linkage development with 
commercial banks. Linkage creation, so it is often argued, supports the integration 
of ‘compassionate* lenders in mainstream financial markets, facilitates the market 
orientation of donor-financed organisations and thus enhances the effectiveness of 
intervention aimed at helping the ‘unbankable’ (McGuire and Conroy, 1997). 
While the desirability of linkage development is almost universally accepted, its 
meaning is usually not fully explored.
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The discussion about linkage creation, and the role of non-profit organisations in 
profit-oriented financial markets, is often blurred by the more fundamental 
problem of defining the objective and social aim of such organisations. Can 
micro-lenders be turned into banks and is this desirable? How do charity and 
market forces interlink? Can an organisation that is exposed to competitive forces 
still deliver the social goods expected of it as a compassionate institution? It has 
been argued that there is an inherent contradiction in expecting NGOs to be 
market participants, and to perform well on commercial criteria (Otero, 1994; 
Dichter, 1997). While this view is certainly relevant, this section outlines forms of 
co-operation between commercial financial institutions and micro-lenders that are 
beneficial for both. Such co-operation brings micro-lenders closer to the 
commercial market, but does not necessarily relegate them to it. The form of co­
operation, surely, is not merely one of technical convenience or financial 
compatibility; crucially, it depends on the character of the micro-lenders.
The forms of linkages that micro-lenders can form with established financial 
institutions vary widely, depending on financial regulation and development, 
demographic and economic conditions, and the ‘mission’ of micro-lenders. In 
many instances, linkages are seen as access to capital for making loans, gained 
from commercial banks. This ‘traditional’ view sees this as access to loans for 
micro-lenders, equipping them with the necessary funds for lending to their 
clientele. Also, credit or default insurance is a major venue where commercial 
financial institutions meet micro-finance. The choice between capitalisation and
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risk insurance is essentially determined by the nature of the micro-lender 
involved. Capitalisation can be used to subsidise a loss-making micro-lending 
scheme. Default insurance can, in the absence of additional subsidies, only be 
applied to sustainable lending ventures. Those micro-lenders who choose to seek 
indemnity for their loan portfolio typically are the more business-oriented. Both 
forms will be briefly surveyed, but not analysed in detail, because they are 
basically forms of funding micro-credit operations. However, non-capital linkages 
are arguably of greater immediate importance for designing appropriate lending 
technologies in Southern Africa.
Capitalisation for lending
Grants and subsidised loans delivered directly by donor agencies have been 
criticised as incompatible with modem, credit-granting NGOs. They allow no 
leverage and therefore quickly exhaust available resources. Except for new start­
ups, direct donor capitalisation could be phased out for micro-lenders who seek 
and approach viability. Therefore, access to capital through commercial financial 
markets and institutions has occupied much of the discussion of linkage creation. 
In principle, there are two ways for attracting capital from financial markets: loans 
and equity. Loans are the better travelled route; attracting equity remains the rare 
exception. Both will be discussed in the following.
Wholesale credit denotes large-scale lending by established large financial 
institutions to micro-lenders for loan capital, ie to expand their loan portfolio. A
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typical lending model involves a commercial bank, usually in a donor country, 
and a development finance institution. The development finance institution, 
through its own reputation and capital base, attracts loan capital from financial 
institutions at a lower interest rate than micro-lenders could; but it then lends 
funds on to those micro-lenders. In its lending practice, the development finance 
institution mirrors market-oriented decision-making while promoting projects that 
are not adequately integrated into financial markets. In practice, development 
finance institutions are usually set up by governments in donor countries, and their 
share capital stems from public sources in these countries. Borrowing by 
development finance institutions constitutes, in effect, public borrowing of donor 
countries. Lending by development finance institutions is often equivalent to 
direct donor capitalisation. From the micro-lenders’ perspective, the relationship 
with their source of funds differs little from the traditional donor relationship.
Alternatively, donors often facilitate a direct link between micro-lenders and the 
commercial banking sector in recipient countries. Donors give a credit guarantee 
for loans provided directly by commercial banks to micro-lenders for on-lending. 
Such guarantees cover the risk of lenders becoming unable to repay their loans; 
thus the interest rate would reflect a reduced risk premium, but would otherwise 
be market-oriented unless further subsidies are provided. This, in turn, requires 
micro-lenders to be able to achieve a market-related return; interest income less
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lending costs and defaults must be sufficient to cover the costs of borrowing funds 
from banks.14
In both models, the interest rate payable by micro-lenders is, in effect, subsidised 
as it rarely reflects the appropriate, market-determined risk premium. Further, 
when loans are provided directly by international development finance 
organisations, the interest rate is often set below market level. Such profits may 
then be used to cross-subsidise micro-lending operations. Hence, loans with low 
interest rates can be used to provide substantial subsidies, even where the core 
micro-lending activity is loss-making.
Capitalisation through subsidised loans or grants is usually chosen by institutions 
with high operational costs, or during the set-up period. Once lending approaches 
viability, a micro-lender may be able to afford market-related loans, as long as 
credit guarantees assume some of the risk associated with marginal lending. There 
are other factors, however, that may affect the choice between seeking loans or 
guarantees from donors. One is exchange rate risk: many donors lend only in their 
home currency. A credit guarantee allows access to credit denominated in the 
recipient’s home currency, thereby removing the exchange rate risk. Another 
important advantage, from the recipient’s view, is that sourcing credit from local
14 One example of such a relationship is the credit guarantee provided by Appui au 
Develloppement Autonome (Luxembourg) to the Start-Up Fund in South Africa, which used it to 
borrow from a local bank. In some countries in Africa, commercial banks are hesitant to lend to 
micro-lenders, even with guarantees, unless substantial subsidies are offered as incentive.
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commercial banks furthers the institutional development of the micro-lender and 
supports its innovation.15
The opportunities of equity capital, rather than loan capital, for financing micro­
lenders are often neglected. Partially, this derives from the view of micro-lending 
as a social and developmental, rather than a commercial enterprise. As such, it is 
often held, micro-lending requires ‘soft’ sources of equity, usually donors or 
'social responsibility funds' which do not expect a market-related return on their 
investment, or may provide grants. However, several micro-lenders have shown 
that a real return can be earned from loan funds in micro-credit. In such cases, 
attracting profit-oriented private equity investment becomes an alternative to the 
usually more restricted donor funding. Private sector equity investment is 
theoretically available in unlimited quantity; therefore, expansion of a micro­
lender may then depend not on access to funds, but on the lender’s ability to use 
funds adequately and profitably. If a lender attracts private investment capital, 
management also enjoys a higher level of autonomy in comparison to donor- 
funded organisations.16
15 The point that involvement of banks with small enterprises furthers learning effects is also made 
by Levitsky (1997). Through credit guarantee schemes, he argues, banks may be induced to lend 
to small enterprises and thus learn about this sector. Over time, the implicit subsidy entailed in the 
credit guarantee scheme may become redundant. The same argument could be replicated for credit 
guarantees extended to micro-lenders.
16 Several assumptions of capital markets, though, do not hold for micro-lenders as institutional 
investors dedicate a portion of their portfolio to ‘socially responsible’ investments. Other banks, 
such as the Co-operative Bank in the UK and Triodos Bank in the Netherlands, seek to invest all 
their assets in socially desirable projects. Finally, development finance companies such as the 
International Finance Company are able to provide equity to leverage the involvement of private 
investors.
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There are very few examples of equity investment in micro-lenders. Some, like 
the Grameen Bank, have private shareholders, but these are not true commercial 
investors. Rather, their clients are required to acquire one share each. Share 
ownership is a vehicle for creating a stable, long-term relationship, not portfolio 
investment (Von Pischke, 1991, pp. 240-1). However, several micro-lenders have 
‘formalised’ their operations and become licensed banks. One well-known 
example is the transformation of Prodem, a micro-finance NGO initiated by 
ACCION International, into BancoSol in Bolivia (Glosser, 1993; Mosley, 1996). 
Typically, former NGOs choose to vest a large part of their equity in their clients; 
a standard way may be to register as a mutual bank, such as Cash Bank in South 
Africa. Fewer former NGOs have targeted outside investors other than 
development finance institutions. However, the Start-Up Fund even plans to 
become a quoted company at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Formalisation as 
a for-profit organisation has, however, also adverse effects on net income because 
of tax liabilities. Some micro-lenders, such as ADEMI in the Dominican Republic, 
have chosen to remain non-profit organisations although they are highly 
profitable.
Risk management
Credit insurance is a common tool in micro-lending. In many cases, insurance is 
used to make marginal lending ‘market-acceptable* by having the risk bome by 
‘soft’, donor-supported funds. The bank guarantees discussed above are one form
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of credit insurance, made available to commercial banks, by donors, for the 
benefit of micro-lenders. For controlling the lending risks of micro-credit, 
however, forms of insurance are important which are made available to micro- 
lenders with the intention of insulating them against erosion of their loan portfolio 
through defaults. This form of insurance seeks to steady the income flow and avert 
the threat of insolvency of the micro-lender. Such insurance can be provided in 
three forms: several micro-lenders maintain very high cash reserves which serve 
as an informal insurance against cash-flow problems; other lenders established 
their own, dedicated, but separate indemnity trust to cover their own defaults; and 
finally, indemnity companies have been set up to offer portfolio insurance services 
to a wide range of lenders in the micro- and small enterprise field. Such indemnity 
schemes are usually donor-financed.
The strategy of maintaining high cash balances is not a form of insurance in the 
strict sense. However, it is important to note that reserves perform the role of 
insurance. Maintaining high cash balances is the preferred option mainly for 
credit-granting NGOs which have easy access to large amounts of funding at low 
cost. Funds which are kept as reserves cannot be used for loans, hence they reduce
17the lender’s outreach. Holding funds as reserves is only an option if their return, 
by investing them on short-term money markets, is above their cost. If cheap
17 The role o f holding large reserves as a means of insurance could be compared to the capital 
adequacy requirements that are imposed internationally on banks. However, the size is 
significantly different: under the Basle Agreement, commercial banks are required to have 
between 0 and 8 percent of capital for the loans they grant. Micro-lenders were reported to use 
between 50 and 500 percent of their micro-credit portfolio as ‘reserve’; investing this amount on 
commercial money markets (Von Pischke, 1991).
70
donor finance can be profitably invested in domestic money markets, that income 
can become larger than that from the micro-credit portfolio. In this case, the 
institution acquires long-term sustainability while simultaneously insulating itself 
from the performance of its micro-lending activities. However, this strategy 
requires donors to provide capital far in excess of loanable micro-credit funds, and 
it has the implication of subsidising a micro-lender. Institutions which have used 
this approach include the Grameen Bank (Hossain, 1988), the Women’s Finance 
House Botswana, and the Small Enterprise Foundation in South Africa, which will 
be analysed in chapter 5.
Micro-lenders have in some cases chosen to set up an indemnity fund as a separate 
corporate entity for their own portfolio insurance needs. Such a structure 
facilitates better accountability in combination with close linkage between lending 
and insurance activities. Insurance premiums, in such a model, are usually 
deducted from loan pay-outs. By separating lending and insurance functions, the 
potential viability of lending alone can more easily be established. As a separate 
entity, the lender could become viable or profitable, although as a joint operation 
the lending scheme is not. Establishing a form of partial viability offers easier and 
cheaper sources of finance, as was shown above, than one combined, loss-making 
operation. If defaults render the insurance side unprofitable, but the indemnity 
fund can cover its costs, then grant finance can be used for capitalising it. The 
lender may then seek commercial finance for expansion of the credit portfolio. 
Therefore, this option is attractive to micro-lenders without access to generous
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amounts of cheap funding. Credit insurance in this model can be provided for the 
full loan amount. The structure of insurance, including the timing and payment of 
premiums, can be incorporated into the lending structure, yielding a unified and 
consistent product.18 However, if the default risks of the clients of one micro­
lender are not independent, then the risk distribution in the portfolio is poor, 
reducing the value of insurance.
General indemnity funds that insure small-scale lending are often part of a 
national or donor-inspired policy framework for small enterprise development, 
sometimes including other, socially desirable lending such as housing finance. 
Credit insurance can then be targeted to specific groups of borrowers, but remain 
open to a wide variety of competing lenders, including both credit-granting NGOs 
and commercial banks (Levitsky and Prasad, 1987). However, such schemes 
rarely offer full default insurance as this would misalign the incentive structure for 
lenders; with full default insurance they would find proper screening of loan 
applications unnecessary. In fact, incentives structures are invariably biased by 
insurance and sub-optimal screening and monitoring are frequently occurring 
problems for credit insurance schemes. Although general insurers profit from 
better portfolio diversification, incentive and information problems lead to 
additional costs so that the capitalisation required may not be lower than for
18 A typical example of this approach is the Group Indemnity Tmst set up by the Start-Up Fund. 
From the Group Indemnity Tmst, the Start-Up Fund recovers all its default losses. While the 
Group Indemnity Tmst is structured to cover its costs - most of its surpluses in fact are paid out to 
good borrowers as incentives - the Start-Up Fund has achieved high profitability by eliminating 
the defaults from its loan portfolio. The credit and insurance scheme is analysed in chapter 6.
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lender-specific insurers (Bautista, 1992; Levitsky, 1997). Khula Enterprise 
Finance is an example of a recently set-up general default insurer in South Africa. 
It offers credit insurance both to banks and NGOs for loans to specific small 
enterprise or housing projects (Kirsten, 1997). Its loan insurance activities are 
focusing on commercial banks; this leads to the proposition that donor-financed 
guarantees are only desirable if they lead to additionality in commercial banks’ 
lending to a target group. Measurements for additionality still rely on anecdotal 
evidence.19
Institutional co-operation
On the level of general discussions, linkage creation is understood to involve 
capital flows between micro-lenders and commercial financial institutions. In 
practice, most co-operation involves no capital flows. The misconception stems 
from the view of the financial sector mainly as the provider of intermediation. 
However, operating transaction mechanisms is an equally important function of 
the financial sector. Two areas of co-operation between micro-lenders and 
commercial financial institutions are exceptionally important for developing 
micro-lending technology: deposit-taking and transfer systems. While the first 
assumes its importance from the role of financial regulation, the second depends 
on banks’ size and technological strength. In practice, both forms of linkage 
development are interdependent.
19 Additionality is a term widely used in the literature on credit guarantees. It describes that 
additional amount of lending that takes place with a credit guarantee which would not have taken 
place without one (see Levitsky, 1997).
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Many forms of micro-lending involve a component of savings accumulation. In 
the micro-finance field, savings generation may in fact be a policy objective in its 
own right. Several highly successful micro-lenders offer savings facilities and 
often link them with their credit programmes. However, in almost all countries, 
deposit-taking institutions need to have a banking licence. Acquiring such a 
licence is in most cases not an option for micro-lenders; formal capital
requirements and supervisory rigidities deter most micro-lenders (see Chaves and
20Gonzales-Vega, 1994). Savings of a micro-lender's clientele cannot be held 
directly by the lender. However, acquiring a banking license may neither be 
desirable nor necessary. Where the existing infrastructure of banks can be used, 
there is little reason for a micro-lender to incur the costs of duplication. Most 
major established micro-lenders in South Africa have agreements with licensed 
banks to allow their clients the use of deposit facilities.
Co-operation with established financial institutions in the field of savings usually 
requires that every client of the micro-lender opens an account with a bank or 
savings bank. Although information about the account must be made available to 
the micro-lender, the deposits do not form part of its resources or liabilities and 
are regulated through the registered bank. The micro-lender therefore is not 
subject to the regulations concerning banks; the participating commercial bank
20 While their are widely reported exceptions o f micro-lenders turned into commercial banks, it 
remains generally true that this constitutes not a viable option for most micro-lenders in the 
foreseeable future.
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may, at its own responsibility, grant an overdraft facility to the micro-lender
relating to the deposits of the micro-savers. For many typical micro-borrowers the
requirement to open accounts at a formal bank may look daunting, but several
micro-lenders have negotiated framework agreements with banks on behalf of
their clients who then stand to learn from their exposure to formal financial 
21institutions. An additional benefit of requiring clients to open accounts with a 
bank is that such accounts are then also used for transactions: banks operate 
cheque-clearing and electronic transfer systems for their account holders.
When micro-credit established itself, many practitioners thought of it as ‘village 
banking’. At this time, the image dominated the minds of donors and aid officials 
of ‘community bankers’ living in villages and providing services in their 
neighbourhood. Such community bankers are cash-carrying agents, working on 
behalf of larger, formal micro-finance institutions. However, since then, a wide 
variety of methods has been developed and successfully applied. Cash-carrying 
credit officers are now the exception rather than the rule. Many modem micro- 
lenders use electronic transfer systems to move funds between clients and lender 
in co-operation with commercial banks with sophisticated infrastructure.
The use of commercial banks’ transaction mechanisms obviously depends on the 
availability of appropriate systems in a specific country. In many developing
21 The managing director of one South African micro-lender remarked that it was ‘a good 
problem’ for his clients to be forced to open an account, as it helped them to gain confidence.
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countries, transaction systems are slow, unreliable and often expensive. 
Sometimes, transactions depend on cheque-clearing systems which may be 
labour-intensive and thus have high unit costs. However, modem and efficient 
transfer facilities are available in more and more developing countries.22
A well-designed transfer system does not only send money, but is designed so that 
all electronic transfers of money also forward relevant information. This enables a 
micro-lender to concentrate all book-keeping and data-processing. Typically, the 
scale economies of data-processing are large. However, the most important benefit 
of impersonal transfer systems is that they allow the movement of funds without 
corresponding travel requirements for credit officers. This is often argued to 
contribute to financial prudence and a more efficient flow of information to 
headquarters (Meyer, 1997).
Linkages - the relationship of micro-lenders with commercial financial markets - 
are an important factor for developing micro-finance technology. Linkages may 
remove the ‘soup-kitchen’ aura from NGOs, presenting them as calculating, but 
compassionate organisations. However, it does not necessarily require micro­
22 In South Africa, all major micro-lenders use electronic transfers for loan disbursals and 
repayments. In the Dominican Republic, ADEMI was not only successful in using general 
transaction mechanisms for loan disbursals and repayments, but about 3000 of its clients now use 
a MasterCard, which vastly reduces transaction costs for them in all their financial transactions. At 
a more moderate level, postal savings banks exist in most developing countries, including rural, 
underbanked areas in South Africa and Botswana. Their transaction systems, although typically 
not as fast and with slightly higher marginal costs, can handle small and frequent payments, to and 
from every post office.
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lenders to be transformed into commercial enterprises. The promotion of 
linkages does not require profit-orientation, and linkages are not synonymous with 
capital flows.
This chapter has sought to give an overview of micro-credit arrangements. 
Chapters 5 and 6 will present two case studies which represent diametrically 
opposed approaches to ‘banking the unbankable’. While these do not capture all 
different lending technologies, they lie at two opposing ends of the menu of 
lending technologies, and they will thus illustrate the relationship between 
technology choice, sustainability and developmental thinking.
23 Some may wish to transform themselves into commercial banks. Others may choose to become 
for-profit organisations without banking license. Yet others may choose to retain a charitable 
character and explicit redistributional objectives, which are not compatible with profit-orientation. 
For them, too, linkage development offers the opportunity to achieve their objectives more 
efficiently.
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3. Solidaristic Finance - the formalisation of credit clubs
This chapter will discuss the merits of the group credit vogue in recent 
development theory and policy. Group credit institutions are conceptually based 
on rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). Therefore, section 3.1 
outlines three standard types of ROSCAs and surveys the body of literature 
analysing them in various fashions. All early work was carried out by sociologists 
and anthropologists, and only recently have economists discovered the topic. The 
work tends to be descriptive, and remains fairly thin. I will show that the literature 
has failed, as yet, to produce an adequate analysis of ROSCAs that would 
encompass both economic and social facets of this institution. Distinctively 
different strands of analysis remain; sociological and economic research are 
isolated and unsatisfactory.
Section 3.2 summarises the literature on group credit schemes, ie group-based 
institutionalised credit schemes. Since the inception and apparent success of the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, group credit schemes have attracted attention and 
continue to influence policy-making circles. Group credit schemes operate on 
principles which are similar to those underlying ROSCAs. Apart from descriptive 
(and often biased) work there is little of analytical substance relating to group 
credit schemes. Economic models on this subject are argued to suffer from the a 
priori exclusion of social relations. Finally, section 3.3 will briefly outline South
78
African experience with formal group credit models. These support reservations 
about the efficiency of group credit schemes.
3.1 Role and function of ROSCAs
ROSCAs are the most basic solidaristic financial institution. They offer simple 
intermediation based on a small group of participants and their inside savings 
capacity. ROSCAs exist in endless variations; no fixed rules are necessary as 
prospective participants can adopt rules to their liking ad hoc and have to obey 
them for only one rotation, ie usually not longer than a year. From all the diversity 
which is found in descriptive literature, some common principles can be deduced 
and summarised in three standard models:
Basic ROSCAs
The basic model (Type 1) is the prototype for all successive developments and 
still widely found. It comprises a number (N) of members who agree to save a 
specified amount (A) of money (or, theoretically, other storable and exchangeable 
value such as grain) regularly and contribute it to the association at regular, eg 
monthly, meetings. At these meetings, all members’ contributions - the 'prize' - are 
given to one member - the 'winner' - as a loan, ie this member receives the amount 
of NxA. The full rotation is completed after N meetings, after which each member 
has received the prize once. The order of rotation may be determined randomly,
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through gambling or chance, or systematically by financial need, status, or age of 
members.
In this model there is no headperson; responsibility is shared equally in egalitarian 
fashion. No tangible transaction costs are incurred by organisational structures. 
There are no interest rates either. Hence the first winner within the rotation 
remains a borrower until the last meeting, while the last winner is a pure 
depositor. In the presence of positive inflation and/or opportunity costs for capital 
(including 'normal' time preference), this type of credit association distributes the 
benefits of membership extremely unevenly. Some members - at least the last 
winner - would be better off ex-post if they simply hoarded cash.
However, this and similar models are still widely found and always strongly 
associated with a social superstructure. The regular meetings assume the role of 
parties, or the loan given to the winner is required to be 'invested' - fully or in part 
- on entertainment or feast for the members. Financial motives may be in the 
background. Arguably, the financial intermediation function of such basic 
ROSCAs is often doubtful. They appear more comparable to 'kitties' held at clubs 
or workplaces in developed countries which finance occasional social expenditure 
like Christmas or birthday parties.
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Discount ROSCAs
The introduction of a discount constitutes the next stage in ROSCAs' 
development. It improves on the intertemporal indifference of the previous model 
by allowing for discounts. Through this mechanism it is organised that the 'prize' 
increases as the rotation continues, hence late winners are compensated for their 
opportunity costs. The operation of this mechanism, and the amounts of discount 
involved, are tantamount to the imposition of an internal interest rate on 
credit/saving transactions within the associations.
Under the strong assumptions of a (hypothetical) perfect environment, excess 
liquidity can be employed or deposited at a rate of return equal to the opportunity 
costs, excess borrowing can take place at the same rate, and there are no 
transaction costs. If we further assume that the internal interest rate equals the 
opportunity costs, which are the same for all participants, then in this case 
participants are neutral with regard to their allocation of the prize within the 
rotation. On the other hand, there appears to be no economic reason for the 
existence of the association as no benefits are derived which could not easily be 
had from the alternative deposit or borrowing facilities.
Assuming that the external financial market is less than perfect, the above 
assumptions would not hold. The opportunity costs of capital (ie the 
deposit/lending rates available) differ between the participants of the rotating 
credit associations, and the internal interest rate as given by the discount
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mechanism lies somewhere between the highest and lowest opportunity cost faced 
by individual members.
In this case members with high opportunity costs would prefer to be allocated 
early prize slots within the rotation, ie they prefer to borrow. Their opportunity 
costs could be rationalised as high returns to alternative investment projects, or 
high alternative borrowing costs, or actual exclusion from alternative borrowing 
sources. Members with low opportunity costs prefer to lend by seeking late 
allocation slots. Their relatively low opportunity costs may stem from better credit 
ratings at local money lenders, or access to cheap institutional credit. In this case 
both early and late winners benefit from the existence of the associations: the 
former find access to credit at costs below those of alternatives, the latter realise 
returns to their capital higher than they otherwise had been able to. In so far as 
different opportunity costs are an expression of financial fragmentation, this form 
of rotating credit association helps to lower the barrier between its 'fragments' by 
facilitating capital flows between them.
However, the internal interest rates are fixed as are the amounts of money 
contributed and loaned. There is no built-in guarantee that the internal interest rate 
allows for an equilibrium between would-be borrowers and lenders. Because the 
contributions of each member are equal, equilibrium requires that N/2 members 
have opportunity costs below the internal interest rate and the other half of 
members above. Also, given that the interest is fixed in nominal terms, and that
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one rotation may last several months or even years, changes in the general or 
individual opportunity costs are likely to occur. These cannot be adjusted for.
Bidding ROSCAs
The introduction of bidding captures the final stage of traditional ROSCAs’ 
sophistication. It improves on some of the earlier models' inflexibility and allows 
for a somewhat flexible internal interest rate. Again, N members commit 
themselves to meet regularly and contribute amount A to the fund at each of these 
meetings. However, the fund of NxA then is not given in full to any of the 
members, but auctioned between the members. The one who offers the highest 
discount D receives the amount of NxA-D. The discount may either be distributed 
equally between the members - so that their contribution at any meeting amounts 
only to A-(D/N) - or it may be accumulated in a common pool and used for 
outside lending purposes, social expenditure or any common good. Having 
received the prize once - ie having outbid the other members once - the winner is 
excluded from bidding in further meetings.
The procedure of bidding for the prize incorporates market elements: members 
know their own intertemporal preference, and they know the costs of alternative 
lending/investing. Hence they know their own opportunity costs. Bidding on the 
prize reduces the pay-out the winner gets. The stream of instalments is fixed, 
therefore bidding increases the interest rate calculated by discounting the 
instalments. Assuming rational decision-making, each individual member will bid
83
to receive the prize as long as the discount on offer carries a discounted interest 
rate below his/her own opportunity costs, and stops bidding when the interest rate 
exceeds his/her own. The real interest rate that each member pays then reflects the 
relative scarcity of capital within the rotating credit association under 
consideration of members expectations. The most 'desperate' members will outbid 
the others early during the rotation, while the ones with low opportunity costs may 
well wait towards the end of the rotation where competition for the prize is lower, 
and so is the discount. The last winner will receive the full amount NxA without 
discount as he/she is the only member allowed to 'bid'. However, this market 
element is confined to the funds available within the association. The flexibility 
applies to group members only, and their personal access to outside finance. Also 
the turnover of the ROSCA is fixed for the period of rotation. As groups tend to 
be small and knowledgeable about each other, there is also scope for 'strategic' 
bidding. This raises the question whether the bidding process does actually 
guarantee an internal equilibrium.
In the form I have described the three 'standard type' ROSCAs their members 
represent equals within the group. However, the more elaborate the institutional 
arrangements are, and the larger the associations are, the more likely it is to find a 
'headman', and sometimes more 'officials' involved in running the association, 
organising paperwork and securing members' contributions. For these services the 
headman frequently receives some remuneration: a certain share of the prize on 
each meeting, the first prize without any 'discount', or he may be in power to
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determine the order of rotation, enabling him to ask for fees or ’bribes' for the 
allocation of the prize from members. These possibilities illuminate the fact that 
organising and running an informal 'mutual bank' may pay handsome returns 
independently of the benefit generated for the rank and file members. More 
complex and sophisticated schemes are occasionally run by commercial banks, 
local businessmen or are embedded in a pre-existing patron-client relationship.1 
However, the function and structure of these organisations have changed 
profoundly, and they do not properly fit the understanding of solidaristic 
ROSCAs.
The body of literature reports that defaults are not a major problem for ROSCAs. 
A notable exemption is the report by Hyuha et al (1990) who find that widespread 
defaults have led to virtual eradication of ROSCAs in rural Tanzania. The reasons 
for the failure and disappearance of ROSCAs appear under-researched in 
comparison to reports about their widespread existence. Still, there are a number 
of reasons which account for the unusually high stability of ROSCAs, the relative 
security of funds within the association and the commitment of its members:
ROSCAs are characterised by entry restrictions. Membership is exclusive for a 
group of 'insiders' who may be friends, colleagues, neighbours or any other
1 See Nayar (1990) on examples from India and Thomas (1991) on South Africa. Such 
institutionalised schemes could vary in character from philanthropic projects run by the 
‘community responsibility’ departments of concerned commercial banks to profit-oriented, 
legitimate schemes to embodiments of rogue genius. In the latter case, comparisons with Mafia- 
style enrichment or with fraudulent pyramid schemes are seem plausible.
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socially related group. ’Outsiders' are in some cases considered, provided they are 
introduced and their payments initially guaranteed by an 'insider'. Social rather 
than economic criteria dominate the evaluation process of potential new members, 
although both may be correlated. The 'collateral' provided is the social status, the 
individual's standing within the group, the mutual dependence of the 'community'. 
The permanent screening during the period of rotation uses the same device. Some 
societies may actually have access to legal procedures through which they can 
enforce the payment of arrears. This possibility, however, is rather the exception 
and found only with relatively large associations which keep accurate records of 
their payments. However, both Nayar (1990) and Thomas (1991) report the use of 
the legal system for enforcing repayment to informal financial institutions. Such 
liabilities were, however, masked as debt to private individuals or non-financial 
firms.
The use of social collateral is more characteristic of ROSCAs. The type of social 
'enforcement' they use varies significantly. For some small, closely-knit clubs - 
characterised by the emphasis on their social function - the loss of friendship, 
company and trust may suffice to make members comply. It should not be 
forgotten that in many localities where ROSCAs operate, economic transactions in 
general are highly personalised. Hence the loss of friendship may entail severe 
economic loss, making economic exchange more cumbersome and endangering 
the network of mutual solidarity.
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Other types of ROSCAs, ie more economically oriented ones like the third model, 
use legal or illegal methods of appropriation, or repossession and personal threats 
to substantiate the demand for paying up arrears. This may take the form of having 
members 'roughed up somewhat' (Thomas 1991, p296). The prerequisite, 
however, remains the existence of direct social relationships between members, ie 
lenders and borrowers. Obviously, the 'micro-threats' available to micro- 
intermediaries are unthinkable for commercial banks.
Defaults do still occur and are sometimes forgiven. These cases are often 
associated with extreme financial distress of a member, in which case the ROSCA 
members may agree to let the defaulter off, though this creates an obligation for 
reciprocity should need arise. Alternatively, the departure of a member from the 
social environment in which the association was arranged may free him/her from 
further obligation.
Early attempts to understand ROSCAs
ROSCAs first attracted the attention of academic research in the 1960s. Geertz 
(1962) and Ardener (1964) were occupied with documenting the existence of 
ROSCAs over a wide spectrum of societies and countries, and with working out 
the similarities between the institutions they found. Naturally, questions of 
appropriately defining ROSCAs were on their agenda, as was the attempt to 
conceptualise the phenomenon in the context of contemporary social science.
2 One might consider a member of a ROSCA organised at the workplace who shifts employment, 
or an entrepreneur whose commercial success brings about new opportunities for access to credit.
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Though they make some way towards locating ROSCAs in society and its 
developmental processes, they do not provide an analysis of the institutions itself. 
Their preoccupation with the credit groups remains largely descriptive, they take 
the view of the intrigued outsider who tries to make sense of the impenetrable 
object he or she observes.
Geertz (1962) describes in detail the different forms of ROSCAs in Asia and 
Africa. Only the last few pages are devoted to an assessment of this institution. He 
starts with a comparison between cultural change on one side and Israeli 
immigration on the other: immigrants from Yemen, Iran and North Africa are 
characterised by the 'customary family and kinship ties, authority relations, and 
religious views' (p. 259). Still they succeeded in adapting to the 'rational' Israeli 
society 'through the mediation of the agri-cultural cooperative' (ibid.). This 
institution 'may thus be seen as an "intermediate" institution which links 
traditional motivations to modem functions, serving at the same time to transform 
those motivations toward a more rationalistic basis' (p. 259-60). The ROSCA is 
argued to be a similar Trojan horse: it is able 'to organise traditional relationships 
in such a way that they are slowly but steadily transformed into non-traditional 
ones, as an institution whose functional significance is primarily to facilitate social 
and cultural change in respect to economic problems and processes' (p. 260-1).
He concluded that ROSCAs are an institution belonging to the 'middle rung' of 
development, in both economic and anthropological terms. Hence, ROSCAs are
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involved with the 'shift from traditionalistic agrarian society to an increasingly 
fluid commercial one' while, at the same time, they also provide an 'educational 
mechanism in terms of which peasants learn to be traders, not merely in the 
narrow occupational sense, but in the broad cultural sense' (p.260). Eventually, he 
predicts, ROSCAs will be replaced 'by banks, cooperatives and other 
economically more rational types of credit institutions' (p.263).
Ardener (1964) attacks Geertz on two fronts. First, she refutes his definition of 
ROSCAs, and second, she criticises his concept of ROSCAs as a 'middle rung' 
institution. Having supplanted Geertz's definition of the ROSCA, Ardener’s is still 
accepted as the standard in relevant literature (Thomas 1991). She defines 
ROSCAs as 'an association formed upon a core of participants who agree to make 
regular contributions to a fund which is given, in whole or in part, to each 
contributor in rotation' (p. 201). Around the basic concept of fixed contribution 
and rotation, she agrees that another attribute is common to all these institutions: 
they combine social and economic functions which are valued by their members. 
The mix of these functions varies, and may change over time, but these functions 
are always mutually dependent. Further, she acknowledges that there are group 
organisations which exist to furnish their members with mutual credit, yet they do 
not show a strict pattern of rotation.
Responding to the 'middle rung', Ardener finds Geertz’s analysis misguided in that 
it argued that ROSCAs appeared as a consequence of the shift from
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'traditionalistic agrarian society' to a commercial one. Instead she describes 
ROSCAs as a reason for, not the result of, such a shift. She strongly argues this 
point, but cannot avert the impression that she misunderstood Geertz: he found a 
shift between developmental stages and ROSCAs to be mutually supportive, not 
mono-causally related. Hence he might not contradict Ardener's understanding, 
that ROSCAs are one of the reasons why societies do develop and transform. 
However, she does make a valid point in posing the question about the non­
existence of ROSCAs in some monetarised, underdeveloped societies (ie middle 
rung societies). Apparently, some societies do produce ROSCAs at a specific 
stage in their development while others do not. She correctly points out that a 
mono-causal relationship between certain stages in development and ROSCAs can 
not be accepted. While the middle rung could possibly be a necessary condition 
for the formation of ROSCAs, it certainly is not a sufficient one.
Bouman (1976, 1977,1990), Adams (1984,1985), Braverman and Guasch (1986), 
Nayar 1973), Seibel and Shrestha (1988) are ardent advocates of informal finance, 
including ROSCAs. These and others deny vehemently that ROSCAs are a 
backward 'middle rung', a mere episode in the succession of stages in the 
development of economic structures and cultural values. They point out that 
informal finance is fully compatible with rational, modem decision-making and 
has an important role to play in economic development. Unfortunately, their work 
offers much anecdote and little detailed analysis. Nayar (1986) outlines the history 
and development of ROSCAs in India, called chit funds there. In opposition to the
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description of Geertz and Ardener, he covers ROSCAs which are not located in 
deprived, underdeveloped communities, which do not conform to the 'middle 
rung' status. He offers a more detailed analysis of costs and efficiency than in 
previous reports. Nayar also includes modernised versions of ROSCAs which 
could not properly be counted as informal finance. Broadly, his categorisation of 
ROSCAs mirrors the three standard types developed above.
The South African anthropologist Thomas (1991) shows that all three types of 
ROSCAs exist in South Africa. He traces the earliest references of ROSCAs to the 
early 1930 when stokvels - the term used in South Africa for solidaristic savings 
and credit institutions - were reported in ‘slumyards* in Johannesburg. Other 
reports followed in the 1940s, but little work has been done since. Thomas asserts 
that 'apart from the early publications of Ardener (1964) and Geertz (1962), 
relatively little information can be found on [ROSCAs], even in the international 
literature’ (p. 290).
His work, concentrating on the wider Cape Peninsula, illustrates that ROSCAs, 
and notably the more complex ones, exist for reasons other than institutional 
underdevelopment. The social component is shown to be strong, if not dominant. 
One of his respondents felt strong enough about it to state that a 'stokvel is like 
religion - it takes commitment and cooperation' (p. 295). In South Africa, stokvels 
are strongly associated with opportunities for a 'party'. Stokvels may, indeed, have 
originated from tea-party groups which assumed a financial functions as a clear
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subordinate to the partying rationale of the group. 'Social reasons for membership 
of a [ROSCA] abound, and are clearly intertwined with pecuniary interest. Not 
only does membership help establish friendship and neighbourhood ties, but it 
often brings with it the prospect of regular parties (Thomas, 1991, p. 302). 
Thomas also points to the 'importance of mutual trustworthiness and personal 
friendship as membership qualifications' (p. 293).
Thomas does not describe exactly how 'social reasons' and pecuniary interest' are 
intertwined. Though he informs his readers about the doubling of the ROSCA's 
functions, his short survey does not convey an inside understanding of the 
rationale of ROSCAs, nor of the conditions for their existence and stability. His 
colleague Preston-Whyte (1991) goes some way to fill that gap. Her account of 
petty trading in Natal illustrates the social environment and economic motivation 
of female craft traders who, among other things, participate in ROSCAs. She finds 
ROSCAs constitute only one of many ways through which informal traders 
establish and maintain social links, networks and a degree of stability and security 
in an otherwise volatile environment. Though it remains important to facilitate 
savings and credit channels, the financial function could be described as 
subordinate to the cartel-building one. Unfortunately, Preston-Whyte's research 
notes ROSCAs only on the sidelines, and remains more narrowly focused on other 
questions.
92
Modelling ROSCAs and not avoiding the pitfall
Rigorous economic analysis of ROSCAs remains the exemption. I have given an 
overview of the discovery and exploration of ROSCAs by social scientists, and 
their subsequent categorisation by economists. The work by economists on 
ROSCAs is dominantly descriptive, and sometimes carried by an explicit desire to 
introduce informal finance to the acceptable society of developmental financial 
institutions. ROSCAs themselves remained, unfortunately, the great unknown at 
the centre of this argument: repelled or admired, treated with respect or curiosity, 
located geographically, demographically and socially, subsequently uprooted and 
redefined, yet never understood.
An article by Callier (1990) constitutes the starting point of the more rigorous 
approach in the economic analysis of ROSCAs. He provides a rather short 
exposition of ROSCAs, pointing to the benefit they generate over autarky. The 
waiting time - time an individual saves for some specified amount before he or she 
can buy a 'lumpy expenditure'-good - is greatly reduced. The main thrust of 
Callier's argument is, however, that financial fragmentation is the very reason why 
ROSCAs exist, hence financial liberalisation is a more efficient remedy than 
pooling savings and loans. He finds that the ROSCA 'loses its raison d'etre when 
capital market segmentation vanishes as a result of market integration: access to 
credit at the prevailing market rate solves the problem of lumpy expenditures' (p. 
275). If the 'collective action' nature of the ROSCA stretched beyond the provision
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of saving and credit facilitates, as Callier has also argued, one is led to conclude 
that they cannot be as penetrable by a market rationale as the last quote implies.
Furthermore, the view that ROSCAs lose their raison d'etre with market 
integration implies a somewhat optimistic view of liberalised financial 
institutions' ability to serve all those who are presently members of ROSCAs. It 
has been shown that credit rationing may occur not only in fragmented financial 
markets like those of developing countries but also in integrated ones (Duca and 
Rosenthal, 1993).
Besley et al (1993) provide the most comprehensive economic analysis of 
ROSCAs to date. They develop a formal model of ROSCAs for examining the 
potential private gain from participation and compare different types of ROSCAs 
with differing ‘rules’ for the allocation of the rotating credit ‘pot’.3 However, they 
also assume a world without uncertainty, reducing the meaningfulness of their 
model. In reality, the solidaristic nature of ROSCAs and other informal credit 
arrangements provides a network through which members manage risk, and this is 
one of the most important motivations for operating informal financial institutions 
(Platteau and Abraham, 1987; Salas et al, 1991). This function cannot be
3 ROSCAs are perhaps too diverse to capture all structures in few formal models. However, 
Besley et al follow a categorisation adopted elsewhere (Nayar, 1986). In random ROSCAs the 
receipt of the ‘pot’ is determined by chance. In discount ROSCAs, there is an explicit discount for 
early distributions. In a bidding ROSCAs, members bid for the receipt o f the pot, offering cuts on 
the net pay-out. Typically, discounts are accumulated in a kitty for communal use.
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understood in a model where a priori there is no uncertainty, no individual risk 
and hence no demand for insurance.
Examining random ROSCAs, Besley et al argue that “risk aversion is not an issue 
here, since from each individual's ex ante viewpoint, the random ROSCA does as 
well as autarky in every state of the world, and strictly better in all but one” (p.
796). However, they conclude this point by stating that “the individual receiving 
the pot at the final meeting date has been made strictly worse off (ex post) by 
joining the random ROSCA” (p. 797). Risk aversion seems an issue here, as it is 
always a measure of the divergence between the expected outcome and an 
individual's disutility derived from the likelihood of adverse ex post outcomes. 
Hence, Besley et al err when they dismiss risk aversion on the basis of ex ante, 
and faulty, statements. The individual receiving the pot at the final meeting, if risk 
averse, would have had a good reason not to join the ROSCA in the first place. If 
we accept the proposition that a ROSCA has to be neutral, if not attractive to all 
members (i.e. in all their allocational positions) from an ex post viewpoint, these 
findings can safely be ruled out as unrealistic - a longer rotation deters potential 
members and has been found to be counterproductive in fieldwork with 
solidaristic institutions (Thomas, 1991).
The attempt of Besley et al to outline the nature of the bidding ROSCA further 
illustrates the conceptual weakness of placing the model in a risk-free 
environment: in the absence of uncertainty individuals know their own future
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preferences perfectly well, including their inter-temporal preference as represented 
by the interest rate. Bidding, therefore, is meaningless, and can be organized at the 
beginning of the rotation. 'ROSCA members determine the order of receipt for the 
pot when the ROSCA is initially organized at time zero' (Besley et al, 1993, p.
797). In effect, Besley at al describe a discount, not a bidding ROSCA. While such 
a simplification may be necessary for modeling a complex institution like the 
ROSCA, it nonetheless inhibits the meaningful analysis of the economic rationale 
behind solidaristic intermediation.4
The insurance resulting from the solidaristic nature of ROSCAs is difficult to 
endogenize, due to the implicit nature of the contract. Neither are the obligations 
of the insurer (i.e. other ROSCA members) fixed nor the conditions under which 
they should apply, hence no fair premium can be calculated. Because insurance 
rests on the mutual obligation of ROSCA members, no insurance premium is 
actually paid, and value attached to insurance is not observable as a market rate. 
However, assuming risk-averse individuals, the implicit insurance contract 
embodied in the ROSCA is a valuable asset. Because of the obligations entailed 
when entering a mutual insurance arrangement, the implicit insurance contract is 
also costly. Similarly, the value of reputation which serves to enhance one's 
creditworthiness constitutes an economic asset. Its actual evaluation depends on
4 Considering the insurance element that is an important part of almost all informal financial 
institutions, these assumptions are reminiscent of an attempt to model insurance in a world without 
risk.
96
the individuals’ expectations, i.e. the perceived likelihood to seek future loans, and 
on personal values attached to social prestige.
Solidarity, which is the basis of the ROSCA, entails the acceptance of long-term 
commitments and entitlements. The net present value of these cannot be exactly 
determined, as their evaluation relies on private information and social 
relationships. However, solidarity incorporates social respectability, insurance, 
and some form of long-term investment; none of these is represented in the model 
developed by Besley et al. Platteau and Abraham (1987) provide an excellent 
account of insurance in the context of small group-based credit agreements. 
Although their survey data does not include groups that would fit the definition of 
a ROSCA as there is no fixed rotation, their analysis sheds light on the 
underpinnings of reciprocal credit. Their analysis is based on their survey of 
fishing communities in Kerala. Fishers participate in groups who guarantee 
mutual credit lines in case the daily catch falls short of requirements. As the catch 
is stochastic and unrelated, even relatively small groups may constitute 
sufficiently good insurers. They find that credit is essentially an insurance 
instrument, while 'the repayment of the loans is uncertain, and the repayment may 
even be conditional upon the decision of the debtor to stick or to break out of the 
broader relationship he has entered' (p.483). Commercial capital market 
evaluations are inappropriate as 'the price of credit is either formally zero, or is 
blurred in a way that renders its assessment especially difficult. The interest
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forsaken by the credit giver [...] can be construed as risk premia he is willing to 
incur to reduce risk ...' (ibid.).
Further, Besley et al assume implicitly that the exchange of resources and 
commitments between ROSCA members does not incur transactions costs. In 
many economic models, such costs are plausibly omitted as they may be 
negligible. While this view largely applies to cash transactions, those transactions 
involving credit are typically more complex and costly (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985). 
ROSCAs are time-intensive as most empirical accounts attest; members have to 
bear transaction costs in the form of regular meetings and other, social interaction 
necessitated by their financial interdependence (Hyuha et al, 1990). Arguably, the 
approach that views ROSCAs as a market where credit-constrained individuals 
trade financial services misses important elements of solidaristic institutions.
Summary: weaknesses in mainstream analysis o f ROSCAs 
In early research ROSCAs were treated as somewhat exotic institutions that 
existed in the (former) colonies as an expression of not then fully developed 
financial markets. Since the 1980s there is a strand in the literature which has set 
its aim at defending the ROSCA (and other informal financial institutions) as 
progressive and advantageous to credit-constrained individuals. Notably, the latter 
view was enforced by the fact that ROSCAs continue to contribute prominently to 
the financial markets in countries that have since made great progress in
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modernisation.5 In spite of this swing of the pendulum, some of the mysterium 
found in the exotic, 'weird' institution remains.
Recent research oriented towards the analysis of ROSCAs as economic rather than 
social institutions tends to ask different questions. These questions relate to 
ROSCA members as economic agents, their benefit, ie utility from attending such 
institutions, the incentive structure and the institutions' sustainability. However, 
the attempts to model the ROSCA amputate the social, 'solidarity' function that 
ROSCAs were found to possess in earlier research. Besley et al are aware that 
their analysis falls short of incorporating the insurance element. However, 
insurance is an important factor in ROSCAs, but it also entails that every member 
'underwrites' a policy for others. Insurance is intrinsically connected with 
solidarity, and ROSCAs cannot be properly understood without considering both. 
Similarly, personal connectedness can be enjoyed or loathed, the attendance of 
group meetings can be work or pleasure, but in any case social obligations affect 
the incentive structure and stability of ROSCAs.
Excluding any interpretation of connectedness, ie the core social characteristic of 
ROSCAs, the economic models must remain unsatisfactory as explanatory tools 
for economic agents' behaviour and institutions' development. They can hardly 
produce necessary conditions for ROSCAs' existence, but never sufficient ones.
5 ROSCAs exist in urban Taiwan, where they play a role in maintaining social relations which are 
the basis for a range of informal transactions, including credit. There is also a report o f ROSCAs 
run by IMF employees in Washington (Bouman, 1990, p. 164).
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Crucially, the causes of ROSCAs failures remain uncovered insofar as they relate 
not to an inefficient incentive structure but to the breakdown of solidarity or the 
inconvenience of connectedness. Based on a large survey in rural Tanzania, 
Hyuha et al (1990) find that 'lending in the informal markets overstresses 
interpersonal relationships' and a 'decline in moral values has led to increased 
defaults on loans' (p. 24-5). They report that ROSCAs had declined to 
insignificance in rural financial markets. Current theory appears unable to handle 
these conclusions.
In the foregoing survey of research on ROSCAs it was found that social 
connectedness made it a type of organisation that is not easily understood by 
economic analysis. Though there is a pronounced overlap with the problems of 
defining the firm within the parameters of economic theory (Coase, 1937), 
informal groups have received much less attention. ROSCAs are not merely 
economic units with the function of securing future income streams, but they are a 
form of social organisation which promotes a wider range of goals related to the 
personal connections of its members. Personal connections may at times have 
tangible economic returns, but just as likely they may be deemed desirable 
without possessing economic value. Solidarity has been construed as insurance, 
yet such simplification is doomed to remain incomplete. Solidarity does indeed 
provide insurance, but is a more complex system of obligations than could 
reasonably be founded on enforceable and specific contracts. Solidarity is always 
more far-reaching than a formal contractual arrangement can reasonably be, and it
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takes into consideration more circumstantial information than formal insurance 
would. While it is thus right that solidarity entails a measure of insurance, the 
reversal is not necessarily true.
The reasons for creating and running ROSCAs are therefore not identical with 
those that create demand for credit and insurance, which are purely economic. The 
wider-ranging powers of solidarity and personal relationships may be most 
valuable in underdeveloped economic circumstances with underdeveloped access 
to functioning markets. Some functions which are more traditionally associated 
with ROSCAs also have clearly social connotations and have to be considered. 
Members value friendship, togetherness and social functions - the ROSCA 
meetings have been cited by members as first-rate pretext for parties - 
independently of their tangible economic value.
There are therefore several separate possible raison d'etre for ROSCAs: Credit, 
insurance, solidarity and company are all reasons for the existence of ROSCAs, 
and often intermingle in one group. Yet, comparing different groups, their prime 
goal may well differ, but the prominence of ROSCAs in some parts of the 
literature, and the attractiveness of some of their characteristics to many micro­
credit proponents, may have diverted the attention away from the fact that all 
different components - credit, insurance, and company - must be incorporated in 
their analysis.
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3.2 History and Nature of Solidarity in Formal Credit Schemes
The group credit model has a strong appeal for policy-makers, aid officials and 
NGO volunteers because its proponents promise that it will make credit available 
on a self-financing basis to poor people who are normally beyond the reach of 
banking institutions. This claim rests on the assumption that transaction costs - as 
the sum of administrative costs and defaults - can be reduced. This is supposedly 
achieved by making borrowers perform screening and monitoring functions 
through their social connectedness, and overall defaults are lower because groups 
can select their members and enforce commitments more effectively than 
‘standard* lenders owing to their informal environment.
Co-operatives and Village Banks - earlier forms o f solidarity credit 
Group credit schemes are not as innovative as some participants may believe. 
Financial institutions aimed at poverty alleviation and empowerment, based on 
grassroots action and social cohesion, were invented by Friedrich Raiffeisen in 
Germany in the middle of last century. Early this century, the model gained 
popularity in North America and India under the term ‘credit union*. In several 
developed countries, including Germany and Canada, the credit unions established 
then are still part of the financial system (Von Pischke, 1991). However, credit 
unions are part of the co-operative movement; early credit unions in Germany not 
only provided savings and credit facilities, but traded in agricultural produce and 
farming implements. While the Raiffeisen Banken in Germany are now modem
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banks, many co-operatives in developing countries continue to combine financial 
and non-financial activities.
Co-operatives are a form of solidaristic economic organisation which is not only 
much older than joint liability credit schemes, but has also been researched much 
earlier than ROSCAs. All co-operatives are employee owned and managed 
enterprises; some are aimed at producing financial services for their members - 
credit unions - while others are involved in producing marketable products, 
offering employment and income to their members. Co-operatives rely on 
solidarity binding their members and are, in this regard, crucially different from 
employee-owned commercial firms. Co-operatives are also associated with self- 
help, grassroots community actions. The literature on co-operatives, and 
especially credit unions, can therefore provide some insights into the problem of 
solidarity in economic analysis.
'The critical factors for the success of co-operatives and other group enterprises' 
are discussed in an article by the same title by Harper (1992). The article is based 
on survey data covering 150 co-operative managers, staff of support organisations 
and others. The respondents were asked to answer questions relating to the 
desirable organisational structure of a co-op, diversity versus homogeneity of its 
members, similarity of their skills, diversity of the coop's functions, political 
affiliation, self-reliance and leadership structure. In a second part, they were asked 
to assign relative importance to these different questions.
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The most striking result is that these co-op experts hold similar views on only a 
few questions, but they also judge those questions less important to the co-op's 
success. On the other hand, the respondents’ opinions differ widely on those 
issues which they have judged to be of higher importance. Notably, the questions 
related to the solidarity in the group are judged important, but the survey does not 
produce coherent answers as to what the most successful course of action would 
be. There is a narrow majority for the statement that group members should be 
homogeneous, on another question a rather stronger majority favours that group 
members should possess different skills. Harper finds these demands 'at least to an 
extent incompatible' (p. 17). On the question of leadership, a majority of 47% 
favours stronger leadership with 36% for an emphasis on participation. There is 
also a majority of 58% for the argument that a 'group's objectives must go beyond 
income, and include social and community goals' (p. 18), and more than a third of 
all respondents consider this question most or second-most important. The results 
from this survey seem to convey the argument that solidarity plays an important 
part in promoting a group's enterprise, but that the measures for the promotion of 
solidarity are judged very differently. Harper suggests that the diverging answers 
and indecisive results in his survey illustrate that individual circumstances differ 
and require varied responses (p. 20), but it also demonstrates the point that 
connectedness and solidarity are neither easily defined or integrated into 
institutional design.
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Bogaert (1992) summarises the experience of rural co-operatives in India. He 
gives a positive evaluation of the developmental impact of group 
entrepreneurship, but stresses that 'maximization of profit is not the primary 
objective, rather, security, in the form of strengthened social bonds' (p. 38). 
Entrepreneurship, if suitable to a co-operative enterprise, is not 'elitist and 
selective' but 'a set of functions, roles and characteristics that can be and are 
shared [...] amongst individuals' (p. 38).
Guinnane et al (1993) emphasise in their analysis of German credit-co-operatives 
that the extent of group commitment is correlated to the income level of group 
members. Credit co-operatives with unlimited liability, where members commit 
all their wealth to the solidarity group, are dominant in rural and poor areas, while 
more affluent urban groups have introduced some form of liability limitation. 
Their data suggest that the costs of solidarity, especially those related to joint 
liability, are positively related to income and wealth.
More recently, village banks have entered the debate following the successes of 
FINCA in Costa Rica. In the village bank model, a lender delivers credit to large 
groups which are based on local ‘communities’. Confusingly, a ‘village bank’ is 
one local group of borrowers and not their lender. Hence, NGOs lending 
according to the village bank model will establish a larger number of village 
banks, each located in different villages or localities, and will have separate 
lending relationships with each of them (Hatch, 1989).
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Village banks are based on larger solidarity groups, comprising between 20 and 30 
borrowers. As in group credit schemes, the village bank members select each 
other for membership and guarantee each others’ repayment. In this model, 
members set out rules stating entitlements and commitments in a more formal 
manner than smaller solidarity groups. Credit disbursals are made to all members 
of a specific village bank at once: hence all 20 to 30 members receive their loan 
on the same day and all are required to make repayments following the same 
schedule, keeping administration relatively simple. Typically, both disbursals and 
repayments are made on a cash basis.
The village bank concept is most prominent in Latin America and has not yet 
found many followers in Africa (Holt, 1994; Nelson et al, 1996). However, the 
concept was adapted by World Relief, an American NGO, for its rural lending 
programmes in Mozambique. There, it seems to operate with encouraging success 
although viability is still a distant goal. The relatively simple administrative 
structure of village banks, and the simplicity of credit disbursal and repayments in 
bulk, has led to significantly lower lending costs than experienced by comparable 
Grameen-type schemes. While the repayment experience is generally encouraging, 
natural disaster adversely affected it. During floods in early 1996, the on-time 
repayment rate fell from previous 100% to 62%, but recovered to 88% within a 
few months (de Vletter, 1996). However, it could be argued that the village bank 
model tends to be at greater risk from default than Grameen-type institutions as
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larger groups lead to looser solidarity and simultaneous loan disbursal removes 
the incentive of those who wait for their loan to heckle the others to repay.
The village bank model is flexible; many NGOs implementing such schemes 
allow their different village banks to define their own rules for repayment, credit 
utilisation, penalties for late payment and other regulated activities. The internal 
democracy is, more or less rigidly, circumscribed by the minimal requirements of 
the implementing NGO and its request for disciplinary procedures and a level of 
uniformity between its various village banks. One development, however, is 
particularly notable: some NGOs have, influenced by the example of Grameen 
Bank, introduced a subdivision of their village banks into smaller groups of five to 
seven borrowers, who guarantee their loans mutually. In this case, liability is 
transferred from the village bank to the group. However, in difference to the group 
credit model, the village bank remains liable should an entire credit group default. 
However, with the subdivision of liability, the differences to the group credit 
model are gradually eroded.
Group Credit Schemes - in the footsteps o f Grameen Bank 
Above I have mentioned the current vogue for formal, mostly developmental, 
financial institutions to provide credit with joint liability. Arguably, the Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh was the trend setter; recent analysis finds that it 'stands out as 
the most significant peer group lending programme in the world' (Berenbach and 
Guzman, 1994, p. 127). Because of the importance of this type of institution as a
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role model for ‘banking with the poor’, this study will concentrate on the group 
credit approach and not on credit unions or the village bank model.
The Grameen Bank grew out of a local lending project that was started in 1976 by 
Muhammad Yunus, an economist at Chittagong University. In 1983, Grameen 
was registered as an independent bank. Originally, 60% of the capital was held by 
the government and the remainder by the borrowers who have since acquired the 
majority. Yearly disbursals of loans approach US$100 million and more than 
US$25 million has been saved by members in deposits and shares. There are now 
over 800.000 borrowers and loan size averages about US$70.
Grameen lending technology centres on groups of five borrowers who are jointly 
responsible for the repayment. Before they are eligible for a loan, all five members 
must undergo training to become familiar with the working regulation of Grameen 
Bank. The first disbursement provides loans for the two poorest members of each 
group. Only when those loans have been fully repaid does Grameen release the 
next disbursement for two other members of this group, and so on. Ten groups are 
then assembled in a ‘centre’ in order to allow the visiting loan officer to address 
50 members at once. Meetings of each group are held weekly. The social element 
in group activities is strong: members are required to learn the Grameen song and 
sing it together and they are lectured about a range of support-worthy causes and 
rules of conduct, the sixteen promises (Chandler and Fuglesang, 1986).
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The target group of the Grameen Bank is poor rural people, with an emphasis on 
women. No collateral other than group participation is required. In order to qualify 
as a member - one could also say participant, client or shareholder - each 
individual has to acquire one share of Grameen. In the process of expansion, 
Grameen became a customer-owned bank. Most members are female, and many 
are virtually landless (Grameen Dialogue, various issues). Credit is given almost 
exclusively for income-generating purposes, and the highest legally achievable 
nominal interest rate is charged. It is an inherent part of the loan programme that 
members are required to accumulate savings which are automatically deducted 
from their loans. In effect, this raises the real interest charge. Repayment rates are 
high, default lies at 2% as opposed to 90% in the commercial banking sector in 
Bangladesh (Braverman and Guasch, 1989). Grameen has been argued to be the 
least subsidised bank in Bangladesh (Manuel, 1993). Although it is widely argued 
to be one of the most successful institutions providing credit to poor people in the 
world, the level of subsidisation is difficult to compare as Grameen has access to 
concessional lending from foreign sources.
BancoSol (Solidarity Bank) in Bolivia is probably the most established imitation 
of the Grameen Bank model. It employs a similar strategy, using credit groups 
with between four and ten members. As in Bangladesh, loans are meant for 
starting an income-generating enterprise, and the institution has been hailed for 
helping poor hawkers and urban unemployed to withstand the pressure of recent 
structural adjustment and accompanying reductions in state expenditure.
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BancoSol's history leads back to the establishment of Prodem - a micro-lending 
NGO - in Bolivia in 1986 as a joint venture between ACCION International (an 
American NGO) and the Bolivian private sector. Following initial successes, it 
was quickly felt that prospective expansion was restricted by the regulation 
governing non-bank entities in Bolivia. Only banks are licensed to accept deposits 
which are seen not only as a service to customers but also as cheap and reliable 
source of funds. Hence Prodem was transformed into a commercial bank; 
BancoSol opened for business in 1992. It was projected to become profitable 
within the first few years of operation (Glosser 1994), but in fact experienced 
problems due to cost overruns.
The group lending model developed and practised by the Grameen Bank has 
become the subject of policy-makers’ envy and academics’ debate. Yunus 
promotes the idea in various developing countries, including South Africa, and 
has found numerous imitators. In South Africa, one of the targeted institutions was 
the National Stokvel Association of South Africa, the umbrella organisation of 
local ROSCAs. It was hoped that the Association may build on the strength of 
local stokvels (ROSCAs), unlike the Grameen Bank and BancoSol, who had 
chosen to develop their grassroots groups from scratch. The experience with 
stokvels was disappointing. There are, however, still several organisations in 
South Africa running Grameen-type group credit schemes. Two of them - the Get 
Ahead Foundation and the Small Enterprise Foundation - are analysed in greater 
detail below.
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ROSCAs and solidarity credit groups in formal lending schemes 
Group credit schemes are based on groups which are conceptually related to 
ROSCAs. Nayar (1986) demonstrates the continuum from informal ROSCAs to 
formal joint liability credit institutions. He follows up the development of Chit 
Funds from ROSCAs in their most basic form to more elaborate institutions which 
are run by a headman. Some chitties are rather large with up to 3500 members, 
and the operation assumes a formalised character. However, a further stage of 
development saw the proliferation of institutional foremen, often commercial 
banks. Specialised chit fund companies are the dominant force since the 1970s and 
form part of the financial system in India. The Chit Funds Act (1982) passed by 
the Indian Parliament guarantees their position as a non-bank financial company 
and regulates their business. Chit funds are, unlike most joint liability schemes, 
profit-oriented private sector enterprises. They are characterised by rotation and 
time-bound operation. The character of solidarity has changed profoundly and 
Nayar stresses the subsequent commercialisation, though no detailed social study 
is available on the subject.
While the literature is generally positive about the possibility that group lending 
may make credit available to ‘unbankable’ people, it is rarely mentioned that 
borrowers are faced with real costs when acquiring financial services through 
membership in a group. In a typical way, de Aghion (1995) finds that 'contracts 
under joint responsibility can induce peer monitoring among participant
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borrowers. These contracts can potentially dominate standard (bilateral) contracts 
to the extent that they allow the bank to take advantage of both lower monitoring 
costs and social sanction (among peer borrowers) in order to elicit higher debt- 
repayments from each group member' (p. 12). However, running groups, 
monitoring each other and imposing sanctions in case of default are costly, and 
there is time-consuming 'solidarity business'. The shift of transaction costs from 
lender to borrower could be Pareto efficient6 and equitable if the savings of 
lenders are greater than the extra costs of borrowers, and if the savings of lenders 
are shared with borrowers so as to compensate them for their effort. This 
compensation is usually understood as the welfare effect stemming from the 
provision of credit in the presence of credit rationing.
It is also generally assumed that monitoring and screening by mutually liable 
borrowers reduces total transaction costs incurred by the lenders, but that lending 
to groups would not create costs that did not exist when lending to individuals. 
However, a group lender has to perform functions that are not generally found 
with standard bilateral contracts: groups have to be identified or formed, criteria 
have to be developed for the identification of credit-worthy groups, and 
appropriate support structures have to be established. The accompanying costs 
may well be outweighed by the savings group credit schemes can achieve in other 
fields (eg significant reductions of defaults), but the problem of costs which are
6 Pareto efficiency seeks to measure the efficiency of resource allocation in welfare terms. ‘[A] 
situation is said to be Pareto optimal if there is no feasible alternative that makes everybody better 
o ff  (Feldman, 1991, p. 715).
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specific to joint liability lending has not yet been addressed by the appropriate 
literature.
Policy-makers and institutional lenders need to know, for example, whether these 
costs are likely to change during the rotation of credit (ie before all members have 
repaid), whether peer monitoring is stable and how it develops over time. Joint 
liability credit is, from the perspective of the institutional lender, enforced by 
linking the repayment of present loans to access to future credit. It remains an 
open question whether this linkage provides an active threat, and whether future 
access to credit is an active incentive. The credibility of the threat is important to 
determine the effectiveness of linking repayment to future access. The higher the 
costs of alternative sources of credit, and the higher the dependence on credit, the 
stronger appears the threat of ‘red-lining’ defaulters.
Despite the similarity, group credit schemes are different from ROSCAs. Social 
interaction within the group is likely to be different, as the agenda is determined 
by the lender. Meetings take place not merely by chance, or through everyday 
interaction, but times are agreed and a formal discipline established. In fact, many 
group lenders penalise group members who arrive late for meetings; such 
practices owe more to the discipline of banking institutions than to rural 
communities.
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Solidarity Groups and Economic Analysis
Following the critique of mainstream analysis of ROSCAs, I have argued that the 
theory available on institutional credit with joint liability does not understand why 
groups are superior to rational individuals. Why are creditworthy groups more 
reliable than their individuals? What difference is there between a random 
grouping of unrelated people and a credit-worthy group? Institutional lenders need 
not only find the answer theoretically but each time a group applies for credit. 
Screening for 'group solidarity' may not be less costly than screening in a bilateral 
context. Mainstream economic texts typically evade the problem by assuming that 
‘connectedness’ exists, and that a group lender knows this.
However, most institutional lenders do not find ready-made, credit-worthy groups 
in their chosen area of operation, hence they do not face the problem of selecting 
the best borrowers. In fact, they are usually involved in setting up groups for the 
purpose of lending to them, and possibly achieving other developmental goals 
through them. This involves the institution in a timely process during which it will 
seek to create, artificially, the connectedness that ROSCAs possess. Arguably, the 
provision of access to credit could be enough for poor people to take this task onto 
themselves. In practice, this is rarely observed, and the lender usually gets 
involved in 'grassroots' work with the aim of promoting credit groups. Institutions 
with the intention to lend to grassroots-groups find a productive asset missing that 
is crucial to the working of their lending model.
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These costs can most easily be understood with the concept of 'social capital' that 
describes trust and connectedness as a productive asset. 'Physical capital is wholly 
tangible, being embodied in observable form; human capital is less tangible, being 
embodied in the skills and knowledge acquired by an individual; social capital is 
even less tangible, for it is embodied in the relations among persons' (Coleman, 
1990, p. 304). Like other forms of capital, social capital is found to 'facilitate 
productive activity' (ibid.). Those who own social capital usually refer to it by 
other names, such as friendship, trust, expectation.
With regard to ROSCAs and credit groups, social capital encompasses internal 
rules of conduct, a set of obligations and expectations among group members, all 
of which facilitate the production of valuable services, both credit and insurance. 
These obligations and expectations are built up over time at some positive cost. A 
credit group is an intentional organisation and as such it is 'the direct result of 
investment by actors who have the aim of receiving a return on their investment' 
(Coleman, 1990, p. 313). Obligations are not always fungible, so in a group 
members may have obligations outstanding to each other which do not cancel out. 
Social capital, unlike physical but similar to human capital, is not easily 
transferable or marketable. It relies on the persons in whose relationships it is 
vested and on the stability of their social relation.
Social capital can promote Pareto efficient exchange. One agent can create an 
obligation by giving a service to some other person when the costs are perceived
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to be low, and the benefit large to the other person. The favour can be repaid when 
relative 'prices' have changed, due to personal reasons. The insurance against 
distress built into solidarity structures in poor communities demonstrates this 
mechanism.
Solidarity and connectedness can amply be described as social capital. As with 
any form of capital, it needs to be accumulated with sacrifices in present 
consumption. Creating social capital is costly with tangible economic expenses. 
Social capital, in turn, is expected to yield returns. It is this complex which is 
conspicuously absent from the literature on ROSCAs and group credit schemes. 
The real resource costs of group connectedness - of creating it, identifying it and 
maintaining it - are excluded from the consideration of its usefulness, and also 
from the data that the literature mostly presents: loan repayment rates may be 
high, but little is told about the operating costs of highly subsidised institutions 
like the Grameen Bank. In the absence of collateral and applicable, sufficiently 
efficient normal banking technology, social capital is among the necessary 
conditions for the success of group-based lending.
In a modem world, relationships play little role in the procurement of goods and 
services. People may prefer to use credit without the necessity to socialise with 
their peers and impress their lender about their social attitudes. Friendship, social 
life and economic functions would be relegated to different institutions, such as 
banks, employers, friends, family and so on. In a less than fully ideal world,
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relationships are important, as they are a requirement in an environment 
characterised by weak or lacking institutions and markets. Solidarity is not a 
virtue more easily enjoyed by poor people.
The conditions for successful joint liability schemes may well be met in 
appropriate circumstances. Yet the sufficient conditions are more stringent than 
the necessary ones which are borne out by the literature. The necessity to build 
social capital and to provide a subjective return on it indicates the gap that exists 
between necessary and sufficient conditions.
Economists who only recently developed a taste for research into solidaristic 
institutions have focused on the internal incentive structures and returns for 
groups' members. They have done so from a strictly individualistic perspective. 
Trust and solidarity - characteristics that earlier research had found so important to 
ROSCAs - were essentially assumed away, or presumably covered in such 
assumptions as monitoring costs and asymmetric information. An independent 
understanding of the role of solidarity was, however, ruled out by this course of 
action.
In the following section, a broad survey of group credit institutions of various 
designs in South Africa will give evidence on the problem of maintaining 
solidarity while controlling costs. In chapter 4 I will develop fully the critique of 
solidarity, arguing that solidarity is in fact a jointly produced asset and not a by-
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product. I will argue that there is a possible solution, leading to a hypothesis: 
Connectedness of borrowers is not a pre-existing feature of quaint rural settings, 
but an asset that needs to be created and maintained for successful solidarity 
lending. To this end, borrowers and lenders face non-tangible contributions which 
are substantial, and decisive for success. Further, credit is always more expensive 
in groups than it would be were markets accessible.
3.3 Group Credit in South Africa
The current paradigm has conveyed the argument that innovative financial 
institutions can transcend the frontier of conventional banking if they build their 
lending technology around solidaristic groups; and a closer inspection found this 
claim to be doubtful. The empirical evidence from South Africa substantiates 
these reservations. Recent experience from South Africa generally confirms that a 
gap exists between the conclusion of recent literature and the results of NGOs’ 
involvement in the micro-loan sector.
Micro-enterprise lenders in South Africa show that group credit is no panacea for 
entrepreneurial credit. The accumulation of discouraging experience is no 
coincidence; in all cases, group credit did not work as prescribed in the literature 
for a number of reasons. The implicit assumptions of the group credit literature do
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not generally hold for the urban poor, for semi-industrial entrepreneurs, in South 
Africa’s townships:7
1 - communitarian solidarity
In South African townships, people are geographically mobile but have generally 
a low attachment to specific neighbourhoods. Movements between townships, 
homelands and other areas are frequent. Some of the anonymity of cities is 
present. These neighbourhoods do not facilitate solidarity, trust and long-term 
relationships in the same way as do rural communities. Even in rural areas, 
geographical mobility is often high. Labour policy of the last decades has enforced 
a migrant labour system, and both male labourers and dependants often have a 
foothold in both village and city. 'Disruptions of social organisation and of social 
relations can be highly destructive to social capital' (Coleman, 1990, p. 320), an 
effect that climaxes under violence as experienced frequently in South African 
townships. Dependence from the joint good - credit provision, acceptability in the 
group or community - is weak and unpredictable as individuals pursue multiple 
opportunities, both in terms of income-generating opportunities and geographical 
location. Entrepreneurial activity often constitutes a survivalist strategy that is 
abandoned as soon as more attractive opportunities arise; survivalists often engage
7 This information draws on interviews with Gunda Bernhard of the Informal Business Training 
Trust, Christine Clover of the Group Credit Foundation, Hilmar Thomas, an anthropologist 
working on a health project in the Cape Flats, Don Shay of the Triple Tmst Organisation, Kwedie 
Mkalipi of the Credit Union League of South Africa and informal business people, mainly taxi- 
drivers and hawkers, in Johannesburg and Cape Town during 1994 and 1995.
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in petty trading (Preston-Whyte, 1991). The frequent breakdown of solidarity 
groups seems unavoidable in these circumstances
2 - short term finance needs
Authors often assume that informal sector firms 'commonly require small amounts 
of short-term funds' (World Bank, 1989, p. 113). South African urban 
entrepreneurs do not agree. In townships, the nature of business differs 
dramatically from the countryside. Entrepreneurial loans are often given for the 
purchase of a capital good, such as a sewing machine, or welding equipment. The 
life span of these goods is long, and the entrepreneur may need long to repay a 
loan on them. Generally, neither ROSCAs nor group credit schemes rotate for 
longer than a year; and practitioners found their stability compromised by rotation
o
times exceeding six months in urban South Africa. Hence the purchase of crucial 
capital equipment requires loan arrangements for which a ROSCA/stokvel or 
group credit scheme is quite inappropriate. On the other hand, there is an adverse 
selection problem. Small, short-term loans are mostly appropriate for petty traders 
(hawkers); their initial stock could be purchased with the meagre proceeds of the 
first credit round of a group credit scheme.9 Yet, borrowers whose main 
investment is in stock are highly mobile and may find alternative sources of 
funding, especially supplier credit. They are therefore less committed to a long-
8 This information was volunteered during interviews with managing directors of the Group 
Credit Company and Rural Finance Facility.
9 Information on the appropriateness of loan sizes and repayment terms for various kinds of 
entrepreneurial activities was collected during a series of interviews in townships and in informal 
conversation with fruit, clothing, and cosmetics hawkers in Cape Town and Johannesburg city 
centres.
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term relationship with a lender than those entrepreneurs who invest in productive 
assets.
3 - co-operation as stable equilibrium
Stable peer groups in urban areas are often comprised of work colleagues in 
formal sector employment. Especially peer groups among teachers and support 
staff at formal sector institutions are known to have implemented many stokvels 
and credit unions. Unlike entrepreneurs, members of these groups are not in 
economic competition with each other. They also have secure income and basic 
social security, so that they can more easily predict their regular savings and 
repayment capacity. Entrepreneurial peer groups are formed by the colleagues 
who are also competitors, eg taxi-drivers, hawkers. Yet, in an environment 
characterised by rough competition and a survivalist attitude, there appears to be 
little incentive for co-operative help. Rather, the formation of 'gangs' could be the 
outcome as has happened to the taxi industry (Bank, 1991).
'Peer pressure' in South Africa has a real risk of translating into physical, and 
criminal, violence. Numerous social workers testify their experience on this point. 
Violence, unlike solidarity, does not aid the functioning of financial 
intermediation, or entrepreneurial activities. On the contrary, violence is often 
cited as one of the major obstacles to economic development of the townships. 
Any policy that enhances the potential for violence, therefore, has to be judged 
counter-productive.
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The experience of two group lenders illustrates the structural dilemma between the 
need to establish solidarity and the pressure on costs. These institutions that have 
taken diametrically opposed strategies are compared; neither has successfully 
implemented a group lending scheme. The viable Credit Unions are then argued to 
have steered clear of trouble by avoiding, by and large, involvement with 
unemployed borrowers. Finally, a supposedly successful lender - the Get Ahead 
Foundation - is then analysed and found to be much less efficient than is claimed.
The Group Credit Company10
On the initiative of the Urban Foundation, the Group Credit Company was set up 
in 1988 in Cape Town to provide loans to low-income groups. In accordance with 
its name, a Grameen-type lending technology was applied. Activities concentrated 
on the urban and semi-urban communities on the Cape Peninsula. After a year or 
so of satisfactory performance during which all original funding had been 
'utilised', 'the Group Credit Company decided during 1990 on a growth strategy 
with the objective to increase its lending capability to R20 million' (Development 
Bank of Southern Africa 1991, p. 1). However, the Group Credit Company soon 
experienced severe problems with the loan groups. First, the administration of 
group credit worked out to be much more costly than was originally budgeted, and 
the Group Credit Company received consultative help from the Development
10 Much of this information was provided by the managing director of the Group Credit Company, 
Christine Clover, during an interview in September 1994. Additional insights stem from informal 
discussions with staff of the Development Bank of Southern Africa at various times between 1994 
and 1997.
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Bank of Southern Africa. Its report argued that specific attention needs to be given 
to 'the ratio of loan officers to loan groups taking into consideration the cost 
associated with loan officers’ income generated through loans' (Development 
Bank of Southern Africa 1991, p. 3). Simultaneously, the recovery of loans 
worsened. Apparently, the credibility of the Group Credit Company's promise of 
future loans diminished. Groups found it more advantageous to default than to 
maintain a good credit record in the hope of future credit that may never 
materialise. In this situation, the simultaneous increase in costs and decrease in 
loan recoveries brought the Group Credit Company close to failure.
At this time it was decided to change the emphasis from group to individual 
credit. The Group Credit Company provides savings and credit facilities for low- 
income individuals and seeks to disassociates itself from group credit though it 
continues to run those credit groups which were established before the policy 
shift. Current emphasis is on prudence and financial control, and the Group Credit 
Company claims to have achieved a successful turn-around. In late 1994, the 
company registered as a mutual bank and changed its name to ‘Cash Bank’. The 
association of group credit and near-disaster remains strong within the 
organisation.
Reasons for the break-down of group credit, that originally appeared successful, 
were stated as follows: First, the costs of travelling credit officers were 
prohibitive. More contact with credit groups was required than anticipated,
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especially when 'things go bad' which means that arrears also affect operating 
costs adversely. Further, contact with groups is made more difficult by the 
settlement patterns in the area of operation where townships are sprawling, 
locations are difficult to find (especially in squatter areas) and political insecurity 
took its toll at the time, too. Second, repayment rates were adversely affected by 
the lack of group solidarity. Rotation times of credit groups were too long and the 
stability of groups could not be guaranteed over periods required for economic 
reasons. Frequent movement of people into and out of townships means that the 
connectedness of groups is less than desirable. As claimed by the Group Credit 
Company, individual banking products could be designed to avoid these pitfalls.
The Group Credit Company illustrates that the need to further group solidarity is 
an important yet expensive component in the group credit technology. The process 
of building solidarity was found to involve credit officers extensively with local 
borrower groups, associated communication and travelling expenses were not 
compatible with the cost projections and could not be supported by the revenue 
generated from the loans. When the Group Credit Company started its lending 
programme, it fell prey to optimistic predictions and calculated that it would be 
possible to apply group solidarity technology without significant implications for 
administrative costs. After the inception, and following substantial loan 
disbursements, these effects became known. As the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa has argued, the costs of loan officers could not be justified by the 
number of loan groups, hence the costs of group maintenance threatened the
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viability of the Group Credit Company. Subsequent cost reductions led to defaults 
and the costs-revenue relationship quickly deteriorated. In conclusion, the Group 
Credit Company shows that cost-consciousness does not mix well with solidarity- 
based lending. In order to maintain sufficient social cohesion, a group credit 
scheme must be prepared to spend generously on extension staff and relationship- 
building activities.
National Stokvel Association o f South Africa
The National Stokvel Association of South Africa (NASASA) is an umbrella 
organisation for stokvels in South Africa. Its membership of 11500 stokvel groups 
is concentrated in the Northern Province and constitutes probably only a minority 
of all national stokvels. NASASA is a lose organisation, yet there is some 
regionally biased animosity to 'being bossed from Joburg'.11
Andrew Lukhele, NASASA's charismatic founder and president, emphasises the
social aspect of stokvels which is important to further the solidarity and cohesion 
1 2of groups. He summarises stokvels1 aim as 'have fun while channel people's 
savings to proper investment'. Since the inception of NASASA it was its policy to 
develop a partnership with a formal financial intermediary. Presently, NASASA 
makes institutional credit and saving facilities available to its member stokvels
11 This opinion was sampled during interviews with stokvel members in Cape Town. See also 
Thomas (1991) for similar reports about regionally biased perceptions of NASASA.
12 This opinion and the following quotes were the fruits of an interview with Lukhele in August 
1994; similar views are expressed in Lukhele (1992).
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through the People's Benefit Scheme which it runs in conjunction with the First 
National Bank of South Africa. The People’s Benefit Scheme encourages stokvel 
groups to save with First National Bank offering unit trust and fixed deposit 
instruments. Groups with a savings record can borrow against their savings. The 
maximum loan amount is 150% of the deposits. Deposits cannot be accessed as 
long as loans are outstanding as they are held as collateral. An Indemnity Fund, 
capitalised by the Development Bank of Southern Africa, guarantees the amount 
not covered by groups' savings.
Solidaristic credit institutions like stokvels save and provide credit in cases of 
distress. Insurance is one of their functions. The People’s Benefit Scheme requires 
them to save in illiquid assets which cannot be accessed on short notice. The 
credit scheme requires stokvels to use savings as collateral, leaving only 1/3 of the 
nominal loan amount as net credit. Interest spread is used to hide the high real 
interest rate. The People’s Benefit Scheme seems inappropriate for the needs of 
ROSCA-type institutions. Less than 10 percent of NASASA's member groups 
have decided to use the scheme. Critics have pointed out that the Peoples’ Benefit 
Scheme is inappropriate for the needs of stokvel members.
NASASA appears insecure about its role. Lukhele describes it as 'financial 
facilitator', not intermediary, saying that 'we don't want to handle money, we only 
deliver people to the bank'. The ambitions are cast more widely in the field of 
community development. NASASA is involved in a school feeding system and
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contemplates supporting township hydroculture vegetable growing. On the social 
side, a stokvel football league is organised for the development of team spirit 
amongst its members. Valuable income is generated by the promotion 
programme: companies are invited to promote their products to stokvel members 
through the network of NASASA. According to its own information, NASASA 
can provide visibility in a wide audience of township consumers. In conclusion, 
the NASASA is far from becoming a lean, well-focused lender. It may yet be a 
successful NGO catalysing social change on a number of fronts, but it is not the 
financial intermediary that some see in it.
However, NASASA has succeeded where the Group Credit Company has failed: 
it is a large organisation with a loyal membership base, its members are not
merely customers. Multiple activities are designed to enfranchise diverse stokvel
(
members, and NASASA explicitly concerns itself with members' well-being 
beyond credit. However, this success comes at a cost: NASASA has not been 
successful in turning itself into a serious financial institution but rather 
incorporates elements of a welfare organisation and lobbying group. Financial 
services are now only one of many services, and they are dominant neither for 
their members’ nor for NASASA's income. Commercialisation, especially the 
township promotion schemes, provides a larger share of NASASA's budget, the 
remainder coming from membership fees and donations of foreign donors and 
local corporations. Hence, NASASA has shown that group solidarity is crucial for 
stability, and has proven that it is possible to achieve a high level of cohesion. Yet,
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concentration on a narrow set of objectives and activities had to be sacrificed. 
Somewhat ironically, the success in creating a strong institution with a loyal 
membership basis means that the prospect of turning NASASA into a viable small 
enterprise lender is further removed than at the Group Credit Company.
The Credit Union League o f South Africa
Proponents of solidaristic credit claim that viability and solidaristic structures are 
not conflicting objectives. Yet this claim can only be upheld by institutions which 
avoid high risk members and engage in loan markets that are easier to navigate 
than the entrepreneurial credit sector. The Credit Union League of South Africa is, 
arguably, the only solidaristic lender in South Africa with a chance of succeeding 
with financial viability. Despite a lack of tradition with credit unions, there exists 
now a strong and noticeable movement that consists of local credit unions and the 
umbrella organisation, the Credit Union League of South Africa. The promotion 
of credit unions was seen as a conscious act in the direction of black 
empowerment. Linkages with the international credit union movement are strong, 
and the Credit Union League receives financial help from American credit unions 
and USAID.
Local credit unions are designed to be self-sufficient. The League accumulates 
additional funds to which donors have contributed and which local unions may 
borrow, and acts as an information and consultancy centre. Previously, credit 
unions were organised in close collaboration with religious communities, usually
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around township churches. The communal emphasis was strong. The credit unions 
experienced problems with defaults and the depletion of their funds. Policy was 
re-oriented in order to make the credit unions more business-oriented and 
financially accountable. The performance is now more satisfactory.
Credit unions maintain a measure of stability by avoiding high-risk borrowers. 
Most of their members are employed in the formal sector. Although they are 
’unbankable', they have a high degree of income security and usually borrow for 
items such as housing, consumer durables and schooling, not for entrepreneurial 
activities. In contrast to credit groups within a group credit scheme, credit unions 
form as a self-help savings and credit mechanism. Net savings are often high, and 
members are not expected to be net borrowers for some time after entering the 
club. Members select each other for loan eligibility which is not automatically 
linked to membership. Secure income, preferably from formal sector employment, 
is a usual way of showing 'social collateral'. External finance (ie the net 
indebtedness of the credit union) is only an exceptional occurrence, savings being 
the main emphasis for raising funds. Credit unions occupy a ground somewhere 
between a communal savings club and a small-time building society.
Credit unions are justifiably proud to contribute to socially desirable expenditure, 
but they are not strictly comparable to Grameen-type lending or small business 
loan schemes because they largely avoid the more demanding and more risky
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entrepreneurial market. Hence, their likely success is partly due to avoidance of 
the market segment that this study identifies as its main interest.
The Get Ahead Foundation
In 1988, the Get Ahead Foundation started disbursing loans to micro-enterprise 
owners in South African townships. Its agenda was a political one: to contribute to 
the correction of the effects of Apartheid. During the first few years of operation, 
the rapid expansion of the loan portfolio and the client base was seen as 
vindication for the Foundation’s success as a social agent. During 1991, the client 
base tripled. In the quest for size, loan officers necessarily adopted a hand-outs 
attitude which they passed on to their clients. Also, staff were selected on 
empowerment criteria too, and many lacked the qualifications for prudent loan 
administration.
As a result, the group liability was often ignored. Groups were allowed to re­
organise, including members from previous defaulters. Repeat loans were 
disbursed while repayments were still outstanding, and repayment rates sacked 
(Christen et al, 1992). In 1993, ‘70 percent of the portfolio was in arrears and they 
needed to make a provision for 50 percent of the portfolio’ (Calvin, 1997, p. 3). 
When the crisis became fully known in 1993, reforms were implemented with the 
support of the key donor, USAID, that sought to strengthen the staff capabilities 
and to raise their morale, as well as to build discipline in the group lending 
principle. These reforms led to a weeding out of clients, reducing the client base
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by about 60% until it started growing again in the first half of 1994. Both the 
reorganisation as well as the improved group nurturing have increased the 
administrative costs, but defaults were down to 5% at the end of 1995 from 
around 25% in early 1994.
According to Churchill (1997), data from 1994 and 1995 show that the reforms 
have had the desired effects. However, he cautions that ‘[ajlthough portfolio 
quality has been restored, achieving efficiency, self-sufficiency and financial 
stability are still major challenges (p. 40). In fact, another study shows that the Get 
Ahead Foundation incurs costs of R1.4 for each Rand of credit disbursed (Strauss 
Commission, 1996).
The Small Enterprise Foundation
The Small Enterprise Foundation is a NGO located at Tzaneen, Northern 
Province. It describes its aim as the 'alleviation of unemployment and poverty in 
the black population of the rural areas of South Africa' (Small Enterprise 
Foundation 1994, p. 1). Imitating the Grameen Bank, the Small Enterprise 
Foundation is often referred to as one of the more successful lenders in the 
unsecured loan market in South Africa and enjoys a level of admiration from 
competitors and local policy-makers (Christodoulou et al, 1993, pp. 13-14), and 
according to the Strauss Commission (1996), it is more efficient in lending than 
the better-known Get Ahead Foundation. The Small Enterprise Foundation will be 
analysed in greater detail in chapter 6.
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4. Group Credit: Contractual Exchange or Joint Production?
Recent interest in micro-credit coincides with a long-held belief in participatory 
development. Not only are previous policies such as subsidised rural credit 
perceived as having failed, but solidaristic institutions also fit into the current 
paradigm that prescribes ‘grassroots participation’ as the key to successful 
development policy, aid implementation and poverty alleviation. Consequently, 
solidaristic financial institutions have become the vogue of development thinking 
during the last decade.
Rigorous economic analysis of solidaristic financial institutions remains the 
exception. Discovered in the 1960s, rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs) were explored and discussed by sociologists and anthropologists 
(Geertz, 1962; Ardener, 1964), and subsequently categorised by economists 
(Nayar, 1986; Smets, 1996). Many contributions were predominantly descriptive, 
and sometimes carried by an explicit desire to introduce informal finance to the 
acceptable society of developmental financial institutions (Bouman 1979, 1990; 
Nayar 1986; Lukhele, 1990). The ROSCA itself remained, unfortunately, the 
mysterious black box at the centre of this discussion: repelled or admired, treated 
with respect or curiosity, located geographically, demographically and socially, 
subsequently uprooted and redefined, yet never understood.
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The second major form of solidaristic financial institutions is group credit 
schemes modelled on the pioneering Grameen Bank (Yunus, 1982; Hossain, 
1988). Many similar institutions exist now in various countries of the developing 
world (Berenbach and Guzman, 1994). Because group credit schemes are formal 
organisations, documentation is more easily available than on informal ROSCAs. 
Unfortunately, academic literature is again dominated by enthusiastic but hardly 
rigorous contributions (Fuglesang and Chandler 1986; Glosser 1994). 
Conceptually, ROSCAs are the origin of solidaristic financial institutions and still 
constitute their ‘pure form’. Group credit schemes are more relevant for policy 
formulation; indeed, major institutions presently favour the continued 
establishment of group credit schemes.1
In section 4.1, three research papers that have as yet made the most rigorous 
contributions to the understanding of group credit schemes - Besley et al (1995), 
Stiglitz (1993), and Armendariz de Aghion (1995) - are examined. All three 
represent substantial progress in the analysis of solidaristic financial institutions, 
as they illustrate the benefit of co-operation, but do not provide an adequate 
understanding of the nature of groups. Section 4.2 argues that their approaches do 
not help us to understand the crucial characteristics of solidarity because they 
systematically underestimate the private costs of participation. Section 4.3
1 For example, see Financial Times, 2 February 1996, reporting on the World Bank and other 
institutions holding very optimistic views about the repayment capabilities of borrower groups. On 
24 December 1996, the Financial Times reported again about the Grameen Bank as a model for 
replication. Wright (1997) reports about the International Finance Corporation’s ‘micro-finance 
debut’ which is, apparently, equivalent with its planned support programme for Grameen-type 
lenders.
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proceeds to develop an alternative understanding of solidaristic financial 
institutions that views solidarity as a productive asset for making available joint 
goods. This approach applies the concept of ‘social capital* and the theory of 
‘group solidarity’, leading to the new, critical perspective of solidaristic financial 
institutions outlined in section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes this chapter.
4.1 Solidaristic Financial Institutions as Contractual Clubs
Traditional economic analysis views solidaristic financial institutions as groups of 
individuals who enter into mutual contracts of exchange. However, this view leads 
many authors to formulate assumptions and develop models that misrepresent 
solidaristic financial institutions in some important aspects. Callier (1990) points 
out the central conceptual problem that bedevils this approach:
“The traditional approach, which analyses the ROSCAs in the framework 
of financial intermediation, is logically valid. However, it does not 
highlight the economic logic underlying the emergence of this institution 
and fails to account for the specific features of the ROSCAs. To its
participants, the ROSCA is more like a pooling of resources needed to
gain the benefits of some kind of collective action [...]: the logic of the 
ROSCAs is the logic of collective action, not the logic of the market” (p. 
274).2
2 Here Callier refers to the traditional approach to ROSCAs, but the same criticism is valid 
directed at the analysis of group credit schemes in mainstream literature.
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In the view of this ‘traditional approach’ individuals trade savings and monitoring 
effort with each other, receiving credit in return. Other important aspects of 
solidaristic financial institutions, notably risk, insurance and participation costs, 
are then omitted from their models. Such inappropriate assumptions led 
economists to impractical conclusions and policy advice.
Most economic analysis of group credit schemes focuses on either the 
informational advantage that socially connected individuals have within their 
communities, or on superior penalties that connected individuals can impose on 
each other. Besley et al (1995) focus on ‘social sanctions’ which are possible due 
to the social connectedness of borrowers in a group and formulate a ‘repayment 
game’ in a model with a two-member joint liability group. They conclude that 
group lending has both positive and negative effects on repayment behaviour, the 
outcome of those contradictionary effects depends on the ‘social penalty function’, 
ie on the severity of social penalties.
As with other economists writing on group credit scheme, Besley et al assume that 
repayment decisions depend primarily on the success of the investment projects 
that the borrowers undertake individually with their share of the loan. Hence, they 
view low return on investment as the principal reason behind default. Therefore, 
they interpret the positive effect of group lending on repayment rates as ‘the 
possibility that successful borrowers may repay the loans of partners who obtain 
sufficiently poor returns to make repayment profitable’ (p. 16). The concentration
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on investment projects distracts from the importance of opportunism and bounded 
rationality in determining repayment behaviour. In solidaristic financial 
institutions, members screen each other for character, not only for business 
acumen.
Besley et al discuss institutions that cannot be explained within the parameters of 
their analysis. They conclude that ‘group lending may allow a bank to harness 
“social collateral’” (p. 16), but they offer no logically consistent explanation for 
its emergence. While asserting that ‘participation in village life typically involves 
restraining self-interest’ (p. 9), Besley et al do not explain which institutions 
regulate individuals behaviour in such ways. They observe that ‘a variety of 
enforcement mechanisms, formal and informal, are harnessed to ensure this’ (p. 
9). However, such ‘mechanisms’ are themselves participatory institutions. It is 
logically flawed, therefore, to assume that such institutions provide costless 
enforcement services on the basis of social participation, and to proceed with the 
analysis on the basis of a framework that views participating villagers as rational, 
maximising individuals. Two avenues for imposing a penalty are suggested by the 
authors: admonition and exclusion from other forms of exchange that normally 
take place between partners.
3 Besley et al only mention ‘mechanisms’ at work in village communities; this term implies that it 
functions automatically. These mechanisms should more appropriately seen as institutions.
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Collateral is an asset, whether ‘social’ or otherwise.4 Institutions such as ‘village 
control mechanisms’ provide the environment for the creation of such assets; such 
mechanisms could be compared with the judicial system that enforces contracts in 
mainstream societies. Penalty mechanisms, whether vested in village 
connectedness or in courts of law, require real resources both for their 
establishment as institutions and their operation. Neither collateral nor contract 
enforcement are free.
Besley et al provide a caveat, though; they state that they are ‘seeking 
implications of social phenomena rather than explaining them’ (p. 10). However, 
such an approach would be valid only if the ‘phenomenon’ is independent of its 
‘implication’; it is not logically sound when social institutions are, inter alia, 
shaped by their roles in society. Besley et al assume that connectedness is a given 
feature in village societies and that contract enforcement and social collateral 
evolve automatically from it. However, it seems more appropriate to assume that 
both connectedness and the formation of social collateral depend on the intensity 
of economic exchange between villagers, including the availability of group loans. 
To ensure that their model is an adequate approximation of group credit schemes 
Besley et al would need to consider social institutions; notably, the costs of 
establishing and maintaining ‘social collateral’ are missing from their analysis.
4 If collateral was not an asset, the threat of losing it could not be a deterrent for potential 
defaulters.
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In contrast to Besley et al, Stiglitz (1993) looks at the informational gains that 
group lending achieves by tapping ‘local knowledge’. Stiglitz discusses the 
meaning of solidarity in his introduction, but then develops a model without any 
reference to it, although he intends to capture informal contractual obligations and 
returns. He assumes that information is costless because the borrowers are 
neighbours and know each other well. However, he also reports that “the 
interdependence among the members of the group is artificially created” (p. 72). 
His model allows no insight into the process of peer monitoring. Increased risk is 
the only cost of joint liability that he states explicitly. However, even if 
information were free, monitoring (i.e., the analysis as opposed to the gathering of 
information) and enforcement must be costly. Also an overemphasis on 
monitoring distracts from the process of group formation: Stiglitz mentions the 
selection effect of group formation in a footnote (note 5), but excludes any 
consideration within his model.
The riskiness of borrowers is described as given ex-ante, although not observable 
by the lender without costly monitoring. In the model, as in Besley’s, it is only 
represented as the respective riskiness of the chosen investment project.5 
However, contrary to the assumption underlying this specification, evidence 
shows that riskiness of repayment is largely influenced by members’ commitment 
to the group, and the group’s ability to apply social pressure (Thomas, 1991;
5 This implicit definition of lending risk captures the insolvency of micro-business only. However, 
opportunism and free-riding are also potentially important reasons for non-payment in credit 
markets without collateral.
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Albee and Reid, 1992). It is the interaction of group members, therefore, that has a 
large influence both on the repayment behaviour (i.e. actual risk) and the costs of 
group participation. Neither is adequately addressed by Stiglitz. A group as such 
does not exist in his model; he dispenses with the object of investigation and 
replaces it with borrowers who act as agents for the lender to monitor their peers.
Following the approach established by Stiglitz (1993), Armendariz de Aghion 
(1995) develops a more complex model of credit with peer monitoring. Her aim is 
not only to prove potential superiority of peer monitoring over ‘standard bilateral 
credit contracts’, but also to consider specific variables for efficiently designing 
such a credit contract, such as group size and monitoring structure. On the 
diversification of group members according to their economic activities, she 
assumes that peer monitoring depends crucially on the knowledge of a group 
member about peers’ return to a specific investment project. This knowledge, she 
argues, is easily acquired as all projects are stochastically dependent. In reality, 
peer monitoring depends little on the peers1 knowledge about specific investments, 
and strongly on peers' knowledge about each others’ overall financial position, 
including personal and familial affairs, and ‘character’. “Group credit schemes 
induce borrowers to engage in assortive mating wherein local knowledge about 
each others’ assets, capabilities, and character traits is used to sort and self-select” 
(Wenner, 1995, p. 265). The advantage of peer monitoring over traditional
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practices lies in their social connectedness, not merely private information about 
specific investment projects.6
Armendariz de Aghion's discussion of the structure of monitoring finds pyramidal 
monitoring superior to mutual. This conclusion is based on the assertion that 
mutual monitoring agreements duplicate efforts as each member gets monitored 
several times if the group size exceeds two. The quality and reliability of 
monitoring does not enter the argument, while, in fact, the benefit of peer 
monitoring lies exactly in the pulling together of all local information.7 Peer 
monitoring is a group effort that relies on the members' connectedness and cannot, 
therefore, be delegated.
The body of literature presented here constitutes a major leap forward as, for the 
first time, informal, ‘joint-liability’ groups are shown to be potentially 
creditworthy in a rigorous economic model. Unfortunately, economic theory still 
models solidaristic groups without making explicit reference to solidarity. 
‘Connectedness’ is assumed to be in existence and to be objectively - and 
sometimes costlessly - observable from the outside by the potential lender. Only 
under these conditions can the potential lender be able to treat a number of 
individuals as a group that can present ‘solidarity’, i.e. mutual liability, as
6 If all group members ran businesses of the same type in the same village, overtrading in this 
sector could well undermine the viability of their projects.
7 This ‘pulling together’ is exactly how reputation is created: a group arrives at some consensus, 
agreed by informed members, to evaluate character and credit worthiness of individuals.
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collateral, rather than the sum of their individual wealth. It is only on the basis of 
these, arguably implausible, assumptions that economic literature can conclude 
that joint liability ‘contracts can potentially dominate standard (bilateral) contracts 
to the extent that they allow the bank to take advantage of both lower monitoring 
costs and social sanctions (among peer borrowers) in order to elicit higher debt- 
repayments form each group member’ (Armendariz de Aghion, 1995, p. 12) and 
can assert that group credit is preferable ‘in less developed countries [...] 
especially in rural areas where a large majority of individuals do not have enough 
collateral to secure a loan’ (Armendariz de Aghion, 1995, p. 1).
4.2 Solidarity and Capital Accumulation
All three papers discussed above share one weakness. Their authors all stress that 
certain social relations - ‘connectedness’ - are the key to solidaristic financial 
institutions. Yet, they do not incorporate into their analysis the difference between 
a solidaristic group and contracting individuals. This means that all three authors 
acknowledge that solidaristic financial institutions are based on specific, non­
standard decision-making patterns; yet they proceed to model these institutions 
assuming general, standard decision-making. Solidaristic groups are also generally 
characterized by a relatively high level of egalitarianism, compared with non- 
solidaristic groups such as firms. As a result, all three authors focus on monitoring 
costs - which are really only one part of total ‘solidarity costs’ - or payment 
streams and assume various free goods: free information, free trust and
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connectedness. While group-oriented behaviour is clearly a precondition for peer
• 8 monitoring, solidarity is supposedly m abundant supply. This approach can be
criticised for presenting an atavistic picture of villagers enjoying cosy and trustful
relationships.
In contrast to recent economic analysis, early work on solidaristic financial 
institutions was almost exclusively done by sociologists and social 
anthropologists. While the insights of both sociologists and economists are 
valuable for the understanding of solidaristic institutions, their approaches and 
results often appear incompatible.9 Sociologists are primarily concerned with the 
behaviour of groups and within groups. Solidarity - that is the binding ‘glue’ of 
groups - is assumed to exist, as without it no social order would be explicable. 
Normativists, who argue that group-oriented behaviour stems from socialisation 
processes, have tended to argue that the reasons why solidarity groups exist are to 
be found in the characteristics of the specific communities in which they are 
embedded. These norms, supposedly characteristics of rural, more communally
8 The failure becomes apparent through a simple mind-game: Imagine a development manager who 
is to set up a group credit scheme in some area where no such scheme exists. Once you are 
supplied with all you need by the donor - funds, offices, support staff - the question is: where are 
the solidarity groups? How do you recognize them? After you advertise your lending strategy in the 
local population, groups may approach you for loans - how do you know that they do, in fact, 
constitute a solidaristic group and not a bunch of free riders? Finding answers to these question 
will involve your organization in spending time and money to get to know the applicants, to learn 
about their relationships with each other, to foster relationships in the way required for your 
purposes, and, thus, become a member of their group yourself.
9 Two distinct strands of knowledge, therefore, exist simultaneously, apparently without much 
chance for mutual enlightenment, but obviously in contradiction to each other. This unfruitful 
friction is not limited to the research into solidaristic credit groups; rather it is embedded in the 
foundations o f sociology and economics respectively and afflicts many areas of shared interest.
142
oriented societies, guarantee individuals' willingness to behave to the group's 
benefit at the expense of private gain. Such a view is implicit in Lukhele (1990) 
and Fuglesang and Chandler (1986). According to this approach, group formation 
and solidarity are aided in rural and poor communities by the normative influence 
of closely-knit societies. Structuralist interpretations of solidaristic financial 
institutions emphasise that their members are all credit-constrained and thus share 
specific vested interests. According to the structuralist view, solidarity groups 
form because their members all experience credit rationing and aim at bettering 
themselves through co-operation (Callier, 1990; Moodley, 1995).
Both sociological schools give plausible and important explanations for the 
emergence of solidarity, yet both remain unsatisfactory. Most important for this 
study, they fail to account more fully for the critical conditions under which 
solidarity arises and flourishes. Why, for example, is solidarity such a rare 
occurrence in public life - and misconduct a common threat - if normative 
behaviour is so persuasive? Why do so few, but not all (or even most) individuals 
with shared interests, form solidaristic groups - a question raised by Ardener 
(1964) in response to Geertz's (1962) structuralist interpretation of ROSCAs? 
Why do group members not free-ride?
Solidarity denotes a pattern of behaviour where a group acts in ways which are in 
the long-term interest of its members. Yet there are no visible incentive 
mechanisms that entice members to behave in the group’s rather than their own
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individual interest, no immediate or tangible return as in a contracting situation. 
Therefore, many authors found it difficult to reconcile solidaristic behaviour - and 
institutions relying on it - with the assumption of rational choice decision-making 
which underlies modem economics (Hechter, 1987, pp. 30-31). It is this gap 
which the above authors failed to address, and where therefore their models 
deviate from the reality of solidaristic financial institutions.
However, solidarity does produce returns. Individuals may be better off if they 
position themselves within a network of social relations so that they can borrow 
(Besley, 1993; Stiglitz, 1993) because credit availability is a valuable asset. 
Within the context of solidaristic institutions, the availability of credit is 
dependent on developing - and being able to demonstrate the success in 
developing - specific social relations. Economists refer to productive assets as 
capital, but social relations are not yet widely accepted as constituting productive 
assets.10 Social groups better themselves by setting long-term objectives, 
committing private resources to each other and adhering to rules and norms with 
the aim of preventing shirking and free-riding. Being able to lend credibility to 
their commitments, they pareto-improve above the Nash-equilibrium that 
individualistic actors would choose.11 Social capital has been accumulated when
10 Generally, social capital is more accepted in economic research with a multi-disciplinary 
flavour. Notably, work in the fields of development and management are willing to apply the 
concept to issues from business networks in Asia to reputation and the value of the firm.
11 Nash equilibria are outcomes of games, with two or more players, based on mutual expectations 
of their respective decisions. Credible cooperation may improve the pay-off for all players (and 
therefore improve welfare in the distribution-neutral meaning of pareto-optimality): In the case of 
the prisoners’ dilemma, if the two prisoners constituted a solidaristic group, neither would confess,
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two parties are prepared to commit their own resources to a specific, intertemporal 
transaction that two individual rational choice agents would not engage in without 
safeguards, such as collateral or enforceable contracts, to prevent opportunism and 
bounded rationality. Social capital thus plays the role of such safeguards, although 
it is not necessarily established by - nor subject to - formal rules.
Social capital shares certain properties with human capital - the productive value 
of knowledge and skills of persons - as it is also embedded in persons and 
personal relationships. Like human capital, it cannot be transferred. As a non- 
marketable asset, its value cannot be determined by market-based ‘price*. Finally, 
its production process can rarely be precisely described as many incidents of 
social exchange, experience and cultural formation imprint on the production 
process of both forms of capital. “Like human capital and physical capital, social 
capital depreciates if it is not renewed. Social relationships die out if not 
maintained; expectations and obligations wither over time; norms depend on 
regular communication” (Coleman, 1990, p. 321). While these facts are intuitively 
known to solidaristic financiers, they still have to be addressed explicitly in theory 
covering solidaristic financial institutions.
knowing that the other is bound to cooperate. In fact, crime syndicates heavily rely on group 
formation and credible commitment, enforced by ‘peer pressure’ (see also footnote 13).
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4.3 Joint Production and Group Lending
So far it has been argued that a solidaristic group is not merely a network of 
individuals conducting contractual exchange of private resources. Rather, it 
constitutes “a collection of individuals who are engaged in a specific type of 
mutually oriented activity” (Hechter, 1987, p. 16) with the aim of engaging in 
risky, intertemporal transactions that would, normally, invite opportunistic 
behaviour. This mutually oriented activity, made possible by social capital 
binding together the group’s members, aims at providing credit, insurance and 
company as a 'jointly produced good'.12 Joint production requires that group 
members enter into obligations to provide private resources for the production 
process within the group. Members are obliged to contribute for membership in 
the group, but not for the consumption of a specific quantity of the joint goods. 
Therefore, the obligation can adequately be seen as a membership fee or tax. The 
products of participatory activity are also not distributed according to the rules of 
the market, but according to exogenous decisions made by consenting group 
members. Rules have to be agreed which govern the extent of obligatory 
contributions of effort and money, the organisation of production and the
12 This type of good possesses similarities with a free good, but it differs because its supply can be 
restricted to those who participate in its production. Gaining access to this 'collective good' is the 
motivation for joining a group. The necessity to produce a good jointly rather than individually 
may arise from the costs of production or the nature of the good. Hence, either private resources 
are insufficient and pooling is warranted, or private production is impossible regardless of 
individual endowment. The latter case is more likely to be true with non-tangible goods; Hechter 
mentions the examples of churches which produce 'salvation' and 'the pleasure to be gained by 
playing chamber music' which necessitates membership in an appropriate group (Hechter 1987, p. 
54).
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distribution of the good. The group also needs to control its members and enforce 
the obligations. If it is unable to do so, members will free ride, i.e. enjoy the good 
but avoid contribution (Olson, 1971).
Control has two elements, monitoring and sanctioning; the latter entailing a 
credible threat, including expulsion from the group and from the enjoyment of the 
joint good. Members of groups are subject to a degree of dependence on the 
group. They desire the joint good, for this is the reason to form a group. Entry 
occurs only if the benefit from consuming the joint good exceeds the disutility of 
the contribution. Dependence is created by the disutility incurred from leaving the 
group and taking the next best alternative. It is greater the fewer alternatives exist, 
the more difficult alternative sourcing is, and the more important the joint good is 
for individuals' survival.
Personal relations and commitments which accumulate over a period of time 
through repeated interaction within the group are sunk costs in the group 
constituting non-transferable social capital. Social capital thus entails that rules 
and practices are established which structure the production process and determine 
individuals’ entitlements to the group product. As social capital increases, 
members also become more dependent because larger shares of their private 
wealth is embedded in non-fungible social relations, thus their exit costs increase.
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Contributions have to be large enough to cover the costs of production for the 
joint good; if they are not, production will not be forthcoming and the group will 
disintegrate. While the contributions of members can comprise any type of scarce 
resource - time, effort, money, reputation - the level of contribution may well 
differ between members within the group, depending on the internal social 
structure. The maximum achievable contribution is determined by the level of 
dependence of group members. Were contributions greater than the dependence, 
that is the costs of leaving the group, membership would hold no net benefit. 
Groups may also produce more than one good. Often groups can be found 
providing some more tangible good but also company, friendship and social 
fulfilment. Many reports on solidaristic financial institutions have pointed out that 
social meetings, which are part of the production process, are enjoyed by their 
members and are an important incentive for participation (Ardener, 1964; 
Fuglesang and Chandler, 1986).
Why are jointly-produced goods produced by groups and not by freely contracting 
individuals, as is implicitly assumed by Besley et al (1993; 1995), Stiglitz (1993) 
and others? Supposedly, free contracting would provide immediate rewards for 
individuals and would be more efficient than group production. Obligations to 
forego control over private resources were unnecessary and, socially, the costs of 
establishing and controlling group rules could be channelled to more directly 
productive ends. Several answers are possible. Firstly, complex contracting 
arrangements are expensive, and an obligatory rather than a contractual system
148
may be found to be the more efficient solution. This argument lies at the 
foundation of the theory of the firm and has been well documented (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1985). Firms, like solidaristic groups, rely on some form of 
obligation and control rather than immediate contracting. Further, contracting is 
spontaneous and offers returns to individual effort, yet the rate of return is 
frequently beyond the individual's control. Contracting relegates the individual to 
the volatility of markets; risk-averse individuals may prefer group production 
because allocation is exogenous. Thus, groups offer implicit insurance (Platteau 
and Abraham, 1987).
Why are group members not compensated for their efforts, effectively paid wages 
or commissions, as Armendariz de Aghion (1995) suggests, describing group 
members as agents on behalf of the lender? Hechter argues that there are ‘groups* 
(such as firms and co-operatives) paying wages. These ‘groups’ are characterised 
by the fact that their products are marketable. The sale of their products, therefore, 
enables them to acquire the means for compensating their members. Solidaristic 
groups, in comparison, produce goods which can only be consumed by their 
members, i.e. immanent goods. Creditworthiness, attained by creating group 
characteristics, is such an immanent good. Therefore, it is also misleading to 
construe solidaristic credit as a commercial service.
Hechter (1987) argues that the conditions for solidarity are dependence, 
contribution and control. Dependence exists because a group is the only, or the
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least costly provider of some valued good. Contribution is the cost of membership 
which entitles members to some, exogenously agreed share in the production. 
Control is necessary to ensure that they honour their promise of contribution, and 
to sanction their behaviour.13 “The greater the average proportion of each 
member's private resources contributed to collective ends, the greater the 
solidarity of the group” (Hechter 1987, p. 18).
Dependence has been argued to be a function of various variables, one being the 
lack of viable institutional alternatives. Solidaristic financial institutions are more 
frequently found in poor, underdeveloped communities where access to numerous 
goods, notably insurance and credit, is dependent on social networks (Basu, 1984; 
Platteau and Abraham, 1987; Hyuha et al, 1990). Efficient markets are less readily 
available there than in developed countries and sectors.
Contributions are the condition for membership which entitles members to the 
receipt of the joint good.14 Yet the value of the contribution exceeds the price of 
the good if it was available on a reasonably efficient market because production in 
a group necessitates the accumulation of social capital. The costs of accumulation
13 The creation of these three properties (dependence, obligation, and control), and the 
accumulation of social capital within a fiercely exclusive group, are the foundation of organized 
crime. Gambetta (1993) describes the interplay of ritual, physical threat and social and economic 
incentives through which solidarity is enforced in the Italian Mafia. Obviously, social relations 
embedded in a Mafia ‘family’ give rise to economic exchange which are not available to free 
contractors, and which benefit the members of the solidaristic group.
14 Contributions for ROSCA membership commonly comprise household resources: time, work 
food, and, obviously, money. However, the non-tangible costs are often substantial.
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include the resource need for the establishment of organisation, i.e. rules and 
control. Therefore, contributions have to exceed the costs of production and 
assume a level closer to dependence. The group must be seen to be appropriating a 
share of the consumer surplus.15 Intuitively, this appropriation can be understood 
as the costs of providing a safe environment for joint production; social capital has 
to be ‘overinvested’. As risk-sharing is one of the attributes of solidaristic groups, 
overinvestment is a necessary safeguard to ensure the survival of the group in a 
volatile environment.16 Brett (1996) refers to the ‘costs of consent’ which arise 
from the establishment of the group’s ‘superstructure’, notably time-consuming 
decision-making procedures. In any case, joint production costs exceed physical 
production requirements - such as the monitoring costs captured by Armendariz de 
Aghion’s (1995) model - due to the requirements of regular communication, 
meetings, and social bonding (Coleman 1990). Therefore, when a market 
develops, groups will cease to be the provider of a joint good at the lowest 
realisable price. Bankable people do not normally form credit groups. Callier 
(1990) finds that the ROSCA “loses its raison d'etre when capital market 
segmentation vanishes as a result of market integration: access to credit at the 
prevailing market rate solves the problem of lumpy expenditures” (p. 275).
15 For a more detailed argument see Hechter (1987) p. 169-71.
16 As groups offer a more constant income stream than immediate contracting - ie predictable 
access to their joint good - the costs of overinvestment in the establishment of the group could be 
viewed as an insurance premium.
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Control in solidaristic financial institutions is often exercised in a rather informal 
way, and through more than one mechanism. Monitoring extends not only to 
reliable payments, but also to other aspects of an individual's economic and 
personal situation, and his or her character (Wenner, 1995). Sanctioning involves 
both the exclusion from the group, and also exclusion from a wider range of 
communal activities. Sanctions are most efficient if they can rely on co-operation 
of third parties. To this effect, group defaulters may be ostracised socially not only 
by their group members, but by other authorities playing a role in the life and 
economy of a village or community. The consequent loss of social capital may be 
a more severe threat than exclusion from the solidaristic financial institution per 
se. Hence group members may go to great lengths to honour their promises for 
contribution to the group, thus avoiding exclusion from economic exchange 
(Bournan, 1979; Thomas, 1991).
This approach derives solidarity from the assumption of rational choice agents; 
and it needs to be emphasised that this form of solidarity “differs from others that 
refer not to potentially observable behaviour of group members but to the strength 
of the sentiments binding them together” (Hechter 1987, pp. 18-19). While not 
denying the existence of sentiments, the concentration on observable behaviour 
aids the deduction of falsifiable statements and the application to solidaristic 
financial institutions. Solidarity, therefore, is not identical with altruism. 
Solidarity specifies a set of social relations that requires surrendering control of 
private resources, but that is also compatible with a long-term private
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maximisation strategy. It is based on reciprocity, not free giving, and therefore 
involves a rational choice calculus.
4.4 Solidarity and Group Credit Schemes
I have argued that group solidarity is a costly asset, a second order collective good 
that is produced by groups for their own productive use. The costs involved in its 
production, therefore, are part of the total production costs of the final product, 
credit. However, group credit schemes are promoted on the basis of their alleged 
efficiency in providing micro- loans. The costs of social capital, an integral part of 
their production function, are frequently neglected. In the following section, I will 
show that group lenders are also solidaristic partners to their clientele, although, as 
formal institutions, the relationship is asymmetric. In fact, much of the success of 
group credit schemes stems from their ability to present themselves as solidaristic 
partners of poor people. The lenders* burden in the ‘costs of consent’ are, 
unfortunately, financial obligations which are in conflict with the objective of 
financial efficiency of group credit. In contrast to ROSCAs, group credit schemes 
are lender-driven, and the lender is a formal institution with a level of authority. 
However, solidaristic groups constitute the organisational basis for this formal 
institution; these groups are formed in order to jointly provide access to external 
sources of capital. Thus the joint good has been created when a group comes into 
existence with characteristics which signal creditworthiness to the lender. This 
solidarity can be described as primary solidarity since it comes into existence only
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by power of another relationship with solidaristic characteristics. The connection 
between the group and the lender constitutes the secondary level of solidarity.
For this second level of solidarity, the credit officers are the crucial focus. The 
relationship between credit officer and borrower groups has two important 
functions: First, trust and connectedness between credit officer and borrowers 
create the social capital that binds solidarity credit scheme and members together. 
Second, only in this relationship can the solidarity credit scheme, through its 
agent, observe the nature of intra-group relationships. The credit officer thus has 
to verify that borrower groups are adequately equipped with social capital.
The solidaristic nature of the lender-borrower relationship is most visible in their 
’bonding'. The lender induces the borrowers to internalise 'rules of conduct'.17 
Internalisation not only seeks to lower monitoring costs, it also represents a non- 
fungible investment by the borrowers and thus increases their exit costs. The 
Grameen Bank and other group lenders promise to provide contact and advice in 
financial matters and have an 'open ear' for the problems of the borrowers. This 
amounts to presenting the lender as a personalised, caring partner who takes 
interest in the well-being of the borrowers beyond its institutional self-interest. 
Thus, the Grameen Bank, like other lenders, commits itself to specific obligations 
vis-a-vis its borrowers. Having established its reputation with a specific
17 Fuglesang and Chandler (1986) detail 'The Sixteen Decisions' which relate, inter alia, rules for 
the use o f pit latrines and food practices) and sing the Grameen-song together during meetings. 
For detailed descriptions of the daily group work see also Von Pischke (1991).
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community, Grameen has also sunk costs into this relationship and increased its 
exit costs.
On the other hand, members are also required to engage in costly bonding. 
Grameen requires its borrowers to purchase its shares during the loan program, so 
that the majority of the Grameen Bank’s capital is now owned by its borrowers; 
other group lenders use obligatory savings. It would be misleading to construe this 
as a portfolio investment by saving groups.18 Rather, it is part of the contribution 
to the solidarity relationship between lender and borrower, and is meant to cement 
the stake borrowers have in maintaining a long-term, stable relationship (Von 
Pischke, 1991, pp. 238-242). Other group lenders require non-tangible start-up 
contributions such as taking ‘entry exams’. Grameen further “encourages 
members to form schools and it sells textbooks, while centres have set up child 
welfare funds”, it further “produces construction plans for houses” and “has a seed 
distribution program featuring very small packets to encourage gardening” (Von 
Pischke, 1991, p. 240). The lender assumes functions of a welfare organisation, 
borrowers become clients, or members; those borrowing from a commercial bank 
are mere customers. There are specific, costly obligations arising for both sides 
from the nature of this relationship.19
18 As Grameen shares cannot be sold on a commercial basis, and may only be owned by members, 
they represent a sunk cost in the borrower’s relationship to the lender.
19 While the borrowers face contributions similar to those of ROSCA members, i.e. household 
resources, a group credit scheme-lender supplies corporate resources: staff and management time, 
contributions in kind like stationary, transport costs, and obviously capital for lending. Solidarity 
costs are therefore, from a lender perspective, tangible, real costs.
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Following from the understanding of group credit schemes as social order based 
on a form of specific capital accumulation, it is possible to formulate several 
conditions for successful implementation of a group credit scheme:
• Groups are possible only where dependence exists. The joint product - credit, 
insurance and company - has to be valued highly enough, and there must not be 
any viable alternative to group credit. Group credit was often seen as a way to 
avoid exploitation by moneylenders. Whether the allegation of exploitation is 
true or not, once they provide an alternative source of credit, the dependence on 
credit groups is diminished and their stability is not assured.
• Obligations must be set by agreed rules. The value of obligations is not to 
exceed the ‘consumer benefit’ from credit; due consideration is to be given to 
transaction costs. From the borrowers’ perspective, contribution includes not 
only the time spent on sitting in meetings but also, for example, the time 
involved in getting to meetings, preparing for meetings and in the management 
of the group, involving activities such as keeping accounts and communication 
outside meetings.
• Control must be feasible. If control costs are high the viability of groups will be 
reduced or undermined. Monitoring requires extensive personal contact 
between group members. Effective sanctioning is possible only where social 
and geographical mobility is low and economic interdependence strong. 
Finally, the costs of control must not be so high as to render joint production 
unattractive.
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For an institutional lender involved with credit groups, control entails the 
management of groups and group characteristics, not only of their members as 
individuals. Monitoring could be almost costless if it was restricted to checking 
payment streams. But in practice, monitoring requires personal interaction and an 
orientation towards social relationships; the overt screening of repayments is 
sometimes discouraged. Sanctioning is practically restricted to the denial of future 
credit for the group. Should a group collude to default, effective sanctioning is 
virtually impossible, unless the wrath of local communities can be invoked. 
Therefore, group lenders find it important to establish a good image with the 
wider community, and they are frequently prepared to incur real costs for this 
purpose.
Natural (and free) ‘connectedness’ of borrowers is not the only condition for the 
successful application of group credit technology, as was implied by recent 
literature. Solidarity is a second order collective good that is required in the 
production of the joint good, credit. Borrowers and lenders face non-tangible 
contributions which are substantial, over and above the costs of ‘pure’ production 
of credit. Because group credit schemes are not natural persons but institutions, 
these contributions are measurable as the effect on general, operational costs or 
staff costs. Reliance on inadequate theory has led lenders to structurally and 
systematically underestimate their costs. This result illustrates a missing link in 
existing economic theory on solidaristic institutions: the contributions - both from 
lender and borrower - to the solidaristic network are substantial and crucial to the
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stability of groups. Although group credit schemes have generally encouraging 
repayment records worldwide, the cost factor could result in prolonged reliance on 
subsidies. The costs are a potential obstacle to the successful implementation of 
group credit schemes: the case study in chapter 5 indicates that ‘costs of consent* 
can easily surpass the interest costs of credit for the borrower, while the costs of 
establishing and maintaining group networks exceed the default costs of 
comparable individualistic lenders.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that group solidarity is a costly asset. The costs 
associated with accumulating it can be substantial, and may in fact outweigh the 
benefits of solidaristic intermediation. This conclusion is supported by the fact 
that many group credit schemes are much more costly than existing theory would 
imply. While social relations can reduce default rates, it is crucially important to 
consider the costs of creating such a social environment. This result suggests that 
non-solidaristic, non-participatory institutions should be considered as serious 
alternatives. Elsewhere it was argued that innovative non-group micro-lenders can 
be viable (Chaves and Gonzales-Vega, 1996), and could contribute to micro­
enterprise development (Mauri, 1985; Grosh and Somolekae, 1996). Others have 
argued that innovation and ‘good governance’ are more important factors for 
success than control through groups (Jain, 1996).
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Evidence from South Africa and elsewhere shows that the costs of producing an 
enabling environment for solidaristic lending vary considerably. Factors 
influencing the costs of social capital accumulation include pre-existing social 
structures and relationships but also other factors that have an impact on 
communication costs, such as population density and settlement structures 
(Hossain, 1988). However, to my knowledge there is not one solidaristic lender in 
developing countries who achieved viability of the lending operation without 
substantial cross-subsidisation from other activities. Individualistic lending in 
similar circumstances could arguably be more economical, even including 
generally higher default rates. This fact would suggest that accumulation costs of 
social capital are indeed substantial.
The costs of accumulating social capital - of establishing, monitoring and 
enforcing group rules - may explain why so little investment in poor communities 
is financed by solidaristic institutions. It is not the fragility of legal systems, as 
Stiglitz speculated, but the production function of solidaristic institutions that 
impedes the blossoming of ROSCAs and group credit schemes alike. Finally, the 
participatory principle in development theory is still prevalent, although it appears 
that its fundamentals have not been critically tested; recent research finds them 
fragile (Brett, 1996).
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5. South African Micro-finance in Context
Following the abstract arguments developed in the previous chapters, this chapter 
provides an overview of the economic and political background to the operation of 
micro-finance institutions in South Africa in the mid-1990s. This discussion will 
then provide the setting for the analysis of two micro-finance institutions, 
representing two different approaches, in the following chapters. I start by setting 
out the policies of racial discrimination during the Apartheid era and their effect to 
black entrepreneurial activities in section 5.1. Here, I discuss discrimination in the 
labour market, poverty, and the housing crisis. The chapter then moves on to 
explore the changes of economic policy during political transition in section 5.2. 
This section includes a discussion of changes in financing NGOs during changing 
donor and government objectives. Section 5.3 provides an overview over the 
financial system in South Africa. It starts with brief comments on the central bank 
and the commercial banking sector, moves on to the non-institutional lenders and 
finally provides a summary of development finance institutions. This section 
detects the absence of a coherent policy towards the integration of the financial 
sector, especially between institutions serving different parts of the population. 
Section 5.4 provides an overview of the micro-finance sector. In particular, it 
points out that the sector is young, underdeveloped and comprises only four 
institutions of significant size.
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5.1 The Apartheid Era and its Legacy
The segregation of people by race has a long history in South Africa. From early 
this century, segregation became increasingly enshrined in law, thus formalising 
and enforcing the status quo at the time. While this is mirrored by developments 
in other African countries, then colonies, South Africa became notorious for its 
ideology of Apartheid. Although racial segregation reaches back much further, the 
Apartheid system refers mainly to the legal, social and economic system 
established in South Africa under the rule of the National Party from 1948 until 
1994. The establishment of the Apartheid system, and its peak under president 
Vorster, coincided with movements towards and attainment of national 
independence in most African colonies, and the start of civil wars in South 
Africa’s neighbouring countries, which all resulted in their eventual independence. 
Therefore, South Africa was the country where black economic development 
remained suppressed by white supremacist aspirations longer than anywhere else 
on the continent.
Regulation and business development under Apartheid
Apartheid planners acted within the constraints of an ideology that ruled that black 
people were in white areas only on a temporary basis, as they were citizens and 
residents of their respective homelands. However, their temporary residence status 
in white areas, including all major towns and cities as well as the most valuable 
farm land, was deemed necessary as black labour was important in white industry,
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mining, fanning and as ‘domestic help’. The ideology of temporary presence of 
black people in most of the country denied black entrepreneurs the opportunity to 
establish businesses in economically more important parts of the country. The 
Land Act of 1913 prohibited black people from owning land outside designated 
‘native’ areas. This meant that black entrepreneurs were automatically excluded 
from financial markets since they could not offer collateral in the form of property 
ownership.1
On the basis of this notion of temporary residence, a comprehensive control 
apparatus was established to monitor movements and resident status of black 
people in white areas. Implicitly, this apparatus served the interest of white 
business owners. Urban townships for black people were designed as temporary 
living quarters for black people while working for the white urban economy. 
Townships were not meant for families, and the original planning contained few 
of the social amenities that would induce voluntary long-term settlement. The 
Natives (Urban Areas) Act No. 21 of 1923 restricted the permitted economic 
activities within townships to the most basic necessities, mostly selling food. 
More up-market retail or service activities, such as bars or repair shops, were not 
licensed as ‘businesses satisfying more than the barest daily necessities remained
1 However, the geographical separation under Apartheid also created business opportunities for 
black entrepreneurs as white-owned businesses were banned from black areas. Especially after the 
gradual easing of business licensing requirements in the 1970s, several black business 
accumulated substantial wealth in retailing. Their success was partially attributable to the absence 
of white-owned retail chains in black areas.
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the defended preserve of white entrepreneurs and were located in white urban 
areas’ (Riley, 1993, p. 5).
In 1948, the National Party came to power and ventured to implement its vision of 
Apartheid. Most important, it passed the notorious Group Areas Act in 1950 that 
enforced race-related zoning retrospectively. This forced black entrepreneurs in 
white-designated areas to sell their businesses, and also affected residential 
ownership. Hence, property that could have served as collateral was often sold 
significantly below its market value. This policy affected a large number of Cape 
coloured people who had lived in mixed areas in Cape Town, but who were forced 
to sell or even saw their houses demolished.
The stricter segregation regime and harsher implementation could be explained by 
the interests represented by governments following the election in 1948. 
Generally, the National Party governments that ruled South Africa from 1948 to 
1994 were more sensitive to the demands of diversified white business interests 
than their predecessors.3 This could be explained by the sections of society most 
directly represented by government: the National Party represented the accession 
of Afrikaner interests (Schrire, 1991), many of whom were farmers, traders or
2 Most famously, the formerly coloured District Six in Cape Town was ‘cleared’, ie demolished, 
by authorities, its residents resettled to designated coloured areas and the land, adjoining the 
central business district of Cape Town, was opened to white development. However, because of 
the stigma attached to the forced relocation of its previous residents, the land of the former District 
Six remained mostly undeveloped during the Apartheid years and its use is debated even today.
3 However, it should be noted that Apartheid-related regulations were softened, or increasingly 
ignored, from the early 1980s onwards, accelerating under the de Klerk presidency from 1989 
until 1994.
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small and medium business people. Previous governments were more easily 
identified with the large scale mining and finance interests of the English- 
originating white population, who felt their position less threatened by black 
entrepreneurs. While both major ethnic white groups relied on exploiting black 
labour (and on appropriating black-owned land), the large-scale mining empires 
controlled black labour through ownership and market power, while Afrikaner 
interests were better served by direct legislation.4 ‘The National Party, dominated 
by Afrikaners and in power continuously since 1948, had used its power of 
patronage to create an administrative machine in its own image* (Schrire, 1991, p. 
40).
In 1963, legislation was further tightened to the detriment of black entrepreneurs. 
First, the ‘one man-one business’ policy, based on an informally circulated policy 
document, sought to limit black business expansion. This prevented the 
emergence of a professional, business-oriented middle class. The effect of this and 
additional legislation was ‘to persuade black entrepreneurs to move their activities 
away from urban townships and to establish business ventures in the homelands 
instead’ (Riley, 1993, p. 6) where they were deemed to be permanently resident.5
4 H.F. Verwoerd is often seen as the ‘architect’ o f Apartheid, and as its most eminent theorist. He 
was Minister of Native Affairs from 1951 to 1958 and then Prime Minister until his assassination 
in 1966. ‘Verwoerd’s policy resulted in a crop of legislation’ (Davenport, 1991, p. 338).
5 Homelands are the semi-autonomous tribal lands created by the Apartheid governments for 
creating the notion of separateness between the ethnic groups in South Africa. They were all 
equipped with their own government and administrative machines and heavily subsidised by the 
Pretoria government. Eventually, four of them acquired ‘independence’, but were never 
internationally recognised.
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Until 1976, black entrepreneurs were permitted to be active in only twenty-five 
trades and professions; this number was increased to fifty-two until such 
restrictions were removed during the 1980s (Riley, 1993). In addition, separate 
and inferior education systems for the non-white population disadvantaged young 
non-white job seekers,6 while the job reservation system reserved access to 
apprenticeships and skilled jobs to white applicants. This policy not only 
disadvantaged black people in the search for formal sector employment and 
income, but it also served to limit their opportunities to acquire relevant skills for 
setting up their own businesses. The 1960s and 1970s were probably the peak of 
Apartheid oppression (Schrire, 1991). During the 1980s, the legal framework 
making up the Apartheid regulatory superstructure was slowly dismantled, 
although crucial provisions remained in force until after the official transition to 
non-racial democracy in the early 1990s. Most importantly, the structural 
distortions caused by Apartheid survive the abolition of relevant legislation, and 
constitute the main challenge for current policy.
Apartheid and SME development
During the last decades of Apartheid government, two distinct trends were 
observable: first, the labour absorption capacity of the formal, and mostly white, 
business sector declined, and second, the hostile stance on black self-employment
6 The expenditure gap between school education for black and white pupils was rather staggering. 
‘Between 1969 and 1991 the government made significant strides in reducing the gap in per capita 
expenditure between African and white pupils’ (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1993, 
p. 588), from 18:1 in 1969 to 3:1 in 1991.
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and small-scale entrepreneurship eased. The declining labour absorption is 
illustrated by the fact that 81 percent of new entrants to the labour market were 
matched with job opportunities during the 1960-5 period, while expanded 
employment accounted for only eight percent of new entrants in the period from 
1985 to 1990 (Riley, 1993, p. 8). The resulting increase in unemployment was 
borne mostly by black people. By one account, African unemployment increased 
from 28 percent in 1960 to 50 percent in 1990, while white unemployment 
increased only to 19 percent, up from 15 percent, during the same period (Fallon, 
1992). Since 1990, total formal sector employment has further decreased and 
black unemployment is estimated at 60 percent (see below). Declining labour 
absorption in the formal sector was accompanied by increased informal sector 
employment. The annual rate of employment growth was 24 percent in the 
informal sector between 1983 and 1993 (South African Institute of Race 
Relations, 1996, p. 189).7 This development led policy-makers and planning 
authorities to accept, often reluctantly, that independent black entrepreneurship 
was becoming an economic necessity. This acceptance related not only to 
homelands, but also, albeit in a more limited way, to urban areas. Therefore, 
government policy moved to de-regulate the small enterprise field.
As a result, the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) was 
established in 1980. This was a government-private sector joint venture to provide 
support to small enterprises. Loans to existing businesses were one of its most
7 Almost half (48 percent) o f all informal sector jobs are in trade (ibid.). Hawking is the most 
widespread trading activity.
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sought-after services, although it operated more like a development bank than a 
micro-lender: lending was to established businesses with traceable financial data 
only, collateral was required, and application procedures were similar to those of 
commercial banks. Also, it remains doubtful how important black 
entrepreneurship was on SBDC’s agenda. One of its ex-managers claimed during 
an interview that the emerging black business sector had always been their target 
group, but admitted that almost all lending had gone to small and medium-sized 
white-owned businesses.8 The SBDC was completely restructured and its role 
partially taken over by other institutions in the mid-1990s, as I discuss below. 
Otherwise, the government was committed to de-regulation during the 1980s in 
order to remove the bias against black entrepreneurs, but did little to actively 
promote black entrepreneurship.
The legacy: unemployment, poverty, and the informal economy 
Since the end of Apartheid in 1994, the employment situation has further 
deteriorated. The most important reasons for this are that trade liberalisation has 
led to some, limited, re-organisation in the manufacturing sector, leading to a loss 
of low-skilled jobs, that the gold mining sector is facing a crisis and has shed 
labour, and that political uncertainty and (expected as well as actual) labour 
militancy around the election period led to delayed investment, whose 
employment effect is felt with some time-lag.
8 This comment stems from Wolfgang Thomas, now the chief economist of Wesgro, the regional 
economic promotion agency o f the Western Cape. Prior to the 1994 elections, he was the Western 
Cape manager of SBDC.
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From the end of 1989 to the end of September 1997, total formal non-agricultural 
employment fell by 9.0 percent. This implies that the number of formal non- 
agricultural jobs declined by 509,000. In the private sector, the fall was even 
steeper, and total private sector non-agricultural employment declined by 14.9 
percent over the same time period (South African Reserve Bank, 1998, p. S-124). 
Since the end of 1989, the total number of registered unemployed rose by 159 
percent to 301,214 in September 1997 (South African Reserve Bank, 1998, p. S- 
125). The number of registered unemployed, though, significantly underestimates 
actual unemployment. This is obvious, as the rise in unemployment of just under 
185,000 is smaller than the fall in employment, during a time when the potential 
labour force expanded significantly.
Nattrass and Seeking (1998) report attempts to estimate ‘real’ unemployment. As 
a first step, such an attempt requires an estimate of the size of the potential labour 
force. While the data presented by the South African Reserve Bank captures only 
those who are either formally employed or registered unemployed, an ‘expanded’ 
measure based on survey data seeks to include those who are actively looking for 
work and those who would accept suitable work if available, referred to as the 
‘discouraged workseekers’ (Nattrass and Seeking, 1998, p. 47).
On the basis of these ‘expanded’ estimates of the workforce and industrial surveys 
of the formal labour force, calculation can be made of the total labour absorption
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into formal wage employment. Such a measure expresses the percentage of the 
labour force which is in formal wage employment; its reversal is the 
unemployment rate referring to those unemployed by the formal wage sector, 
excluding informal employment. Based on this measure, Nattrass and Seeking 
detect ‘a steady decline [of labour absorption] over the past two decades’ (1998, p. 
49). They survey studies showing a decline of labour absorption rates from 60.2 
percent in 1975 to 39.3 percent in 1994. Nattrass and Seeking also point out that 
unemployment is correlated not only with racial group but also by gender. 
Especially in the non-white groups, women earn less than men and are more likely 
to be unemployed (Nattrass and Seeking, 1998, p. 46). Hall argues that 
‘[estimates of unemployment, which are notoriously inaccurate, range from 30 to 
60 percent of the economically active population’ (1997, p. 395). The decline of 
labour absorption in the formal economy is mirrored by the rise of informal 
employment, often driven by necessity.
Several authors relate the problems of conceptually defining the informal sector 
and therefore of measuring its size (Kirsten, 1991; Rogerson, 1996). However, 
Rogerson surveys several studies which find that more than 4 million people work 
in informal sector employment. One study by Wolfgang Thomas, a former 
manager at the Small Enterprise Development Corporation, estimates that 4.3 
million people were working in the informal economy in 1993, constituting 28 
percent of the total labour force (Rogerson, 1996, pp. 6-7). Rogerson also shows 
that all surveys find that most informal sector workings are self-employed.
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While large-scale unemployment is a main contributor to poverty, other but often 
related factors contributed to worsening living conditions especially of urban 
black people. ‘Apartheid urban planning and residential settlement patterns 
concentrated the black population in peripheral residential areas, where the highest 
concentrations of unemployment are now found’ (Hall, 1997, p. 396). Further, 
‘the spatial dislocation of the urban working class from the main centres of social, 
cultural and economic life causes huge spatial inefficiencies’ (ibid.) which find 
expression in the huge cost (both financial and non-financial) of commuting.9 
Harrison et al (1997) find that townships are ‘dormitory residential areas’ where 
‘unemployment rates are high, and access to employment for residents is often 
problematic because of the long distances to work’ (p. 44) because of the scarcity 
of local enterprises. They therefore identify ‘local economic development [...] as a 
dominant development strategy for South Africa’s towns and cities’ (ibid, p. 58). 
The formerly imposed limits on entrepreneurial activity also severely constrained 
the availability of goods and services in townships. Such restrictions served to bid 
up the costs of goods and services, especially spaza shops and shebeens,10 while
9 ‘White areas have established agglomeration economies that will enhance returns on investment 
in infrastructure and economic development’ while ‘these positive contextual factors are few or 
absent in the townships’ (Coetzee and Naude, 1997, p. 907). Therefore, ‘many external constraints 
(for instance, on black enterprises) were created by the “apartheid city’” (ibid.) on the economic 
development in black communities.
10 Spaza shops and shebeens are informal, and under Apartheid illegal small service enterprises. 
Spazas are small shops mainly selling food and a limited variety of daily-need items (Robertson, 
1991). Many spazas are operated from residential homes, while others are set up in streets, in tin 
shacks or disused caravans. Shebeens are bars and are almost always operated from residential 
homes (de Haas, 1991).
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potential returns of operating illegal enterprises were depressed by harassment, the 
frequent confiscation of goods, and deportation. The unsecured tenure of 
businesses in townships led, though, also to a popular culture of opposition, in 
which the culture of shebeens plays a pivotal role (de Haas, 1991).
Mass migration to urban centres and the ensuing shortage of housing in townships 
created extremely crammed living conditions, especially towards the end of the 
Apartheid years (Sithole, 1991).11 When authorities increasingly chose to ignore 
the Group Areas Act, from about 1986, migration of black people to previously 
white areas reduced the pressure on housing somewhat. But those able to move to 
white areas were invariably the better-off, middle class blacks (Kotze and 
Donaldson, 1996). Hence, the urban housing shortage became worse as influx 
control weakened. The growth rate of the black urban population was estimated as 
4.3 percent from 1990 onwards, and forecast to remain at the same level until 
2010 (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1993, p. 206) According to the 
South African Housing Trust, a housing NGO, there was a housing backlog in 
urban areas of 1.8 million housing units in mid-1992, and almost 2.0 million 
houses needed to be built until the year 2000 in order to accommodate a growing 
urban population {ibid., pp. 211-2).
As officially ‘temporary’ residents in white South Africa, most township residents 
did not own property, but rented from local government agencies. Decaying urban
11 Previously, influx control and frequent deportation had kept the number of urban blacks 
relatively low, while obviously making life in townships even less predictable.
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living conditions, as well as politically motivated opposition, led to rent and 
service charge boycotts. These, in turn, prompted local authorities to refuse 
responsibility for the up-keep of boycott-inflicted houses and areas. At the same 
time, property owners with mortgages - or bonds, as they are called in South 
Africa - boycotted their repayments, primarily because of a feeling of 
discrimination by banks and mortgage lenders. It was estimated that ‘30 percent of 
the estimated 170,000 African families with housing mortgage bonds had stopped 
paying instalments on their bonds’ (South African Institute of Race Relations, 
1993, p. 435) by mid-1992.
At the same time, organised, but informal community action made repossession of 
houses impossible. Repossessed houses were vandalised and potential buyers 
intimidated, effectively making houses in townships worthless as collateral. The 
Association of Mortgage Lenders stated in 1992 that mere ‘threats of bond 
boycotts had made investors and construction companies reluctant to become 
involved in the lower end of the housing market despite funds being available’ 
{ibid). This led to a downward spiral: while some black organisations called for a 
complete bond boycott in 1992, lenders became cautious, raising the temperature 
of the conflict again because of alleged ‘red-lining’ and racial discrimination. As a 
result, housing finance was increasingly unobtainable for low income groups in 
townships, and the housing backlog increased accordingly. There were renewed 
calls for a bond boycott in 1996, but in mid-1997 only about 10 percent of
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outstanding housing loans in previously black areas were problematic (South 
African Institute of Race Relations, 1997, p. 752).
The developments outlined in this section explain to a large extent the factors 
which inhibit the development of stable communities, conducive to the 
accumulation of social capital (as outlined in section 3.3). Forced removal and 
land appropriation destroyed village communities and urban neighbourhoods and 
disrupted the social relationships embedded in them. The often illegal presence of 
blacks in urban areas, combined with the shortage of housing and other facilities, 
contributed to an atmosphere of insecurity and mistrust. Lack of income earning 
opportunities contributed to a charged competitive spirit and a hitherto unseen 
level of economic aggression. However, the popular dissatisfaction with 
authorities was conducive to other forms of social capital. Mass action, including 
the rent and bond boycotts outlined above, are dependent on social organisation 
and contribute to the formation of relationships which replace those that were 
previously lost. The organisation of hawkers’ associations in many cities and of 
competing taxi associations are also manifestations of ‘non-traditional’ forms of 
social capital accumulation. But these forms do not easily fit into the models of 
solidaristic finance.
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5.2 Political and Economic Transition in South Africa
The year in which the research for this thesis started, 1994, marks a watershed in 
South Africa because the Apartheid regime finally gave way to the Government of 
National Unity, led by the ANC. While the first democratic elections occupy an 
important position in the minds of most observers, it is important to note that 
political transition spanned many years (Schrire, 1991). Apartheid policies were 
softened, and gradually erased, from the 1980s, but the transitional period cannot 
be said to be completed even today.
Since the days of the struggle, the ANC has consistently emphasised its intention 
to address and correct the distortions of the Apartheid economic framework and to 
address the inequality resulting from it. The ANC remained faithful to its stated 
policy objectives, but the economic policy framework through which it seeks to 
achieve them has changed substantially. Before 1990, the ANC did not have an 
economic policy specific and detailed enough to be considered as policy 
documents for a future ANC-led government. During exile, the ANC’s public 
policy statements relied on the ‘Freedom Charter’, a document containing ‘vague 
and contradictory formulations of economic strategy’ (Lundahl, 1998, p. 27). 
However, it was committed to ‘the nationalisation of the mines, banks and 
monopoly industries and for a transfer of land from whites to Africans* (ibid., p. 
28). This document, and two workshops held jointly with the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) in Harare in 1990, scared conservatives prior to
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transition, and was used by some quarters to create a scare of a ‘communist take­
over’. However, these old pre-transition positions never translated into actual 
economic policy once the ANC geared up to taking over government. In the early 
1990s, following its legalisation, a shift took place that de-emphasised 
redistribution of income and wealth as a source of economic growth and placed 
much greater faith in the private sector economy (Nattrass, 1994). The 
transformation of the ANC’s position before its government inauguration 
culminated in the report of the Macroeconomic Research Group (MERG) in 1993. 
MERG brought together economists of varying ideological background, and its 
‘blueprint’ for the ANC economic policy in government was accordingly 
incoherent (Nattrass, 1994).
MERG’s members were all politically close to the broad objectives of the ANC,
but opening the debate to a wide range of economic ideologies reduced the
influence of those in favour of nationalisation and state planning and shifted the
balance to towards market-oriented advice (MERG, 1993). This change of
direction was characterised by most economists as pragmatic (Lundahl, 1998, pp.
28-9), while some saw in it an unwarranted sacrifice of development objectives,
and therefore a bad compromise between acknowledging macro-economic
12constraints and political prerogatives (Fourie, 1996).
12 Fourie (1996) in fact addresses his research to the question ‘Macroeconomic balance or 
development?’, implying that strict fiscal prudence is incompatible with the developmental 
objectives of post-Apartheid macro-economic management. Predictably, he concludes that the 
ANC-led government should emphasise redistributive objectives. Dollery (1994) argues that the 
effect of redistribution on growth is more complex than most contributors to the policy debate in 
South Africa assume. In particular, ‘[wjealth redistribution may enhance economic growth in the
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Shortly after the assumption of power by the ANC-led government in 1994, the 
ANC’s new economic policy was outlined in the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (ANC, 1994). This was in some ways similar the MERG report, but 
also emphasised additional government provision to the poor in areas such as low- 
cost housing, education, electrification, provision of safe water and health 
services, and credible efforts towards the redistribution of land towards the rural 
poor. These were, however, accompanied by promises to stay within strict 
spending limits, to follow prudent conservative fiscal policies and to leave much 
of the financial superstructure of the last government intact. In combination with 
the financial obligations inherited from the former government (especially in the 
form of inflated government apparatuses in the both the Republic of South Africa 
as well its nominally autonomous or independent homelands, and the entrenched 
rights of their employees), these commitments limited the budgetary independence 
of the new government.
The RDP programme was to be funded from its own, separate budget. However, 
its responsibilities overlapped with those of traditional government departments 
through which much of its actual work had to be directed. Limited implementation 
capacity resulted in underspending of RDP funds. Implementation problems were 
confounded by allegations of non-cooperative, hostile old staff and counter­
short term by transforming some of the stock of wealth into income, and depress economic growth 
in the longer term because of the reduction o f capital stock’ (ibid., p. 203).
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allegations of inexperienced and under-qualified new staff. Finally, despite actual 
underspending, it became clear that the RDP’s promises, including one million 
new low-cost houses within five years, could not realistically be financed under 
the strict fiscal constraint the government had promised to follow (Lundahl, 1998, 
p. 30; Gibson and van Seventer, 1996).
In the face of mounting obstacles and public criticism, the RDP office was closed 
in 1995 and the control of strategic economic policy shifted to the Department of 
Finance. During the phase of perceived failure of the RDP in 1995, the public 
debate crystallised around the large vested interest groups, and employers’ 
organisations and trade unions put forward arguments and policy suggestions in 
direct competition. The ANC began tilting to the fiscally conservative side, and 
differences with COSATU became public. This situation of policy impasse - the 
RDP perceived as having failed but not yet formally superseded by another 
strategy - may have contributed to the rapid reversal of capital flows in early 1996, 
leading to a crisis of the Rand. From the end of January to the end of April 1996, 
the nominal effective exchange rate of the Rand fell by 16.7 percent, pushing 
inflation up to a height in mid-1996 and causing two increases of the Bank rate, 
rising by 2 percent, in 1996 (South African Reserve Bank, 1998, p. S-26). During 
the crisis, the government sought to assuage the fears on international capital 
markets by presenting itself as reliable, fiscally conservative and single-mindedly 
favouring external stability over internal political pressures.
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In June 1996, the government then presented its document on Growth, 
Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR). This sets out a framework, based on an 
econometric model, for achieving real annual GDP growth of six percent by the 
year 2000 and significant employment creation as a result. Government’s role, 
though, is limited; its most important input lies in its commitment to reducing the 
fiscal deficit and maintaining external stability while ‘activist’ policies in areas 
such as housing and education were to unfold within such constraints (Donaldson, 
1997). Growth, according to the model, relies on private sector investment and 
foreign capital inflows. The GEAR document presented a further move, prompted 
by the crisis as well as the thinking of the Department of Finance, towards 
conservative conception of the government’s role in economic development. 
Despite its politically appeasing name, it ‘puts growth ahead of employment and 
redistribution’ (Lundahl, 1998, p. 33). Immediately, criticism centred on the 
appropriateness of the econometric model that was used, over-optimistic data and 
the lack of a credible causal explanation of the private sector response - in terms 
of investment activity and job creation - on which its predictions rely (Nattrass, 
1996).
Economic policy and the poor
The development of the economic policy of the ANC and the ANC-led 
government shows that the emphasis has changed from favouring direct 
intervention to reliance on market dynamics. While the end of Apartheid has 
resulted in a reduction of inequality - mainly because of a less distorted formal
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labour market (Nattrass and Seeking, 1998) - economic opportunities for the poor 
have not improved as much as they had hoped in 1994. Even the advocates of 
liberal economic strategies point out that the ‘trickle down’ process, by which 
macro-economic growth translates into employment growth and welfare gains for 
the poor, is part of a long-term strategy (Donaldson, 1997).13 Independent from 
the perceived theoretical merits of this approach, recent economic performance 
lacks the vigour on which enhanced employment and redistribution depend. Real 
GDP growth in 1997 was only 1.7 percent, following marginally higher rates of 
growth in preceding years (South African Reserve Bank, 1998, p. S-137), 
implying a marginal drop on a per capital basis of 0.4 percent in 1997. Personal 
disposable income fell by 1.3 percent in real terms during 1997. Consecutive years 
of negative per capita growth in the early 1990s mean that its level in 1997 is 8.5 
percent below its level in 1989 (South African Reserve Bank, 1998, p. S-138).
Due to the limitations implied in a conservative financial policy, critics have 
argued that the objective of redistribution towards the poor has been compromised 
by financial constraints and the perceived demands of ‘international investors’. In 
fact, while early programmes sought to address the Apartheid legacy through 
large-scale macro-economic intervention, including nationalisation, current policy 
lacks a ‘grand design’. This, it is important to point out, is seen by many as a
13 Donaldson also argues that ‘[t]he GEAR framework provides for a marked acceleration in 
government investment spending’ (1997, p. 456) in order to reduce the investment backlog of 
R170 billion in social infrastructure, ‘including education and health facilities and basic residential 
services’ (ibid.). However, this provision under the GEAR framework depends on its assumptions 
about accelerated economic growth.
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strength and a sign of the maturity of the ANC’s policy, while others see it as a 
sell-out of an organisation started as a liberation movement.
Macro-economic, fiscal prudence still leaves the possibility of micro-level 
intervention in favour of asset and income redistribution. Such attempts have 
sometimes been disappointing, mainly because of implementation delays, often 
due to institutional constraints. Kotze and Basson show that in the early 1990s the 
ANC was committed to land redistribution ‘subject to payment of “just” 
compensation determined by a court of law* and that ‘the state must take 
responsibility for redistribution’ (1994, p. 186). Following its accession to 
government, the ANC set ‘a goal of redistributing 30 percent of agricultural land 
from whites to blacks within five years and restoration of land forcibly 
appropriated after 1913’ (Cousins, 1995, p. 481). A Land Restitution Commission 
and a Land Claims Court were set up to address legal claims resulting from forced 
evictions under Apartheid. However, land reform policy followed the example of 
other areas of economic policy in increasingly opting for market-orientation rather 
than for direct intervention. Since the mid-1990s, ‘the government intends to 
accelerate private market transactions by restructuring financial services in rural 
areas’, which implied the government’s ‘acceptance of voluntary market transfers 
[which] was welcomed by champions of the free market in South Africa (Lyne 
and Darroch, 1997, p. 562). Although current data on redistributed land are hard to 
come by, some estimates put the amount of land acquired by disadvantaged 
entrants at below 1 percent of all arable land (ibid., p. 564). Restoration of land
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ownership through the Land Restitution Commission and the Land Claims Court 
encountered numerous delays due to the legalistic nature of the process, especially 
as the rights of existing owners and the public interest in uninterrupted production 
are given substantial weight. The prospect of land reform is now viewed more 
critically than a few years ago (de Wet, 1997).
Commitments to accelerated building programmes, including low-cost housing, 
drinking water and sanitation (Eberhard and Quick, 1995), and electrification 
(White et al, 1997), were to be financed within the budget constraints from the 
RDP allocation (van Horen, 1996). As outlined above, RDP implementation 
proved arduous and lags behind schedule (Friedman, 1997). The responsibility for 
delivering the goods originally promised under the RDP now lies with respective 
ministries and government departments, and only electrification seems to proceed 
satisfactory (Eskom, 1998, pp. 42-3). In health and education, where government 
provision was highly skewed in favour of rich and white people under Apartheid, 
the government sways expenditure towards the poor. This includes an emphasis 
on primary health provision and the offer of free health care for children. 
However, the slow, compromise-seeking process of change leaves many 
disappointed.
Despite the limitations to direct intervention implied in the macro-economic 
policy pursued by the ANC-led government, the end of Apartheid as a political 
event brought about noticeable effects. While domestic economic policy was more
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continuous than many South Africans had expected, the attitudes of foreign 
decision-makers affecting the South African economy changed considerably. 
International sanctions were lifted, diplomatic ties were established with many 
developing countries and followed by increased trade links.14 South Africa is now 
a considerably more open society, and has a more open economy. The effects are 
felt at various levels: South African manufacturers complain about stiffer 
competition, stemming both from legal imports as well as increased contraband; 
tourism has boomed since 1995, as has international drug trafficking. Foreign 
direct investment, however, has not reach the levels expected by policy-makers, 
with detrimental effects on employment creation.
Financing non-governmental development expenditure
One economic sector specifically affected by the changed attitudes of foreign 
decision-makers is the voluntary sector as the political context of aid flows to 
South Africa was substantially changed. Here, two distinct effects are visible: 
compared with the preceding decades, the focus of government policy shifted 
towards those who were deemed the victims of Apartheid, and the focus of donor 
policy shifted from political liberation towards economic and social upliftment. At
14 The direction of trade flows does not, obviously, always depend on diplomatic developments. It 
is interesting to note that the improved and heightened profile of South Africa led to rather rapid 
expansion o f exports. A worthwhile case is wine: arguably, western consumers buy wine not only 
on the basis of a quality/price evaluation, but also on the basis of the perceived attractions of its 
originating country. Following the transition to democracy in 1994, South Africa’s wine exports 
shot up, increasing by over 100 percent per annum to some markets (especially the Nordic 
countries). Although wine constitutes only a small part of South Africa’s exports, anecdotal 
evidence points to noticeably improved employment conditions for unskilled, black labour in the 
Western Cape, where all of South Africa’s export-destined wine is produced. More recently, black 
empowerment deals led to the first black-owned and operated wine producers in South Africa.
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least nominally, therefore, government and donors found themselves working 
towards shared goals.
Despite the more laudable government objective, several NGOs felt threatened as 
benevolent government planners sought to limit their independence. It was argued 
that ‘consideration needs to be given to establishing a national forum of 
government and NGOs through which all foreign donor assistance is channelled to 
nationally determined priorities, regions and sectors’ (Jinubhai, 1995, p. 110). 
This line of thinking exercised a strong pull of resources towards the RDP and of 
subsuming the work of NGOs to centrally determined plans and delivery 
measurements. NGOs steeped in the tradition of defiance during the Apartheid era 
seemed to loose their justification and their access to overseas donor funds. 
Especially smaller NGOs felt vulnerable; their anxiety was amplified by the fact 
that social development - the field of their experience, which they still thought of 
great importance despite political liberation - was to be dominated by measurable 
delivery in sectors such as housing, with little regard for the needs of their specific 
constituents. For some time, NGOs became cautious.15 Micro-finance institutions, 
too, were uptight with providing information on their financial performance, 
although they were never seriously endangered by the general funding upheaval 
because of the simultaneous boom in donor funding for micro-credit. Although
15 This impaired my fieldwork in 1994-5 because many NGOs were unwilling to share information 
about their activities, or even finances. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in some cases even 
donors were denied adequate access to vital information. Not only NGOs, but also their 
employees, vied each other suspiciously while the fortunate ones won contracts under RDP 
programmes.
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this was maybe not quite visible yet in 1994, micro-credit gained so much 
importance in the following years that there is excess funding capacity in Southern 
Africa.16
5.3 The Financial Sector in South Africa
South Africa has, for the half-century spent under Apartheid ideology, striven to 
develop a modem, European-style society for the white members of its society 
while excluding the majority from this development and banishing them to tribal, 
pseudo-traditional lands and lifestyles. The enforced ‘invisibility’ of black people, 
from a white perspective - except for rendering services - was mirrored in the 
structure and working logic of its banks, and the mentality of its management. 
While that legacy cannot quickly be overcome, rapid changes have taken place 
since the mid-1980s.
Banking was thought, by assumption, to be the prerogative of the affluent, and by 
implication, white. The invisibility of the majority is best illustrated by informal 
remarks made by bankers. In 1993, bankers at their Johannesburg headquarters 
claimed that 85 percent of the country’s population were ‘unbankable’, while a
16 During fieldwork, this view was confirmed by Pinky Mashigo, representative of the European 
Commission and by Ellen Brown, Southern Africa representative of the Ford Foundation. During 
1996-7, when I undertook research on micro-finance for the Bank of Botswana, similar views 
were expressed by Marcia Musisi-Nkambwe, representing USAID, James Hochschwender, 
consultant to USAID, Aniceto Bila, NGO liaison officer o f the World Bank, Kerstin Kiehl o f the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and Jan Vossen, regional representative o f the Dutch donor Hivos. 
The sources of funding and the possible reasons for excess funding are discussed in the last section 
of this chapter.
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regional manager (Grahamstown branch) claimed that his branch was serving 
black people adequately, only that there were very few, and therefore only few 
required loans.
The South African financial system is the most highly developed and most 
sophisticated in Africa. Despite its size and complexity, I will summarise it only 
briefly. Its most important institutions, including the central bank and the major 
commercial banks, have no significant contact with the part of the population that 
is most attracted to micro-finance services. The changes affecting development 
finance institutions, and their emerging new structure, will be discussed more 
prominently towards the end of this section.
The formal financial system - some key institutions
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) is responsible for banking supervision, 
foreign exchange reserves, and monitoring foreign exchange transactions and 
enforcing capital controls. Liberalisation of the foreign account since 1995 
reduced its role in maintaining external stability. It further plays a role in advising 
government and implementing government policies related to its field of 
responsibility, while enjoying a status of semi-independence.
Following the election in 1994, the new government saw it in its interest to calm 
fears of instability on international financial markets and decided to retain high- 
level personnel inherited from the previous government. Therefore, the finance
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minister at the time, Derek Keys, stayed in his post until he was succeeded by 
Chris Liebenberg, another conservative banker. Only in 1996 did the ANC-led 
government appoint a finance minister from its own ranks, Trevor Manuel, 
following Chris Liebenberg’s resignation in the middle of a severe currency crisis.
While the continuity at the Finance Ministry related mainly to its head, the 
Reserve Bank is probably the only major public institution that has not 
significantly changed the composition of its staff. Not only the governor, Chris 
Stals, but almost all senior staff stem from the Apartheid-era. Generally, the 
Reserve Bank has little contact with micro-finance institutions. Some minor 
questions concerning financial regulation and micro-finance arose in the early 
1990s, and the Reserve Bank has generally taken a sensible, liberal course of 
action.17
The commercial banking sector is dominated by four large banking groups. All 
four groups comprise several institutions, including banks, insurance companies 
and mortgage or leasing firms. The diversity of institutions and financial products 
offered by each group is very wide (Jones, 1992). Besides functional sub-division 
into merchant banks, retail banks, insurance, vehicle finance and other specialised
17 These issues related to items such as portfolio quality in a case where micro-lenders borrowed 
from commercial banks and re-lent without collateral. Another major case was the establishment 
of a supervisory framework for mutual banks. However, there remains some doubt that its staff 
fully understand the nature of micro-finance. Two seminars that it held on the topic of micro- 
finance in 1996 and 1997 were dominated not by enterprise-oriented micro-lenders, but by 
consumption-oriented lenders. Although calling themselves ‘micro-credit institutions’, they 
require collateral and lend only to employed people. These firms are owned and managed by 
Afrikaners, and research on them was carried out at the Afrikaans-language University of 
Stellenbosch.
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service providers, the four national groups own also regional banks. All banking 
groups are historically linked to mining interests and mining finance houses. 
Three of them, the bank groups led by the Standard Bank of South Africa, 
Nedbank, and First National Bank of South Africa, are related to the traditionally 
English-speaking urban white professional class, while the fourth group, led by 
ABSA (Amalgamated Banks of South Africa) is comprised of institutions which 
were mostly the product of Afrikaner advancement into mining, finance and the 
professions from the 1920s onwards. The banking groups have been instrumental 
in recent years in financing leveraged buy-outs of large white-owned firms by 
black interests, usually pension funds of black trade unions. The firms sold to 
black investors, often insurance companies, were usually carved out of the mining 
and banking groups themselves.
Commercial banks and black customers
Since about 1990, all bank groups have sought to attract previously ‘unbankable’ 
customers. In some cases, this involves cooperation with NGOs or black 
organisations. In others, banks have set up schemes for lending to poor black 
people, usually entrepreneurs, or have re-focused existing financial products more 
directly towards the ‘black’ market. While all four banking groups addressed 
problems of ‘banking the unbankable’, and all set up separate departments or 
research units, the level of activity remained rather different between them.
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However, these attempts have, in some cases, looked less than plausible. In order 
to demonstrate credible interest in the low-income black market, a bank will need 
to strive to develop methods of serving poor customers in a profitable way. As 
long as banks view their engagement in this market segment as permanently loss- 
making, they will understand it as a costly image-oriented activity - similar to 
corporate sponsoring for other worthy causes - rather than as a serious business in 
its own right. In general terms, most banks have tended to create small enterprise 
lending departments within their headquarters structures. These departments were 
staffed by research and product development staff who were highly motivated and 
committed to their brief, but isolated from ‘serious’ decision-making within their 
organisations. This perception is underlined by the assertion of a senior bank 
manager in 1994, responsible for strategic planning, who explained to me that it 
was in the bank’s profit-making interest ‘to be seen to do our bit for society’.
One example was the Business Growth Plan, a trial scheme run by Standard Bank. 
It operated in Katlehong, a township south of Johannesburg, during 1994, but was 
discontinued in 1995. It was started with special meetings where a loan officer 
addressed the public outside a Standard Bank branch, followed by a business 
viability workshop for approved applicants. If the field officer finds applicants’ 
businesses viable, they were asked to save 20 percent of their prospective loan 
amount. Loan amounts could vary from R1500 to R2500 for the first and from 
R2000 to R5000 for all successive loans. The scheme was discontinued because 
loan demand proved disappointing and costs higher than expected. According to
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Standard Bank staff, defaults were not an important reason for the termination of 
the programme.18
Non-bank financial institutions: formal and informal lenders 
Institutional credit is available to most South Africans, even the previously 
disadvantaged, in the form of retail credit. Most furniture chains as well as many 
other retailers provide credit (Van Rooyen, 1993). Credit conditions are 
sometimes very competitive, but this may be misleading as cash purchasers are 
often in a position to negotiate discounts. Retail credit, though, is mostly of 
interest to consumers. Producers, even micro-entrepreneurs, tend to seek out 
cheaper inputs from cash-and-carry warehouses or factory shops.
Credit Unions have only limited impact in South Africa. Several large credit 
unions are active, but their members are mostly recruited from formal sector 
employees who tend to be better-off black people. There is little evidence of 
business lending, and Kwedie Mkalipi, the general manager of the Savings and 
Credit Cooperative League of South Africa, stated during private discussions in 
1994 that ‘the poorest are a drain on us’. Although involvement of many 
households poorer than the national average may contribute to a reduction in
18 While I am critical about the Standard bank here, it may be important to give banks some credit 
for running unsuccessful trial operations if they remain interested in the ‘unbankable’. Standard 
Bank continues to serve a low-income market. At the time of the Business Growth Plan trial 
scheme, Andrew de Beer (manager, informal business lending) told me about the ‘design’ work 
for E Bank, a banking facility planned for low-income customer, which relies heavily on ATM 
machines. E Bank is now operating, and it remains to be seen whether it will be more successful 
than other low-income banking schemes. A preliminary analysis provides reason for optimism 
(Paulson and McAndrews, 1997).
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economic inequality, credit unions do not reach typical micro-finance 
beneficiaries.
Moneylenders offer short-term credit at very high interest rates. Harper (1998, p. 
143) reports about interest rates of 50 percent per month while Van Rooyen 
(1993) mentions similar rates. Although moneylenders perform an important role 
as emergency lenders, there is no evidence of them providing business finance 
except for short-term working capital purposes (Preston-Whyte, 1991). On the 
basis of research in a number of other African countries, Nissanke and Aryeetey 
(1998) conclude that ‘[c]redit from moneylenders is not attractive for investment 
purposes’ mainly because of their restricted capital base and market rigidities. 
However, the activity of informal moneylenders is probably underrepresented in 
literature on informal economic activities in South Africa. Informal credit is 
probably widely available as emergency consumption credit, especially in urban 
areas. But informal moneylending is not even discussed in the Race Relation 
Surveys and rarely elsewhere.
Stokvels, the South African term for ROSCAs and similar group-oriented savings 
and credit clubs, vary in size from a handful of friends to over a hundred members 
(Thomas, 1991). Most are formed as burial societies, which provide insurance 
against the burial costs of family members, or as consumer clubs aimed at 
financing consumer durables. Business finance is a motive behind a minority of 
stokvels (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1993, p. 112). In 1996, about
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29 percent of Africans were members of stokvels and contributed about R30 per 
month to the more popular types of stokvels, such as burial societies, but typically 
between R90 and R250 per month to investment-oriented stokvels (South African 
Institute of Race Relations, 1997, p. 282).
This leaves a wide ‘market’ to the micro-finance institutions. Their niche is a wide 
open field of poor people who require credit typically because they wish or need 
to start a business, or because they plan to build or improve residential property. 
Poor people also value other financial services - mostly savings facilities and 
insurance - which neither retail lenders nor informal moneylenders offer, but 
which are typically a feature of many micro-finance institutions. While banks 
hardly ever get in touch with this section of society, and informal finance is ill- 
suited for meeting their needs, micro-finance institutions never reported a lack of 
demand as a constraining factor. The graduation of mature borrowers from micro­
finance schemes to formal finance, though, remains difficult. The most important 
constraint is the Usury Act which limits interest rates on loans above R6,000 to 
the prime rate plus nine percent. Therefore, micro-finance institutions can charge 
cost-covering interest rates for small loans, but there remains a ceiling through 
which only few borrowers can break.19
19 Recently, some micro-finance institutions succeeded in negotiating an exception from the Usury 
Act. The Start-Up Fund, for example, could therefore raise its loan limit to R12,000. From such a 
level, graduation of borrowers to banks should be possible. However, loan portfolios have to 
mature further before conclusions could be reached. It is important to note, though, that most 
micro-finance clients in South Africa are given access to bank accounts, and therefore have the 
opportunity o f establishing a track record.
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Institutional changes and SME Support policies 1994-7
Between the change of government in 1994 and the end of 1997, the small 
enterprise promotion ‘landscape’ has been re-modelled substantially. The Small 
Business Development Corporation has all but vanished from small enterprise 
lending, the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) has relinquished its 
role in this field, new institutions were formed, and micro-enterprises first reached 
the policy agenda of the national government. Reviewing this period, Thomas 
(1997) argues that ‘South Africa has shown that a concerted, national effort 
towards a new SME support strategy is possible’ but concludes gloomily that 
‘national strategies, White Papers, Presidential Conferences and consultative 
mechanisms are all but a few early steps in the complex, slow and highly 
disaggregated process of small enterprise promotion’ (p. 13). In fact, changes have 
either not yet reached the intended beneficiaries, or, as some critics would point 
out, the changed superstructure had little effect in real terms.
In 1989, the Development Bank of Southern Africa started to support NGOs 
involved in micro-credit. This represented the first step of official 
acknowledgement and support for the micro-enterprise sector. However, allegedly 
because of the perceived political set-up of the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa, this function was devolved to a ‘black’ institution, Khula Enterprise 
Finance Limited. Therefore, its micro-finance support policies could never fully 
develop and had only limited effect.
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The political troubles of the Development Bank of Southern Africa originate from 
the days of its role in setting up the Apartheid-based view of Southern Africa. 
Under Apartheid, it served as a regional development bank with responsibilities 
for not only the Republic of South Africa and its autonomous homelands, but also 
the ‘independent* countries of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. The 
services offered to those four countries, which enjoyed only token independence 
and were not internationally recognised, were the sole justification of the 
Development Bank’s ‘regional’ claim. Thus, it constituted a tool in the creation of
an Apartheid-conforming Southern Africa and, as such, emerged tinted from the
20Apartheid era.
Only in late 1997 had South Africa arrived at its new institutional set-up for SME 
support, and most of the new institutions had started operating. Following the 
Small Business Enabling Act, approved by Parliament in 1996, the official SME 
support framework consists of the following institutions:
• the Centre for Small Business Promotion is a policy think-tank within the 
Department of Trade and Industry, and coordinates the initiatives of central 
government;
20 This picture should, though, be complemented by an alternative view which holds that the 
Development Bank was staffed by those members o f the ruling social ‘tribe’, Afrikaners, who had 
an authentic interest in black economic and social development. According to this view, they saw 
the Development Bank of Southern Africa as a refuge where ‘subversive’ activities of black 
economic empowerment could be pursued without rebuke. This view of the Development Bank 
was relayed to my by some of its long-serving staff members.
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• the Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency provides all non-financial SME 
support, chiefly through independent service providers (mostly NGOs) in areas 
such as training and technology support;
• Khula Enterprise Finance Limited is a ‘wholesale’ lender for micro-and small 
enterprise credit institutions, but also supports capacity building; and
• the National Small Business Council is a representative institution for 
entrepreneurs to voice their concerns to government, based on federal 
principles.
The Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency operates via Local Business Service 
Centres, Tender Advice Centres and a several NGOs. It started to operate in 1996 
and supported 65 service providers in mid-1997. Khula Enterprise Finance is the 
only financial institution in the new small enterprise promotion framework and 
will be discussed below. The National Small Business Council is constituted by 
Provincial Small Business Council members who are elected from regions within 
their respective provinces. These provincial representatives constitute the national 
council (Kirsten, 1997).
It is important to note that during this phase, from the change of government in 
1994 to the establishment of the new small business promotion framework in 
1997, there was almost no public debate. Kirsten, summarising the process in 
1997, reports that the political process leading to the new framework ‘was 
launched from a very thin base. There were few groups representing SMMEs
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[small, medium, and micro-enterprises], and amongst them was a lot of infighting. 
There was insufficient applied research’, while donors contributed models of ‘best 
practice not always applicable on South Africa’ (1997, p.3; see also Riley, 1996) 
This all meant that ‘the process of developing a strategy was driven from the top, 
at national government level’ (ibid.). This lack of public debate can be explained 
by the overwhelming number of problems facing the government and South 
African society during transition, and the lack of experienced and trusted 
personnel at government level. Together with the funding scare mentioned above, 
this was a further factor leading to the isolation of NGOs during the time of my 
fieldwork.
Emergence o f the new development finance framework
Following the reconstruction of the institutional environment, five institutions are 
now active in development finance activities. Not all relate to micro-enterprises, 
but all seek to complement the market-oriented financial institutions in pursuit of 
government policy objectives. These are:
1. the Development Bank of Southern Africa,
2. the Industrial Development Corporation,
3. the Land and Agricultural Bank,
4. the National Housing Finance Corporation, and
5. Khula Enterprise Finance Limited.
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The Development Bank of Southern Africa, as outlined above, had some of its 
responsibilities removed and concentrates now on infrastructural development, 
often leveraging private sector investment. However, while its regional focus 
under Apartheid related only to the nominally independent homelands, it now 
seeks to become active in SADC countries. There, it seeks to address needs 
beyond the narrow role in its home economy and to find a role in lending towards 
development of agriculture and SME promotion, including micro-credit. 
However, these regional ambitions were still at a planning stage in 1997.
The Industrial Development Corporation, a less important player, lends for 
manufacturing purposes, mainly to medium-sized firms. It used to concentrate its 
efforts on industries with demonstrated export potential, and had its focus shifted 
to SADC countries.
The Land and Agricultural Bank has its origins in the former Land Bank. This 
government-owned bank constituted part of the design for Afrikaner 
advancement. It lent mainly to Afrikaner fanners, supporting the acquisition of 
large farms, often preceded by the forced expulsion of black smallholders, and the 
adoption of capital-intensive farming methods.21 In this effort, it was aided by the 
agricultural marketing boards for the major types of farm output which guaranteed 
prices and controlled imports and distribution. In the slowly changing political
21 The Land Bank administered de-facto subsidies to farmers by offering loans at very low interest 
rates. In 1982, when its function o f subsidising farmers through cheap credit was largely removed, 
the interest rate on short-term loans was raised from 2.75 percent to 17.75 percent, implying that 
interest rates had been subsidised by 15 percent (The Banker, September 1982, p. 18).
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climate of the 1980s, the Land Bank ‘re-discovered’ black smallholders as a target 
group. It now plays a double role in continuing to be one of the major banks for 
large commercial farmers as well as supporting land purchasing and start-up loans 
for small-scale farming, in line with the land redistribution objectives of 
government.
Unlike the previous three institutions, the National Housing Finance Corporation 
and Khula Enterprise Finance had no predecessors. The National Housing Finance 
Corporation, created in April 1996, provides finance for the construction, 
extension and improvement of housing for South Africa’s black population. It 
uses a variety of financial tools, such as mortgage guarantees, refinance for NGOs 
involved in housing issues, and potentially micro-finance. However, as a very 
young institution venturing into a new activity, its impact has been limited so far. 
Khula Enterprise Finance was launched in December 1995 and took over the 
portfolio of loans to micro-finance organisation from the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa when it became operational in 1996. Plans are under way to 
support to capacity building of micro-finance institutions, but, like the National 
Housing Finance Corporation, Khula is still too young to be able to analyse its 
development.
Policy towards SME promotion, and development finance, in the early and mid- 
1990s was thus characterised by inconsistency between the not-yet-vanished old 
and the not-yet-fimctioning new. Old institutions and policies, that had been set up
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with different objectives, ground to a halt as they were evaluated and restructured. 
New institutions were created where this was thought necessary by the new 
authorities. It was in this situation of uncertainty of future policy that I conducted 
fieldwork.
5.4 Micro-finance Institutions in South Africa
The micro-finance sector in South Africa is still small and young, and its core 
consists of only four institutions. Because of the limited number of institutions 
vying for funds, and their limited capacity to absorb them, there is practically no 
competition for funding. Donors, therefore, have not been able to imprint then- 
own designs on micro-finance institutions in South Africa. This situation can be 
traced to the different objectives under Apartheid: not finance, but racial 
suppression was the main impediment to successful and equitable enterprise 
development. Once funding levels increased for ‘new wave* micro-finance 
institutions - due both to political liberation in South Africa and to increasing 
donor interest in micro-finance world-wide - there were only few institutions in 
South Africa fitting the new paradigm. Prior to decisive easing of Apartheid 
constraints, most NGO work was related to the political liberation that was to 
precede economic objectives. NGOs were, therefore, involved in political 
organisation besides the more traditional roles in education, health and other 
social matters. This different, more politically driven approach did not completely 
preclude lending to the ‘unbankable’, but provided a different setting for them.
198
There are examples of the ‘old’, pre-micro-fmance approach. These are integrated 
institutions built around a ‘theme’, or policy objective such as poverty alleviation, 
employment creation or small enterprise development. In fact, these goals are 
often found in some combination, although they are not identical.
When lending is not micro-finance: the Triple Trust Organisation 
One such organisation is the Triple Trust Organisation (TTO) in Cape Town. It 
was started in 1988. Its name relates to the founder’s ‘holistic vision of providing 
training, marketing and finance’ (Triple Trust Organisation, 1993, p. 1). It intends 
to ‘train individuals in labour intensive production, using simple technology, 
business skills and providing access to markets and to credit’ (ibid.). Its loan 
programme, operated by the subsidiary Self-Help Financing Trust, advances loans 
to its trainees for the purchase of capital equipment and raw material. In 1993, it
advanced 215 loans, sharply up from 48 loans in 1992. During those two years it
received grants and concessional long-term funding of R2.1 million, most of it 
from the Development Bank of Southern Africa. In 1993, its spending on fixed 
assets reached R487,000, and its net loan book R220,000 including provisions for 
bad debt of R142.000, 65.0 percent of the total (Triple Trust Organisation, 1994, 
p. 31). Neither the level of financial support from donors nor the level of capital 
expenditure could be justified by its lending activity. Also, its 62 members of staff 
are mostly busy with business and skills training, not with credit-related activities.
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In discussions with Don Shay, a coordinator at the Triple Trust Organisation, in 
June 1994 the issue of sustainability was discussed. He explained that the 
philosophy of the organisation emphasised the sustainability of its beneficiaries. 
Creating sustainable and profitable enterprises was the objective of the Triple 
Trust Organisation. Achieving high repayment rates from its portfolio of mini- 
loans is seen by its staff as a good indicator of the beneficiaries’ ability to create 
sufficient income and to stay in business. The high rate of provisions for its 
outstanding loan indicate, though, that some doubt exists about their beneficiaries’ 
success rate.
The Triple Trust Organisation could not, therefore, expect to become financially 
sustainable through the interest payments received from its clients. Don Shay 
argued that the organisation’s sustainability rested in its capacity to deliver on its 
own objectives, on its achievement in creating viable businesses, and its ability to 
convince donors that this is a worthwhile objective pursued by the Triple Trust 
Organisation in an accountable and efficient manner. Financial sustainability, he 
emphasised, could lie in the cross-subsidisation of its core activities by revenue 
generated from consultancy. The professional staff of the Triple Trust 
Organisation offer consultancy services to other NGOs and government.
The lending scheme of the Triple Trust Organisation is, therefore, not being 
implemented with the intention of contributing to the lender’s, but to the 
borrowers’ sustainability. It is a tool applied in pursuit of the organisation’s
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developmental objectives. Most importantly, the Triple Trust Organisation does 
not describe itself as a financial institution. This sets it apart from the new 
generation of micro-lenders, and in comparison to their lending volumes, the 
lending activities of the Triple Trust Organisation are insignificant.
Most micro-finance institutions in South Africa were set up later than the Triple 
Trust Organisation, mostly in the early 1990s. In 1997, the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa commissioned a study of all micro-finance institutions to which it 
had contributed resources. This including 13 institutions which, according to 
another, independent study, ‘are the principle micro-lending institutions in the 
country’ (Ashe 1997, p. 6). Together, they serve only 24,000 borrowers; this
compares with Ashe’s estimates of 3.5 million survivalist enterprises and 8.0
22million small, medium and micro-enterprises (ibid.). However, the micro­
finance sector in South Africa is still underdeveloped,23 and therefore dominated 
by a handful of relatively older organisations. ‘Nearly 21,000 of the 24,000 
enterprises are served by just five programs: the Get Ahead Foundation, the Small
22 On average, 70 percent of all micro-finance beneficiaries are urban, while 71 percent are women 
(BEES, 1997).
23 Especially in comparison to a country like Bangladesh, where several large and established 
micro-finance institutions compete for clients and funding, each with over 100,000 clients. Similar 
large institutions exist in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, while in Bolivia a large number of institutions 
compete a relatively limited micro-lending market (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997; World Bank, 
1996). Due to the relative abundance of funding for micro-finance in Southern Africa and the 
mass of ‘eligible’ poor, micro-finance institutions in Southern Africa are not in a competitive 
situation.
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Enterprise Fund (sic), Rural Financial (sic) Facility,24 Start-Up Fund, and IB EC’ 
(Ashe 1997, p. 7).
The average loan size of IBEC (Informal Business Enrichment Centre) is over 
R8,000 (BEES, 1997, table 22) and therefore falls outside the micro-lending 
category. From its inception in 1990 onwards, IBEC was the first lender to the 
informal sector in South Africa lending exclusively to individuals, until it was 
joined by the Start-Up Fund in 1993. The interest rate on its loans, at 19 percent, 
is closer to the prime rate of commercial banks than that of other micro-lenders. 
IBEC’s entry-level loans are also rather large - around R2,000 is the lowest its 
credit officers consider, and most are above R4,000 - and it does not lend for 
business start-ups or businesses lacking some form of documentation. For this 
reason, IBEC does not qualify as a ‘real* micro-finance institution and I will not 
discussed it in detail.
The Get Ahead Foundation was the first institution in South Africa to extend 
credit to ‘unbankable* urban micro-entrepreneurs. In the BEES survey, it showed 
the largest number of borrowers. However, its focus on liberation, its link to the 
civic movement and the politicisation of its staff had led to financial problems in 
the early 1990s (Churchill, 1997). When I conducted my fieldwork, the Get Ahead 
Foundation was in the middle of its restructuring and had all but withdrawn from 
the micro-finance debate. Mpumzi Pupuma, since 1996 the Get Ahead
24 It should be the Small Enterprise Foundation and the Rural Finance Facility.
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Foundation’s new managing director, (now renamed to ‘Get Ahead Financial 
Services’) asserted during a brief discussion in Pretoria in early 1997 that the 
organisation would now concentrate on financial service provision as ‘the old 
battles are fought, won, and over’. While the Get Ahead Foundation had a crisis 
related to its re-direction from semi-political movement to financial institution, the 
three remaining micro-finance institutions in the sample were started with a clear 
agenda focusing on delivering financial services.
Adding value to the banking system: the Rural Finance Facility 
Most striking, in this regard, is maybe the Rural Finance Facility. It was 
established in 1991, but the first loans were made in 1993 through its branch in 
Brits. Its main office is in Doomfontein, an office area in Johannesburg, and it 
maintains regional offices in most provinces. The Rural Finance Facility was 
founded by Chris Hock. He has worked for the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa and had been the finance manager of the Rural Advice Centre before 
establishing the Rural Finance Facility. While he is still the managing director, he 
was joined by three others in providing leadership for the Rural Finance Facility. 
Prosper Nyirumuringa, originally from Congo (Zaire), is an American-trained 
economist with experience in rural credit. Jenny Hoffman, a British chartered 
accountant, joined with some years experience with NGOs. Doug Hamilton, a 
senior banker, was previously the general manager of Societe Generale in South 
Africa. At the local level, the Rural Finance Facility seeks to recruit from within 
the communities it serves. Below management level, the Rural Finance Facility
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employed 16 further staff members by the end of 1994. All 16 were African, 
including five management trainees.
The Rural Finance Facility offers three ‘product lines’ (Rural Finance Facility, 
1994a, p. 7):
1. Micro-Loans are general purpose loans available to groups showing strong 
coherence and passing a character and affordability test (planned repayments 
must be less than 25 percent of net household income). Loan amounts lie 
between R300 and R800, and the first loan has to be repaid within six months.
2. Business Loans are based on written business plans. The borrower must have at 
least 12 months business experience and must pass a character test, loan 
amounts lie between R1,000 and R3,000. The interest rate is about 50 percent 
per annum.
3. Guaranteed Loans are general purpose loans, mostly used for business purposes 
or house improvement and construction. The annual effective interest rate is 
between 25 and 32 percent, depending on loan size, which can be up to 
R12,000. Repayment of Guaranteed Loans is through payroll deduction or 
post-dated cheques. In most cases, the guarantee is provided by the borrowers’ 
employers.
All payments are processed electronically, so that credit officers need not handle 
cash. All credit decisions are prepared by local staff but subject to final approval 
by the Credit Committee, which is based in Johannesburg. The Rural Finance
204
Facility prides itself on customer-friendly service, and this includes very quick 
lending decisions (Rural Finance Facility, 1994b). Once all documentation is 
submitted, approval is given within one to five working days. Because of limited 
risk, larger loan sizes and easier lending procedures, Guaranteed Loans are the 
‘best business’ for the Rural Finance Facility, and Chris Hock said they tried to 
increase their share in total lending. This approach was further vindicated when 
fraud was discovered in the Micro-Loan administration, where credit officers had 
siphoned off funds and artificially increased the default rate. Corrective measures 
resulted in a significant reductions of loan disbursals under the Micro-Loan 
scheme.
Chris Hock, who excels in management-type language use, describes the role of 
the Rural Finance Facility as ‘adding value to the production process of the 
financial system’. As banks cannot do what the Rural Finance Facility does - 
mainly short-term, unsecured lending on the basis of character assessments - it 
taps a previously undeveloped business potential. Creating real returns from this 
ancillary business, ‘value is added’ to the banking system. This additional value 
can be shared between the service providers, commercial banks and the Rural 
Finance Facility.
He sees the roles of the service providers as being clearly delineated. Banks 
participate because their transmission systems are used for sending and receiving 
money, and for tracking payments. They thus increase their turnover and receive
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additional revenue from RFF’s rural lending. The Rural Finance Facility has a 
comparative advantage in its role of designing appropriate products, absorbing the 
risk associated with collateral-free loans, and controlling the lending and 
repayment process. The role that Chris Hock identifies and describes is, in effect, 
that of a specialised financial institution in a diverse market. At the same time, he 
emphasises that there is no effective competition with other micro-finance 
institutions. The growth potential for the Rural Finance Facility is, he said, 
‘practically unlimited’ from the current position.
Both the Small Enterprise Foundation and the Start-Up Fund are similarly 
vigorous in picturing themselves as credible financial institutions. Both are 
discussed in greater detail in chapters 6 and 7, where their lending models are 
outlined and their financial sustainability is evaluated. Here, I will merely set them 
in context.
Towards mutual banking: the Small Enterprise Foundation 
The Small Enterprise Foundation is based in Tzaneen, a small regional town 
serving surrounding farming communities and forest industries. Its current 
managing director, John de Wit, took the initiative of founding the Small 
Enterprise Foundation in 1991 and identified the Tzaneen area because of its 
poverty and, as he described it later, its relative social stability. He was later 
joined by four other directors, who form the management team of the Small 
Enterprise Foundation, although day-to-day management remains the
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responsibility of John de Wit. Patrick Malatji is the coordinator of an Educational 
Project near Tzaneen, Nathaniel Ramalepe is the principle of a farm school in the 
area, Marie Kirsten works for the Development Bank of Southern Africa and 
Daphne Motsepe has previously worked with other micro-finance institutions. The 
directors were recruited either because they come from positions of authority 
within the communities served by the Small Enterprise Foundation or for their 
experience with micro-credit. The total staff comprises 32 people of whom 17 are 
women, 11 are trainees and 15 are credit officers. The lending model is based on 
the Grameen Bank model of group lending.
In the view of its management, the Small Enterprise Foundation exists in order to 
provide financial services - mostly in the form of loan finance but also including 
savings - to unbankable poor people. While emphasising democratic principles 
and pointing out its positive effect of credit on the self-esteem of its clients (Small 
Enterprise Foundation, 1996), the core function is defined as that of a financial 
institution. All management members indicate the importance of financial 
sustainability of the institution, but the opinion about the status of this objective is 
divided. While John de Wit says he was aiming for sustainability, Marie Kirsten 
believed this was already achieved. However, both described their understanding
25 This includes a focus on women; although men are not explicitly excluded from the scheme, 
they constitute only about five percent of membership. The Small Enterprise Foundation is also 
proud to recruit mostly women for its credit extension work. John de Wit does not, in his own 
opinion, have a explanation for women’s different roles. He says that women are poorer than men 
but more reliable. Chris Hock, whose Rural Finance Facility lends mostly to men (because 
guaranteed loans mostly go to male employees o f formal enterprises which provide a guarantee, 
although loan use may he with another family member), argues that women are keener for credit 
and keener to repay because they have fewer other choices in their economic environment than 
men in the same social setting.
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of sustainability in strict financial terms, similar to those expressed in relevant 
literature (Yaron, 1991). The financial reports of the Small Enterprise Foundation 
vindicate John de Wit’s position, and he repeated in discussions the commitment 
of its annual report to ‘become self-sufficient in the medium term (ie. within four 
to five years) through income generated from interest charged on loans’ (Small 
Enterprise Foundation, 1996, p. 2).
The Small Enterprise Foundation also works closely with commercial banks and, 
like in the Rural Finance Facility, uses electronic transmission systems for all 
transactions. While also seeing the Small Enterprise Foundation as a financial 
institution, John de Wit does not picture it as a ancillary service provider ‘adding 
value’, as does Chris Hock. He thinks of it as a growth-oriented, customer-focused 
organisation that will become technically more sophisticated over time, change 
with its customers needs, but remain a not-for-profit company. This resembles the 
Raiffeisen movement last century (discussed in chapter 3) and could lead to its 
transformation into a mutual bank, where profits are retained to finance expansion 
and improvements in service delivery.26
The venture capital approach: the Start-Up Fund
The Start-Up Fund was founded by Tony Davenport in 1993, a qualified 
accountant. He had varied experiences before, having been a missionary while 
also managing a diversified farm in Zimbabwe. Returning to South Africa in the
26 It is interesting to note that this is the path along which the Grameen Bank has developed. As a 
formal, registered bank, it is owned by its members (Von Pischke, 1991).
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1980s, he became involved with several NGOs and went on to start the Informal 
Business Training Trust. Although he has now resigned from his last position of 
non-executive director at the Informal Business Training Trust, this organisation 
still cooperates with the Start-Up Fund, providing business training to some 
prospective borrowers.
The Start-Up Fund is located in Durbanville, just north of the Cape Town 
metropolitan area. It employs only a few people full-time and a couple on a part- 
time basis, mainly for clerical tasks. Most staff are white, female and mostly 
Afrikaner. Tony Davenport says that he could recruit at rather reasonable 
remuneration levels because Durbanville is a predominantly residential area, and 
people living there would otherwise have to commute for work to Bellville, the 
large administrative centre to the north of Cape Town. All contact borrowers have 
with the Start-Up Fund is by telephone, and a number of native speakers of 
African languages were being recruited for telephone service at the time of my 
visits.
Tony Davenport emphasises that, in his opinion, group credit can never work in 
South Africa. He argues that ‘that’s how South Africa is, we don’t have peaceful 
village communities like in other countries’ and he also cites the potential for 
violence as a reason for better avoiding peer pressure. However, he is an even 
more ardent advocate of open access to micro-finance services and denounces 
policies aimed at keeping people out of other schemes. If credit officers were
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responsible for identifying potential borrowers, he argues, then these would by 
necessity need to assess people on subjective criteria and would need to turn some 
applicants away; in his words, only ‘smart alecs’ would gain access to credit. 
Therefore, there is no explicit selection of borrowers in the Start-Up Fund. 
Obviously, access to the lending programme is not as open as Tony Davenport 
wishes us to believe,27 but it does not openly discriminate. Interestingly, this also 
means that women are not specifically targeted, but they still constitute the 
majority of clients. At about 65 percent of membership, this about reflects their 
estimated share in ownership of informal enterprises in Southern Africa 
(Liedholm and Mead, 1998).
From the start, Tony Davenport wanted to achieve commercially sustainable 
returns from lending to micro-entrepreneurs. In his view, such returns are the 
requirement for gaining access to commercial (ie venture) capital markets and, 
thus, for expanding credit facilities to a significant number of poor entrepreneurs. 
The Start-Up Fund is the first micro-finance institution in Southern Africa to have 
achieved financial viability, after about four years during which it relied on grants
27 The very poor are not in the position to afford the up-front membership fee nor do they have the 
time for compulsory business training. These points have been highlighted in the criticism of the 
Start-Up Fund by people close to the Small Enterprise Foundation. Group formation, as in the 
Small Enterprise’s own programme, is restricting access as well. Despite their claims, all micro- 
finance institution aiming at financial sustainability have to restrict access in some way. It is 
interesting to note that in the two-way exchanges about the topic the third contender, Chris Hock 
and the Rural Finance Facility, do not enter. Chris Hock accepts the exclusiveness of the Rural 
Finance Facility’s lending procedures but asserts (private discussion in August 1994) that ‘I’m 
under no obligation to lend to everybody. We have to survive. Still, we lend to people the banks 
won’t touch.’
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and donor loans. It is now financed by the Micro-Business Development 
Corporation on a commercial basis.
The core micro-finance sector: preliminary comparison
Despite the differences of their lending models, it is interesting to note that the 
Rural Finance Facility, the Small Enterprise Foundation and the Start-Up Fund are 
similar in some respects. All three use electronic transmission systems and avoid 
cash transactions, and they state the same reasons of security, cost and 
informational efficiency. Even more important, all three - as well as the re­
organised Get Ahead Foundation - emphasise their role as financial institution, 
setting them apart from other NGOs such as the Triple Trust Organisation or 
NAS AS A (as discussed in section 3.3). These four dominant micro-finance 
institutions in South Africa do not, as argued above, compete for customers or 
funding - there is more than enough for all to grow. They do, however, vie each 
other in the competition for the ‘best’ lending model.
The micro-finance sector in South Africa developed in relative isolation from 
government policy. The main domestic funder, the government-owned 
Development Bank of Southern Africa, did not discriminate against any specific 
micro-finance ‘model’ in its funding decisions, and became the main donor to all 
major micro-finance institutions in South Africa. This can be attributed to two 
factors. First, no single model for micro-finance has yet proven itself for 
application in Africa, and problems in applying imported micro-finance models in
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Africa have been noted (Churchill, 1997; Buckley, 1996a, 1996b).28 Therefore, 
experimentation was justified. Second, the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
was keen on becoming quickly associated with new and politically more 
acceptable activities in order to secure its status during political transition. 
Offering support to the emerging and internationally respectable micro-finance 
sector was one way of furthering this objective. USAID is probably the second 
most important funder of micro-finance institutions in South Africa, but many 
other organisations have provided low-interest loans or grants. As there are many 
potential donors, the threat of one to withhold funds in order to enforce moves 
towards sustainability (or any other objective) has little chance of success.29 With 
the balance of power tilting towards micro-finance organisations, and against 
donors, some organisations may yield to the temptations of the soft budget 
constraint: ‘bargaining for assistance, and inefficiencies and cost overruns 
tolerated in the hope that deficits will be covered from public sources’ (Komai, 
1986, p. 23). While claiming to move towards sustainability, the ease with which 
micro-finance institutions can secure additional funding may dissuade some of 
them from developing true sustainability as consistently as would otherwise be 
possible.
28 Buckley (1996a, 1996b) analysis two Grameen replications in Africa, the PRIDE programme in 
Kenya and the Malawi Mudzi Fund. Especially the later - ‘the most blatant attempt to replicate the 
Grameen Bank model (1996a, p. 283) - is shown to have problems in reaching the same level of 
group support, while PRIDE experiences problems in copying the loan growth rates of the 
Grameen Bank in a less populous country.
29 Tony Davenport, the chairman of the Start-Up Fund, told me about the incident when he was 
turned down for funding by Miserior, the catholic relief organisation, for being ‘too business-like’. 
He quickly secured funds elsewhere, and the criticism by Miserior was no reason for him or his 
board to re-consider their own strategies.
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To set the dominant micro-finance institutions discussed above in context, it is 
useful to consider again the data accumulated for the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa. Within the group of 13 institutions compared in the study by 
BEES, the costs per loan disbursed range from R95 for the Start-Up Fund to 
R5,996 for IBEC (which is very high even considering their high average loan 
size). Following the Start-Up Fund, the second least costly is the Small Enterprise 
Foundation at R410. Most others have significantly higher costs per loan 
disbursal, the average lies Rl,901 (BEES, 1997, table 26). The Rural Finance 
Facility spends R702 per loan and the Get Ahead Foundation slightly above the 
average, Rl,969 (see table 5.1).
Table 5.1: Lending data of core micro-finance institutions in South Africa
Get Ahead 
Foundation
Start-Up
Fund
Small Enterp. 
Foundation
IBEC Rural
Finance Fac.
Cost per loan Rl,969 R95 R410 R5,996 R702
Average loan 
size
R3,659 R362 R739 R8,329 R695
Loans per credit 
officer
76 2,760 161 64 276
Interest earned 
as % of loans
23 26 39 N/A 20
Source: BEES (1997), table 22 and table 26.
It is also apparent that the target group does not correlate to the choice of lending 
model. Arguably, smaller loans are more appropriate for poorer people and a 
poverty alleviation objective, while ‘the budding entrepreneur* requires larger 
loans (see discussion on page 58). The Start-Up Fund, making the smallest
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average loans, lends to individuals, while the Get Ahead Foundation, whose 
average loan size is more than ten times larger, uses the group model.
In summary, modem micro-finance institutions developed in South Africa only 
once the transition towards democracy had been cleared. All major lenders were 
founded and started operating in the first half of the 1990s - or in the case of the 
Get Ahead Foundation, which had a different history, were reorganised at that 
time to create a modem, finance-oriented organisation. Previously, the provision 
of financial services alone would have made little sense, and viability of lending 
to informal, black enterprises was elusive as long as their proprietors were 
officially harassed and their activities technically illegal.
In the following chapters, the Small Enterprise Foundation and the Start-Up Fund 
will be discussed in greater detail. They are appropriate case studies because they 
are members of the small club of relatively mature micro-finance institutions and 
because they implemented lending models - group-based participatory lending and 
mass-minimalist technocratic lending respectively - in a coherent manner (unlike 
the Rural Finance Facility which mixes group and individual approaches). Further, 
they were set up with a agenda focused on financial services from the start (unlike 
the Get Ahead Foundation, which moved from a more political agenda to an 
economic after several years, prompted by a financial crisis) and they are the two 
most efficient micro-lenders, judging from available data, and I intend to compare 
the best examples of competing models.
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6. Sustainability and Group Lending: Does Solidarity Pay?
In solidarity credit schemes ‘grassroots’ groups are responsible for controlling 
eligibility for membership and credit. Group members assume joint responsibility 
and liability for the loans they receive. Joint liability is argued to enhance 
accountability and improve repayment ratios as compared with standard bilateral 
loan agreements. Further, groups receive successive loans, which serve as an 
inducement for continuity. These groups constitute the grassroots form of 
membership organisation and are intended to instil a form of loyalty.
There is a wide literature detailing working practice and social framework of 
institutions such as ROSCAs (Ardener, 1964; Bouman, 1979; Nayar, 1986; 
Thomas, 1991). Also, both independent and donor-inspired accounts report about 
the workings and social effects of solidarity credit schemes (Berenbach and 
Guzman, 1994; Biggs et al, 1991; Fuglesang and Chandler, 1986; Glosser, 1994; 
Jain, 1996). In contrast, economic understanding of solidaristic credit institutions 
is still incomplete. The claim of economic efficiency goes largely unchallenged. 
This chapter, following a brief summary of the theoretical critique developed in 
chapter 4, analyses a Grameen-type micro-lender in South Africa, to challenge the 
notion that solidarity and group structures contribute to financial sustainability in 
micro-lending. Section 6.2 introduces the Small Enterprise Foundation, then the 
financial viability of its group lending programme is assessed in section 6.3. 
Section 6.4 considers the economic costs of participation for the group members,
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and section 6.5 discusses the relationship between participatory structure, scale 
economies and lending costs. The connection of participatory credit and social 
return is also briefly discussed in section 6.6 before section 6.7 sets the long-term 
subsidy requirements of the Small Enterprise Foundation into the context of its 
capital structure and concludes this chapter.
6.1 Solidaristic Credit in Economic Analysis - a summary1
In the existing economic literature, ROSCAs are concluded to shorten saving 
times for lumpy expenditure (Besley et al, 1993); solidarity credit schemes are 
superior to standard, ’bilateral' credit contracts because of peer information and 
supervision (Stiglitz, 1993; de Aghion, 1995). However, as was shown in chapter 
4, they all assume that solidaristic groups constitute a ‘contractual club’.
The understanding of solidarity as a contractual arrangement does not lead to an 
adequate understanding of the reality of group formation. Hovering uneasily 
around the question of group access, Besley et al (1993), Besley and Coate 
(1995), de Aghion (1994) and Stiglitz (1993) seem to acknowledge that groups are 
not formed by contracting but that a sense of 'solidarity' must exist before loan 
agreements can meaningfully be adopted. Solidarity provides access to a valued 
resource flow and constitutes, in this context, 'social capital' (Coleman, 1990, pp. 
300-21). Social relations assume economic value chiefly because they promote
1 The following critique is a summary of the arguments discussed in chapter 4.
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economic exchange and reduce volatility; thus solidarity is an input into a joint 
production process. Group members do not merely exchange resources but 
commit resources to a shared goal. They are not merely agents, but members, who 
participate in a joint production process (Hechter, 1987, pp. 40-9). Group 
members accept obligations for economic as well as social functions of the group, 
which are accompanied by partying, gifts, food and other expenditure ostensibly 
for consumption. Personal relations may appear to be not directly productive, but, 
in fact, they are the sine qua non of 'social capital'. Although group members do, 
obviously, agree on informal contracts, they are different from other economic 
agents because they are in possession of costly social capital. Solidarity, unlike 
contractual arrangements, is embedded in individuals and not transferable.2
Poor people have no access to credit, but small groups of poor people may have 
considerable savings capability. The impossibility of gaining access to credit 
individually creates a situation of dependency: access to a valued good - credit - is 
dependent on joint production based in a group. Where dependency does not exist, 
where people can procure goods from private resources, solidarity is undesired 
and inefficient: people do not normally commit time and resources to credit 
groups if they can obtain standard bilateral credit from commercial banks or, at 
reasonable costs, informal lenders (Hechter, 1987, pp. 45, 52-3).
2 ‘Since groups that produce goods for the marketplace can compensate their members with 
wages, solidarity will be confined to groups concerned with the production of joint, immanent 
goods for internal consumption’ (Hechter, 1987, p. 52). Solidaristic credit, produced by groups for 
their own benefit, obviously is an immanent good.
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While members of ROSCAs jointly produce financial services, members of credit 
groups in formal group credit schemes produce ‘group characteristics’ which 
enable them, jointly, to gain access to credit provided by the formal lender. 
Solidarity credit schemes seek to benefit from the discipline that group solidarity 
enforces. They create dependency on the group by making credit available only to 
those borrowers who can demonstrate a high level of solidarity. Group credit 
lenders thus play a crucial role in the creation of their grassroots groups. In view 
of the extensive informal obligations and commitments between groups and 
lender, it is appropriate to see the lender as a solidarity partner (Von Pischke, 
1991, pp. 238-43; Montgomery, 1996, p. 290). This means lenders are answerable 
to borrowers on matters that transgress the narrow responsibilities of mainstream 
banks. Most importantly, group solidarity will only be observable for the lender if 
its representatives - credit officers - participate in some group functions. Meetings 
are therefore the centre of activity on the interface of solidarity credit schemes and 
their borrowers.
Solidarity is the foundation of group credit, but also a resource-intensive asset to 
create. This highlights the concern for development policy: group credit 
institutions compete for resources - subsidies and donor aid - on the basis of their 
self-proclaimed efficiency. This claim rests on the assertion that solidarity reduces 
default, yet this reasoning tends to ignore the negative impact of group formation 
and maintenance on costs. The understanding of group solidarity as a productive
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albeit costly factor of production, and not a free good, implies that solidarity credit 
schemes are less efficient than their proponents claim, and that their advantage 
over standard, bilateral lenders is less obvious than is claimed in the literature. I 
hypothesise that the cost advantage of group credit stemming from low default 
rates is significantly eroded by the resource-intensive mode of operation that is 
necessitated by their solidaristic lending technology.
6.2 The Small Enterprise Foundation
I will test my hypothesis using data from one solidarity credit scheme operating in 
South Africa. The Small Enterprise Foundation is a private non-profit organisation 
located at Tzaneen, Northern Province. It describes its aim as the 'alleviation of 
unemployment and poverty in the black population of the rural areas of South 
Africa' (Small Enterprise Foundation, 1994a, p. 1). Imitating the Grameen Bank, 
the Small Enterprise Foundation is often referred to as one of the more successful 
lenders in the unsecured loan market in South Africa and enjoys a level of 
admiration from competitors and local policy-makers (Christodoulou et al, 1993, 
pp. 13-4).
The core of the Small Enterprise Foundation's activity is the provision of credit, 
but participation in the management of the Small Enterprise Foundation and its 
sub-units is also seen as an important aspect of ‘empowerment’. Credit and 
'empowerment' are seen as vital components of a process that enables the poor and
219
unemployed in rural South Africa to become successful entrepreneurs. Prospective 
borrowers must attend a four-week familiarisation session, and must then arrange 
themselves into groups. Prior to the disbursement of the first loan, the group has 
to open a savings account and demonstrate its ability to save. Communal savings 
are seen as forging closer ties between group members before they are entrusted 
with borrowed money.
The lending technology involves groups of five or six borrowers; these are 
explicitly related to traditional stokvels, ie ROSCAs (Small Enterprise 
Foundation, 1994a, p. 1). Only one loan per group can be outstanding at any one 
time. Five or six of these groups form a 'centre'. Meetings of centres take place 
every fortnight and are attended by a member of staff from the Small Enterprise 
Foundation. At each meeting, therefore, the fieldworker (the Small Enterprise 
Foundation's title for their credit officers) is able to address thirty to thirty-five 
borrowers. At the end of the review period, the financial year ending June 1994, 
the Small Enterprise Foundation employed fifteen extension staff: twelve full-time 
fieldworkers and three co-ordinators. According to the Small Enterprise 
Foundation, each of the fieldworkers has the capacity to work with 350 borrowers; 
this means that within a fortnight each fieldworker attends ten to twelve centre 
meetings.
From inception of the programme in December 1991 to July 1995 a total of 8446 
loans were disbursed, amounting to R5,294,500. The fame of the Small Enterprise
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Foundation rests mainly on the fact that the institution claims a zero default rate. 
Due to the death of group members, a total of R6,566 were written off, and illness 
was the reason for a debt reschedule of Rl,576. In relation to the size of the 
portfolio, capital write-offs are thus negligible. Total costs, excluding financing 
costs, were R667,160 in the financial year ending June 1994.
Interest payments follow a simple formula: R1 per R100 borrowed (full initial 
loan amount) is payable per fortnight until the full loan has been repaid. Loan 
amounts are scheduled: first time borrowers receive R300; once this loan has been 
repaid they may receive R700, then R1,000. The first loan is repayable over ten 
fortnights (at R33 per fortnight), the larger loans over twenty fortnights (at R42 
and R60 per fortnight respectively). As can be seen, the fortnight is the basic unit 
for accounting of time for the Small Enterprise Foundation. This repayment mode
I
implies an annual, non-compounded interest rate of around 42 percent.3
Table 6.1 - Loan sizes and net revenue schedule of the Small Enterprise Foundation
Loan sizes R300 R700 R1000
Repayment Period 20 weeks 40 weeks 40 weeks
Number of repayments 10 20 20
Amount per repayment R33 R42 R60
Net revenue per fortnight R3 R7 R10
Total net revenue R30 R140 R200
3 For loans repayable over ten fortnights the interest rate is 42.9 percent, for loans repayable over 
twenty fortnights 41.3 percent.
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From this schedule, it can be seen that the Small Enterprise Foundation's income 
is dependent on loans size and duration. Assuming on-time repayment (which is 
the rule), a R300 loan is repaid after twenty weeks and has generated total income 
of R30, the larger loans of R700 and R1,000 are repaid after forty weeks and 
generate total income of R140 and R200. During a standard two-week time 
interval, the net revenue (repayment less capital redemption) is R3, R7 and RIO 
for small, medium and large loans respectively.
6.3 Group Credit and Financial Viability
The Small Enterprise Foundation states that its 'programme is being structured 
from the outset so that it will become self-sufficient in the medium term (ie within 
four to five years) and should be able to achieve this self-sufficiency through the 
income generated from the interest charged on loans' (Small Enterprise 
Foundation, 1994a, p. 2). One of the arguments in favour of solidarity credit 
schemes is, as was argued above, that credit officers can generally address many 
customers at once because lender-borrower contact takes place in larger group 
meetings. In the following I will show that the predictions of the Small Enterprise 
Foundation are unrealistic and that the economies of scale embodied in group and 
centre organisation do not result in reasonable transaction cost savings. Because 
solidarity credit scheme-type intermediation evolves around the credit officer- 
borrower group interface, the credit officer serves as basic unit of analysis and my 
calculations show that revenue and cost structures result in a systematic loss for
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the lender. The analysis is based on the Small Enterprise Foundation's own data 
base and covers the year to June 1994. Where necessary, I will apply assumptions 
biased in the Small Enterprise Foundation’s favour.
The potential viability of the Small Enterprise Foundation's lending technology 
can be assessed by calculating the net revenue (interest paid by credit groups on 
their outstanding loans) generated by each credit officer. This figure, then, can be 
compared with the fully allocated costs of administration of the Small Enterprise 
Foundation. Much of the following analysis depends on the level of costs of the 
Small Enterprise Foundation. However, the level of costs is determined by the 
staff-intensive system of credit delivery: At the end of the review period, June 
1994, fifteen extension staff were employed, twelve fieldworkers and three co­
ordinators. If their average wage cost, including social benefits, is R25,000 per 
year and additionally R100,000 were spent for two or three headquarter staff in 
Tzaneen, then total labour costs are R475,000 per year. In fact, in June 1994 there 
were twenty-three full members of staff, some of them part-time, and two trainees. 
In addition there are costs for renting office space in Tzaneen, for communication 
and transport, printing information and education material, for occasional 
consultancies and auditing, and bank charges for loan dispersal and repayments 
handled through the electronic payments system and for managing the ‘reserves’. 
The actual total costs of R667,160 seem not excessive. However, section 6.7 
considers a scenario where many parameters, including total costs, are assumed to
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have improved. The results prove to be very robust. The Small Enterprise 
Foundation's costs of funding remain outside the analysis.4
Each credit officer can, according to the Small Enterprise Foundation, deal with 
350 borrowers. This means that a total of seventy credit groups with five members 
each are aligned to centres under the responsibility of a credit officer. Under the 
assumption that all credit groups have loans outstanding at all times, each credit 
officer's portfolio comprises seventy loans at any time. The average loan size of 
credit groups was (during the financial year ending June 1994) R693. The ratio of 
annual revenue to loan disbursements is 26 percent (1 percent per fortnight). The 
net revenue produced by a single loan officer is therefore
(1) r = N x i x a v l
N = number of permanently indebted groups 
i = ratio of revenue to loan disbursements 
avl = average loan size
which gives, for 1994 data, r = R12,612.6. Total administrative costs of the Small 
Enterprise Foundation are R667,160; this figure includes credit officer-related 
costs and general overheads as well as bank charges, but excludes financing costs.
4 The Small Enterprise Foundation, as other similar institutions, is funded by grants and 
subsidized long-term loans. Their private funding costs are thus not indicative of their true social 
costs of capital, nor could meaningful projections be made.
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With twelve credit officers, fully allocated costs per credit officer (c) stand at 
R55,596.6. Hence only 22.7 percent of total transaction costs could be covered 
from income from the loan portfolio, assuming seventy average loans were 
outstanding at all times.
However, the credit officers did not, in fact, serve 350 borrowers each. During 
1994 each credit officer dealt with 192 borrowers on average, equivalent to 38.4 
credit groups. Assuming that all groups had a loan outstanding at all times, the 
real revenue per credit officer was only R6,918.9. Thus the contribution to fully 
allocated costs stood at only 12.4 percent.
The Small Enterprise Foundation claims that large centre meetings enable credit 
officers to deal with many borrowers efficiently on a large scale. However, each 
credit officer would need to serve many more borrowers than is possible with 
participatory lending technology in order to generate the income necessary to 
break even at current costs. The break-even number of borrower groups is given 
as
(2) N = c/(i x avl)
c = fully allocated costs per credit officer
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which yields N = 308.56. For 1994 data, break-even could be reached if a single 
credit officer could deal with 309 groups. All groups need to be permanently 
indebted with average-sized loans assuming that the repayment record and total 
costs remain unchanged, ie under constant absolute fully allocated costs per 
officer. Under these assumptions, a credit officer would need to see 1,545 
borrowers every fortnight and maintain personal relationships with all groups.
A glance at the financial statements of the Small Enterprise Foundation reveals 
that annual operating costs were almost 70 percent of total outstanding loans (end 
of period) in 1994. It follows that - were the Small Enterprise Foundation to be 
self-sufficient - it would need to charge exorbitant interest rates to generate 
sufficient income. The interest rate that balances costs and revenues is given by
(3) i = c/(N x avl)
which yields i = 208.92. For actual 1994 data, the Small Enterprise Foundation 
would need to generate income/disbursements at a ratio of over 200 percent per 
annum; instead of charging 1 percent per fortnight they needed to charge 8 percent 
per fortnight for the full loan amount. Ceteris paribus, the Small Enterprise 
Foundation thus has its break-even point at up to 210 percent annual, non­
compounded interest rate.5 Obviously, ceteris paribus is an unreasonably
5 For loans repayable over ten fortnights the interest rate is 210 percent and for loans repayable 
over twenty fortnights 152.3 percent.
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optimistic assumption. This estimate still excludes the opportunity costs of the 
loan capital as Interest Paid is excluded from the cost calculation of the Small 
Enterprise Foundation.
Hence, the chances of reaching sustainability will be further reduced if any of the 
underlying assumptions changes for worse: cost per officer, average loan size and 
number of loans per officer are assumed constant at 1994 levels while repayment 
problems (defaults and debt rescheduling) and capital costs are assumed constant 
at a level of zero.
Interest rates in excess of 150 percent are unrealistic and would probably result in 
adverse selection of borrowers. Moneylenders - the obvious alternative to 
solidarity credit schemes, and generally open for business to even the poorest - 
routinely charge less interest.6 Moneylenders demand high interest and are 
sometimes deemed exploitative, yet many poor people borrow from them because 
they impose only low transaction costs (Bouman, 1990; Hyuha et al, 1990; 
Johnson and Rogaly, 1997, p. 20). In reverse, formal lending programmes like 
solidaristic credit schemes impose relatively high transaction costs but are 
supposedly offering low-interest alternatives to ‘usurious’ credit. Unless a group 
lender offers credit at interest rates sufficiently below informal market rates, the 
solidarity credit scheme will attract only those clients who do not find credit with
6 See Van Rooyen (1994) for a limited survey on interest rates of informal lenders in South Africa 
and Montiel et al (1993, pp. 20-5) on general survey of non-institutional interest in various 
developing countries.
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alternative informal lenders. Adverse selection may then lead to deteriorating 
repayment performance.
Furthermore, micro-credit institutions have the rationale to apply lending 
technologies which are geared towards handling small amounts of money in 
frequent transactions. Because solidaristic lending is staff- and resource-intensive, 
as I argue, it does not easily lend itself to efficient money-handling methods. The 
Small Enterprise Foundation is, indeed, not able to deal with small loan amounts 
efficiently. Following the formula
(4) avl = c/(N x i)
the data for the 1994 financial year yield avl = R5,568.57. In order to reach break­
even, under 1994 conditions and with all data constant except average loan size, 
credit groups would need to take credit on average well over R5,000. As avl is the 
average of all loan groups, most groups would need to have loans well above the 
minimum amount for consideration as standard, bilateral credit by commercial 
banks. Some innovative new commercial banks and development finance 
institutions would also consider credit applications closer to the R3,000 level.7
7 One such bank is Future Bank which is partially owned and managed by First National Bank, die 
country’s fourth largest commercial bank; others include the Small Business Development 
Corporation and the Rural Finance Facility.
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Table 6.2 - Hypothetical estimates on break-even assumption, year to June 1994
variable estimate, all other variables at actual 1994 levels
number of borrowers 1,545
interest rate 210% (8% per fortnight on full loan amount)
average loan size R5,568 (falling to R3,055 with 350 borrowers per officer)
Even if all credit officers did in fact serve 350 borrowers, as is claimed to be 
possible by the Small Enterprise Foundation, the break-even average loan size 
would still not drop below R3,000 (avl = 3,054.76). Hence the Small Enterprise 
Foundation's own description of its lending technology is not consistent with its 
financial projections. The claim of the Small Enterprise Foundation of focusing on 
small-scale credit and targeting lower income groups therefore seems not to be 
supported by the economics of their system of credit delivery.
These figures demonstrate that the poor cost recovery (the relation of potential 
revenue to actual costs) constitute a major problem for the Small Enterprise 
Foundation in fulfilling its ambition of attaining the status of self-sufficiency. 
What could the management of the Small Enterprise Foundation do? The easiest 
variable to change is the rate of loan disbursal. Management can decide to make 
the rule of ‘one loan per group only* less stringent.8 The Small Enterprise 
Foundation has in fact adopted a policy that allows credit officers to disburse 
several loans simultaneously to members of one group. What would happen if all 
five members of a group received loans simultaneously? This would mean that all
8 In fact, in many group credit schemes this happened informally, when loan officers felt 
sympathetic to credit groups and disbursed new loans before all group members have fully repaid. 
This is adequately described as a breakdown of discipline and is often followed by declining 
repayment rates (Churchill, 1997).
229
members could be permanently indebted, and that each credit officer could - 
according to the Small Enterprise Foundation’s own estimates - manage a 
portfolio of 350 loans. According to current data, though, the number of loans 
would be limited to the number of borrowers per credit officer of 192.
Going back to equation 1, this shows that the revenue could indeed reach 113.5 
percent of costs, indicating financial viability by some margin. However, with the 
actual number of borrowers per credit officer, the ratio falls to 62.0 percent (see 
Table 6.3). Not only falls this short of viability by a significant margin, but it also 
assumes, like all earlier estimations, that all members are permanently indebted, 
and that the cost of funds is zero.
Table 6.3 - Revenue as percentage of costs per credit officer, year to June 1994
192 borrowers per officer 350 borrowers per officer
one loan per group 12.4% 22.7%
five loans per group 62.0% 113.5%
6.4 Participation and the Costs of Grassroots Contribution
The main analysis in this chapter concentrates on assessing the contribution to 
joint production, including the costs of accumulating social capital, from the 
perspective of the solidarity credit scheme. It thus focuses on the cost (and 
benefit) calculation as given by the accounts of the Small Enterprise Foundation.
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This argument is used to refute the claim of economic sustainability from the view 
of the Small Enterprise Foundation as a supposedly viable corporate entity.
However, in assessing the viability of the Small Enterprise Foundation’s lending 
technology it is equally important to assess the costs of group participants. If their 
contributions are larger than the benefit derived from participation, the stability of 
the membership base is under threat. As detailed in section 6.6, the Small 
Enterprise Foundation does indeed experience very high drop-out rates.9
Presently, monetary commitments are existent only in the form of loan repayment 
at the prevailing interest rate of 42 percent. Also, there is a risk that individual 
members may have to ‘fork out’ the repayment of another member ‘falling on 
hard times’, ie experiencing ‘approved’ repayment problems. Yet these are the 
tangible costs of group loans that group members are made aware of when joining 
a credit scheme, and that have been discussed in the literature.
This approach neglects the non-tangible costs of participation. In the Small 
Enterprise Foundation’s scheme, they consist largely of time. Groups are required 
to participate in pre-entry educational and group building exercises which are run
9 It has been argued that dropping out may be graduating and thus constitute a measure of success. 
Unfortunately, most groups drop out after the first few stages; 58 percent drop out before reaching 
the R1000 loan level. At this stage, individual group members have not received significant credit 
amounts but have already absorbed costs associated with group formation and gaining credit 
eligibility. Also, the Small Enterprise Foundation was burdened with the costs o f integrating new 
members into centres, including initial training. Early drop out, therefore, is not to be considered a 
success.
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by the Small Enterprise Foundation staff. On completion of these courses, they are 
tested for group coherence by the managing director of the Small Enterprise 
Foundation. Once admitted, all group members are required to participate in 
fortnightly centre meetings which typically last half a day. In addition members 
have to ‘monitor’ other members of their immediate (five member-) group; this 
monitoring is not regulated by the Small Enterprise Foundation.
In the following, I assume that time devoted to participatory activities is equal to 
income foregone, that there is no other benefit accruing from participatory 
activities other than credit, and that there is no surplus labour (eg in the family) 
available to fill the gap. Under these assumptions, the accumulated non-tangible 
costs per unit of credit (k*) can be expressed as
(5) k* = (Y x m x w)/ L
Y = weekly income
m = share of total working time spent on meetings 
w = repayment period in weeks 
L = loan amount per member
which represents the opportunity cost of participation in relation to the loan 
amount. As can be seen, higher income (ie higher opportunity costs of time), 
longer meetings and longer repayment periods all raise the real costs of procuring 
credit from participatory lenders. In the absence of alternative, cheaper credit,
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participation is beneficial only if k + k* < r + u, ie when the sum of tangible costs 
k (weekly ‘interest’ of 0.5 percent over the full repayment period) and non­
tangible interest costs k* is smaller than the sum of return on capital r and utility u 
derived from participation, such as enjoyment of company or learning effects.
In the case of the Small Enterprise Foundation, regular centre meetings require the 
member to devote more than half a day per fortnight to participatory activities.10 
If we assume that all is adequately classified as work, then at least 5 percent of 
total working time is spent on centre meetings. The first loan of R300 takes 
twenty weeks to repay. At this stage, the members may only earn a low income of 
R30 per week (fieldwork experience suggests this is a reasonable estimate). Over 
the twenty-week repayment period the total income thus amounts to R600. If 5 
percent of labour time is spent on not directly productive activities, there is an 
income loss of R30. If shared equally between the five group members, the loan at 
this stage amounts to R60 per participant. Each member thus pays R6 over twenty 
weeks in interest charges and the fivefold amount in non-tangible contributions. 
The opportunity cost represents 50 percent of the initial loan amount. Although 
high, a poor and credit-constrained person may find it acceptable if investment 
opportunities with high returns exist.
10 Including the travelling time to get to the meeting place, which can be as much as a two-hour 
walk one way, up to one whole day may be spent on participatory meetings each fortnight. This 
would suggest that closer to 10 percent of working time is spent on centre meetings, but I continue 
to use the more favourable estimate of 5 percent.
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A loan of R1,000 takes forty weeks to repay. A more successful entrepreneur, 
having passed through earlier loan stages, may at this point earn R100 per week. 
Thus the income over the forty-week repayment period amounts to R4,000; 5 
percent opportunity costs add a total of R200 to the repayment costs which is 
equal to 100 percent of his/her share of loan. This cost may be more difficult to 
justify, especially if the entrepreneur has now access to alternative sources of 
finance such as credit from moneylenders or trade finance from suppliers. 
Possibly, a five-member group could exit from the lending programme because 
only one member has had the success that made continued participation 
uneconomic.
In both cases, my analysis assumed that the participants see group activities as 
work. This evaluation is subjective and it has been suggested that in some 
circumstances meetings are enjoyed, time spent there was seen as a benefit and 
not only as a cost.11 Especially in research on group lenders in South Asia, such 
benefits were often argued to stem from women’s lack of social exchange outside 
their homes. In such a situation, they enjoy group meetings, which then constitute 
an asset, not a liability for participatory schemes (Fuglesang and Chandler, 1986).
11 Especially reports focusing on the non-economic aspects of solidaristic financial institutions 
often discuss the enjoyment of meetings. In South Africa, Lukhele (1990) is exceptionally 
optimistic about the fun of stokvel meetings, while Thomas (1991) points out important 
differences between various types of stokvels.
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However, this view depends on the specific societal context in South Asia; women 
in Africa usually enjoy access to various channels for social interaction.12 Also, 
women living in seclusion may encounter problems in setting up their own 
businesses without help by male relatives. In this case, the ‘empowerment’ of 
women could be seriously thwarted by their reliance on male relatives for loan 
utilisation (Goetz and Gupta, 1996). Arguably, a more successful and business- 
minded entrepreneur is less likely to attach social value as opposed to economic 
costs to meetings. Also, the emancipatory value of exercising self-determination 
in the organisation - as cited by the Small Enterprise Foundation as an important 
learning process - is less valuable once an entrepreneur has economic success; 
emancipation would work more strongly through commitment to his/her 
enterprise.
Finally, my estimates of the duration of meetings, travelling times and incomes 
are only approximate. One might change the parameters, but the basic finding
12 While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate the role of women in society, 
comparing South Asia with Southern Africa, it is possible to find evidence for a significant 
difference in existing literature on micro-finance schemes. Johnson and Rogaly (1997, especially 
p. 100-1) and Goetz and Gupta (1996) report extreme cases of women borrowers’ suppression 
from Pakistan and Bangladesh respectively, all leading to the erosion of the borrowers’ control 
over loan use. Worse still, conservative societal norms in parts of South Asia restrict the 
interaction o f women with people who are not members o f their households. Hulme and Mosley 
(1997) report that that regular meetings give women ‘an opportunity to share information and 
discuss ideas. Such opportunities previously did not exist. Measuring the results o f such 
association was beyond the limits of this study but the creation of a regular forum at which large 
numbers of poor women can meet and talk represents a “breakthrough” in the social norms of 
rural Bangladesh’ (p. 120). Although women are generally in an inferior social position in society 
in Southern Africa in comparison to men, reports do not indicate such a dramatic gender 
differentiation. Preston-Whyte (1991) describes comparatively independent female entrepreneurs 
in Natal. My own fieldwork did not discover cases of intentional fronting (see also footnote 7 in 
chapter 8) and showed that female borrowers were significantly more independent than their 
counterparts captured in reports from South Asia.
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(that participation imposes considerable costs and becomes more expensive when 
members experience business success) remains valid. My estimates exclude the 
costs of in-group monitoring. The inclusion would strengthen the findings.
6.5 Participation, Scale, and Costs
The analysis of section 6.3 is based on data for the financial year ending June 
1994. The projections of the Small Enterprise Foundation's management foresee a 
growing organisation that gains advantage through economies of scale. More 
recent data, however, refute the plausibility of these projections. Neither loan size 
nor number of loans has grown substantially, while costs are on a steep upward 
movement. Half-year results to December 1994 show a slight increase of the loan 
portfolio, but also an accommodating increase of operating costs. At an annualised 
rate, operating costs are still equal to just under 70 percent of the outstanding 
balance on loan accounts. Data for July 1995 show monthly costs of R95,116; at 
an annual rate, the cost/loan portfolio ratio has risen to 103.84 percent. The 
number of clients has decreased to 157 per credit officer; average loans would 
need to equal R10,754.45 were the Small Enterprise Foundation to break even 
(Small Enterprise Foundation, 1995b).
From these indicators it is easy to see that the Small Enterprise Foundation has 
moved away even further from financial viability. The disappointing performance 
was partially attributed to the high drop-out rate of borrowers. The semi-annual
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report (Small Enterprise Foundation, 1994b, p. 2) finds that '20 percent of clients 
leave the programme on completing a first loan, 38 percent on completing a 
second loan and 27 percent after the third loan'. This means that 85 percent of 
members desert the programme before reaching credit levels which could be 
economical for the lender, while initial capital outlays, particularly in the form of 
training and group formation, have to be absorbed by the Small Enterprise 
Foundation. High interest and opportunity costs may be a reason: above a certain 
credit amount and with a certain credit record borrowers may be able to find 
cheaper alternative suppliers. Moneylenders may also require high interest rates, 
but they are usually easily approachable and their lending procedures do not 
impose hidden costs (Bouman, 1990). It appears that it would be crucial to address 
the time-intensive banking method especially for more mature borrowers - who, if 
they have success in business, face higher opportunity costs for their time - in 
order to entice more borrowers to stay in the programme.
It is conceivable that borrowers desert the lending programme because, after 
initial access to credit, the solidaristic structure imposes high costs on them in 
terms of obligations for fortnightly meetings and mutual screening, and also 
because of the risk involved in joint liability. This poses the question whether 
sustainability may be enhanced by easing the group requirements for mature 
groups, ie those which have passed through several loan stages and thus have 
created a repayment record. These groups may, for example, be required to meet
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with credit officers only on a monthly or quarterly basis; also, individual members
could be considered for loans without joint liability.
There are several cautioning factors, however:
• As 85 percent of the initial intake of members do not progress into the fourth 
loan, few clients do in fact reach a stage where they could be considered 
'mature'. If these few were to cross-subsidise the costs of the many who drop 
out early, the economic rationale of this differentiation may well be 
undermined.
• If a large number of mature borrowers would enter such a scheme, it would 
without doubt lead to a further duplication of administrative work. There would 
be different 'classes' of borrowers, each of which was subject to differential 
rules and requirements. Some contact with loan officers would be necessary for 
all of them, but the agenda for such meetings may not overlap. Hence credit 
officers could be required to visit their respective areas more often in order to 
have meetings with all different 'classes' of borrowers.
• Differentiation of borrowers is against the solidaristic spirit of institutions like 
the Small Enterprise Foundation. The image of the Small Enterprise 
Foundation is based on participation and internal democracy; the contact 
between credit beginners and advanced borrowers is crucial to the participatory 
spirit and the self-understanding as not merely a lender, but a social movement. 
Coleman finds that ‘social capital depreciates if it is not renewed* (1990, p. 
321), like any other form of capital, ‘through regular communication’ (ibid.).
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Hechter (1987) argues that visibility, ritual and public commitment to group 
values are crucial to instil ‘solidarity’ and enforce obligations within artificially 
created groups such as the Small Enterprise Foundation structure. Thus, the 
Small Enterprise Foundation is supported in its claim that frequent meetings 
are indeed crucial to their lending technology, although some cost reduction 
may be obtainable from optimisation of the exact frequency and time 
requirement of centre meetings.
• Finally, lean credit for mature borrowers on a bilateral basis may be more 
efficiently organised by other lenders, possibly those with a higher minimum 
loan size. Various South African institutions, from both public and private 
sectors, do attract clients who have matured from informal lending 
programmes. Also, mature clients could be 'creamed off by commercial banks 
which are eager to create business in poorer areas.
Indeed, currently the Small Enterprise Foundation's policy looks in the opposite 
direction. The mid-term evaluation of the Small Enterprise Foundation, carried 
out by USAID and endorsed by the Small Enterprise Foundation, emphasises the 
importance that 'the Small Enterprise Foundation must track and enforce 
attendance at Centre meetings, making it almost more important than actual 
repayment, since Centre meetings are the primary tool to forge group 
cohesiveness and encourage good repayment' (Small Enterprise Foundation, 
1994b, p. 3). Commitment to the participatory principle is apparently assumed to 
be the key to sustainability. Ignoring the opportunity costs of time spent on
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participatory duties means that the Small Enterprise Foundation implicitly 
assumes that its clientele has no constraint on labour. It should, however, be 
emphasised that the Small Enterprise Foundation's problems lie in the cost 
structure and the drop-out rates, not in deficient repayment.
It could be considered whether, despite the limitations, it is possible to cut back 
the complexity of participatory structure for the benefit of operational efficiency, 
while maintaining the participatory, supportive character of the Small Enterprise 
Foundation, because this is viewed as a valuable social development tool. 
However, it should be clear that the results from the financial data are robust; even 
large reductions in costs, or increases in group size would not quickly alleviate the 
deficit. Even hypothetical improvements of all factors could not, within 
reasonable limits, produce financial self-sustainability (see section 6.7). The 
problem lies in the limitations imposed by the requirement for contact between 
borrowers and lender; unless one credit officer can manage a portfolio of several 
thousand borrowers, financial sustainability is unobtainable. Borrowers in micro­
lending programmes are low-margin customers, and personal service is essentially 
a luxury for which they cannot pay. This insight refutes the notion that group 
credit is an appropriate way to target especially the very poor (see section 2.2) for 
micro-finance institutions aspiring to financial sustainability. In the context of 
participatory frameworks, credit officers are therefore facing an impossible task as
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they are required to generate volume, be personally engaged with customers and 
approach the poorest clients.13
In conclusion, the Small Enterprise Foundation's claims 'that it will become self- 
sufficient in the medium term' and that it 'should be able to achieve this self- 
sufficiency through the income generated from the interest charged on loans' 
(Small Enterprise Foundation, 1994a, p. 2) seem unrealistic. Neither does the 
Small Enterprise Foundation explain on which assumptions it bases its 
expectation for greatly improved interest income. As the analysis shows, no 
sensible change in parameters can be expected to generate the income to cover 
administrative costs, nor is there reason for assuming that administrative costs will 
decline steeply.
6.6 Participation and Social Return
While credit delivery is the main activity of solidarity credit schemes, their 
mission is the alleviation of unemployment and poverty. The Small Enterprise 
Foundation emphasises 'that the programme structure enables the communities 
which the Small Enterprise Foundation serves to increase their sense of security 
and self-esteem not only through the loans provided [...]. Participants are thus
13 This dilemma reflects another conflict of interest: it is now widely accepted that focusing on the 
core activity o f credit helps a micro-lender to achieve sustainability (Robinson, 1996, p. 155). At 
the same time, the concern is often expressed that cutting out non-financial activities leaves micro- 
lenders without the developmental, compassionate touch that is expected of charitable 
organisations (Dichter, 1996). Group credit lenders invariably have a strong emphasis on non- 
fmancial, participatory community-development activities; this could be seen as a fundamental, 
albeit costly, aspect of their mission.
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given control over their own lives in many ways that stretch beyond simply 
providing finance for business growth' (Small Enterprise Foundation, 1994a, p. 2). 
Therefore, the Small Enterprise Foundation could be justified in claiming that 
social returns exceed private returns in the form of enhanced employment 
opportunities and reduced poverty. In this case, continued subsidies may be 
defensible, if subsidies are achieved used efficiently and in a transparent manner.
Yet the claims of the Small Enterprise Foundation to ‘do good* rest on 
unrealistically optimistic interpretation of their data. Since inception to the end of 
June 1994 (end of financial year), the Small Enterprise Foundation has disbursed 
5330 loans and claims to have served an equal number of business people. 
According to its data, its borrowers own businesses that employ an average of 2.4 
people (including owners and part-timers). Thus, the Small Enterprise Foundation 
claims to have 'supported' 12,754 job positions (Small Enterprise Foundation, 
1994a; 1995a). If this claim is to be meaningful, 'support' might be taken to mean 
that the Small Enterprise Foundation's services have significantly enhanced the 
viability of employment, guaranteed its generation and continued existence. 
However, it is a steep claim that each (average) loan of R568 (that is the average 
loan size since inception) keeps 2.4 people in permanent employment. If true, it 
would mean that each job could be 'supported' with a loan of a mere R236.67. 
Even in South Africa, employment creation is more resource-intensive. It may be 
suspected that every helping hand has been counted as a 'job opportunity',
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possibly including credit group members helping each other (as group peers have 
a strong incentive to support each other).
Further, the Small Enterprise Foundation, like other micro-lenders, claims that it 
is capable of serving the ‘poorest of the poor’. However, the self-selection process 
underlying group formation can imply the exclusion of very poor people without 
regular income (Montgomery, 1996). Such a dynamic would, probably undetected 
by the lender, lead to further erosion of the social benefit of lending because a 
core target group would be implicitly excluded from access to credit.
The Small Enterprise Foundation claims to be 'able to ensure that all participants 
have a strong influence over the Foundation's policies' and developmental goals 
are aided by '[c]entres which function as community structures' and 'participation 
in giving direction to the Foundation' (1994a, p. 2). Particularly important are 
workshops which the Small Enterprise Foundation holds with representatives of 
borrower groups. These workshops comment on and influence the Small 
Enterprise Foundation's policies, thus introducing an element of grassroots 
democracy and contributing to borrowers' perception of the Small Enterprise 
Foundation as a participatory enterprise. Participation is seen as desirable in its 
own right, as a valuable social development tool.
However, it has also been pointed out that participatory structures are often 
inappropriate when the expected return is mainly economic efficiency such as
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managing a firm (Brett, 1996) and problematic because of interest conflicts as 
members double as joint producers and consumers (Abel, 1988).14 Participatory 
decision-making is then also more costly than the imposition of authority. 
Participation forces costs of consent on the multiple decision-makers - groups and 
centres and their members - and on their joint enterprise - the Small Enterprise 
Foundation - without removing the need for control.15 Participatory enterprises, 
then, would need to show plausibly that their decisions are better - that their 
control mechanisms are more effective, and higher decision costs therefore are 
recouped from savings in the production of the joint good - or that participation 
entails other, social benefits which justify higher decision costs. In the Small 
Enterprise Foundation's case, control is strong - there is no default problem - yet 
the savings alone cannot justify the costs associated with time-consuming 
personalistic banking practices.
Intended to further the 'empowerment' of disadvantaged people, participatory 
structures endanger this aim whenever democratic ideals dominate economic 
reasoning, thus becoming a threat to sustainability. The proliferation of parallel 
top-down and bottom-up channels of communication contribute to the high cost 
nature of the Small Enterprise Foundation's lending programme. It could well be
14 Arguably, solidarity credit schemes like the Grameen Bank and the Small Enterprise 
Foundation avoid this problem by imposing strong patriarchal structures on their members. In 
practice, members are thus ‘guided’ by a benevolent authoritarian - usually the founder - towards 
decisions for the good of the community.
15 See Hechter (1987, pp. 60-77) on the necessity of control in solidaristic production and on 
control in ROSCAs (1987, pp. 108-10).
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argued that a viable and effective commercial lender would do more for the 
empowerment of poor black entrepreneurs not because of internal democracy, but 
because it could be better in providing affordable venture capital.
6.7 Sustainability in the Long Run
The revenue shortfall of the Small Enterprise Foundation cannot be blamed on 
temporary variations nor on start-up problems (see Table 6.4). Even optimistic 
projections cannot provide credible scenarios for future financial sustainability. If 
costs declined by 10 percent (cost per credit officer of R79,019.44) and the 
income disbursement ratio climbed to 40 percent per year, thus raising the annual 
interest rate to around 60 percent, and credit officers were indeed able to serve 350 
customers as claimed, average loan size would still be beyond micro-credit levels 
under equilibrium conditions because
(4) avl = c/(N x i)
yields avl = R2,822.12. Thus the average loan size necessary to break even would 
be almost four times the actual, present average loan size, and this result is based 
on optimistic parameters and implausibly optimistic assumptions.
Yet the Small Enterprise Foundation is financially secure. Grants from both 
foreign and national sources have built up a sizeable stock of capital. At the
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beginning of 1995, the Small Enterprise Foundation had reserves of R5.2 million, 
and these were projected to cover administrative costs for several years (Small 
Enterprise Foundation, 1995a, p. 13).
Table 6.4 - Core data of the Small Enterprise Foundation, 1992-1996
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Number o f clients 400 1,345 1,925 2,051 2,625
Average loan size 356 770 693 750 (est.) 765
Total staff 4 16 25 29 32
Credit officers 3 6 12 13 11
Clients per credit officer 133 224 192 157 239
Loan portfolio (Rand) 80,177 562,478 954,057 1,099,145 1,545,103
Max. potential revenue (Rand) 59,808 434,973 560,290 646,065 843,412
Total annual costs (Rand) N/A N/A 667,160 1,141,392 1,642,608
Source: Small Enterprise Foundation, Performance Summaries.
Notes:
1. All years referring to financial year ending in June, except year up to end July 1995 and year up 
to end September 1996.
2. Maximum potential revenue assumes that all members are permanently indebted with average- 
sized loans (five loans per group at all times, zero default).
3. The number o f clients per credit officer for 1994 is based on information given by the Small 
Enterprise Foundation and is based on ten full-time credit officers. There were, however, two 
trainee credit officers, so that the overall average number of clients is reduced to 160 per officer.
The Small Enterprise Foundation currently generates more income from its 
reserves than from its loan portfolio; in fact, the reserves are five times larger than 
the loan portfolio. The Small Enterprise Foundation presents this as good news - 
the Small Enterprise Foundation is financially sound and safe - but it also
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illuminates the need for subsidies.16 Investments in formal financial markets are 
not in the spirit of the Small Enterprise Foundation's mission, and such 
investments generate no visible social returns over and above their private returns. 
The requirement for subsidies on a continuous basis, however, is not indicative of 
waste on behalf of the management of the Small Enterprise Foundation. The 
Small Enterprise Foundation was chosen as a case study because it has a 
reputation for professionalism in its field. USAID supports this view and 
concludes in its mid-term evaluation that the Small Enterprise Foundation 'is a 
very sound organisation' (as quoted in Small Enterprise Foundation, 1994b, p. 
I).17 Insufficient financial controls cannot, therefore, be blamed for the Small 
Enterprise Foundation's unfavourable financial performance. This case study has 
shown that more attention needs to be paid to the requirement of social capital in 
participatory institutions. The cost implications of the reliance on social capital 
and solidarity are fundamental; even to poor people, solidarity does not come free.
16 In this case, these are internal cross-subsidies from interest income of the ‘reserves’. However, 
it is important to understand these as equivalent to external subsidies as the 'reserves' are the 
accumulation of grants and external subsidies.
17 In addition to ongoing funding, the Small Enterprise Foundation won the APPLE award which 
USAID endows and which is given, competitively, to the most meritorious applicants worldwide.
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7. How to Lend like Mad and Make a Profit: The Start-Up Fund
Micro-credit is now an accepted development policy tool and attracts attention 
and funding at record levels. Donors, development officials and researchers 
discuss the problems of uncollateralised lending - primarily exposure to moral 
hazard and bounded rationality - and appear to agree on a model of ‘best practice* 
for solving them. Generally, a tight grip on defaults is recommended, including 
‘strict auditing and accounting procedures, suggesting the value of monitoring 
technologies for inducing the desired behaviour’ (Braverman and Guasch, 1989, 
p. 14). In addition, most writers agree on the desirability of ‘some form of joint 
responsibility or liability by small groups [...], whereby default of one of the 
members would imply the cancellation of any future loans to the whole group’ 
{ibid.). Inevitably, both recommendations are two facets of one lending strategy, 
as joint liability is a further incentive for close supervision, exercised mutually by 
solidaristic borrowers. This approach is seen as the answer to previous attempts 
with subsidised credit which have generally failed due to the lack of financial 
discipline (Adams et al, 1984). The paradigm of group credit is associated with 
concepts such as social collateral, peer selection, supervision and pressure, and all 
are aimed at using ‘local’ information and ‘connectedness’ to ensure high 
repayment rates.1
1 The “paradigm” on micro-credit is illustrated by Thomas (1990), Rhyne and Otero (1994), 
Stiglitz (1994), Wenner (1995), Chaves and Gonzales-Vega (1996), Robinson (1996) and others; 
its foundations are laid out in earlier report about the comparative advantage o f informal finance 
(World Bank, 1989; Bouman, 1990).
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The previous chapters have shown that these concepts do not easily translate into 
efficient lending operations. In fact, such operations typically do experience very 
good repayment rates, but their operational costs are high, sometimes prohibitive. 
Most prominent group lenders have not succeeded in reducing the total costs of 
lending - the sum of operational and default cost - to sustainable levels (Hossain, 
1988). Therefore, it has been argued that group credit ‘can also cause severe 
inefficiencies and has many of the same problems that are associated with 
common ownership and team production* (Braverman and Guasch, 1994, p. 58).2
However, while traditional, ‘cheap* credit programmes offered little incentive for 
exercising prudence (Adams et al, 1984), neither by loan officers nor borrowers, 
this chapter argues that it is possible to design lending schemes that do enforce 
prudence, achieve sustainability, but avoid joint responsibility structures and the 
disadvantages associated with them. This proposition will be illustrated through a 
case study of one individual lender serving a marginal, collateral-free market in 
South Africa. Its lending strategy uses several of the structures discussed above, 
but also eschews most standard ‘rules’ as they are presently accepted by 
mainstream thinking on micro-credit. The lending strategy of the Start-Up Fund is 
characterised, inter alia, by the absence of explicit and discretionary screening of 
loan applicants, absence of direct contact between lender and borrower, absence of
2 Participatory structures create ‘costs of consent’ in decision-making, and may not always be 
viable in competition with authority and contracting (Olson, 1971; Hechter, 1987). Arguably, the 
grass-roots approach to development, including the group credit movement, does not pay sufficient 
attention to the costs of participation (Brett, 1996).
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supervision, and absence of default enforcement.3 In contrast to the hands-on 
approach of group lenders, the Start-Up Fund relies fully on mechanisms for the 
self-selection and self-motivation of its borrowers. Further, as sophisticated 
computerised payment mechanisms are used, staffing levels are minimal and 
services are provided in an anonymous fashion. Flouting all conventional rules, 
the Start-Up Fund operates with good success.
Section 7.1 will discuss some issues in institutional design with regard to financial 
sustainability, section 7.2 will introduce the Start-Up Fund, while section 7.3 will 
evaluate the development of its financial performance and sustainability. Section 
7.4 analysis the relationship between self-selection, borrowers’ characteristics and 
repayment behaviour. Section 7.5 concludes this chapter.
7.1 Issues in Institutional Design
Group credit lenders typically report very high repayment rates, from around 95% 
in the case of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh to above 99% in the case of the 
Small Enterprise Foundation in South Africa (Berenbach and Guzman, 1994; 
Small Enterprise Foundation, 1996). The dominant problem for these supposedly 
financially sustainable institutions was identified in the previous chapters as their
3 The Start-Up Fund now reports defaulters to local credit bureaux. This excludes them from 
accessing credit elsewhere, notably consumer credit. However, it remains doubtful how strong a 
deterrent this is considering that most Start-Up Fund clients are unlikely to be considered 
creditworthy anyway.
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operational structure, leading to excessive costs. As total costs of lending are 
constituted by the sum of default and operational costs, group credit institutions 
cannot claim to have solved the problem of finding sustainable micro-credit 
delivery systems. Innovative lenders, therefore, are challenged to find ways to 
reduce operational costs significantly, without losing control of defaults.4
Group credit lenders control repayment behaviour through intensive personal 
interaction, invoking ‘peer pressure’ and social collateral. The intensive contact 
between borrowers and credit officers constitutes the core characteristic of group 
lenders as ‘caring* institutions. However, it is also the reason for unsustainable 
levels of cost, as each credit officer is limited in the number of borrowers he or 
she can handle, while the income generated from micro-loans cannot justify the 
costly nurturing.5 An innovative, cost-conscious lender will not be in a position to 
provide the ‘cosiness* of group-based institutions. In order to reduce costs 
significantly, scale economies must be used which require a simple, ‘mass- 
produced’ financial product. Such a ‘Fordist’ approach needs to reduce the unit
4 For micro-credit institutions, there is a trade-off between default and operational costs. While a 
lender should seek to minimise the sum of default and operational costs, it is not feasible to 
minimise both simultaneously. The more resources are allocated for borrower selection and 
control, the lower will be defaults. Low defaults, however, are not necessarily the appropriate 
criterion for efficient credit extension. Group lenders probably pay insufficient attention to that 
relationship.
5 The point is sometimes made that the costs of personalistic lending practices depend on the 
environment; notably, literate and numerate staff are more easily available and cheaper in Asia 
than in Africa. While this is generally true, there is no evidence that Asian group lenders have 
achieved financial sustainability.
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costs, i.e. the costs of providing credit to one borrower, below the unit price, i.e. 
the income received from loans to one borrower.
In the absence of collateral and comprehensive business documentation, loan 
officers cannot make informed judgements about the creditworthiness of loan 
applicants. Attempting such evaluation would surely prove too expensive for very 
small loan amounts and contradict the objective of mass production. Neither will a 
low-cost lender be in the position to follow up repayment performance on a 
personal basis. In both cases, the margins of micro-loans cannot justify the costs. 
In the traditional view, this creates a vulnerability to adverse selection and 
opportunistic behaviour.6
Credit groups and group-based lenders screen loan applicants through interaction, 
making an assessment on the basis of character and social standing. A low-cost 
lender, in contrast, will rely on self-selection and effective incentives to select 
applicants and motivate repayments. Therefore, such institutions use business- 
mindedness and self-interest of potential borrowers, not their ‘character’, as a 
criterion for lending. It is sometimes argued that an important reason for the 
default of micro-loan borrowers is not opportunism,7 but the inability to repay.
6 Typical micro-loan schemes offer first loans often below US$100, rising over time for borrowers 
who keep repayments up. Even high annual interest rates - fifty percent and more are common - 
generate low income streams per borrower, which cannot cover such transaction costs. Banking 
with low-income people thus requires simplified procedures for collecting relevant information 
and verifying creditworthiness (Bhatt, 1989).
7 Williamson describes opportunistic behaviour as ‘seeking self-interest with guile’ (1988, p. 
569). An opportunistic borrower could, for instance, plan to default when making a credit 
application.
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Hence a mechanism for self-selection should stipulate rules that discourage those 
from participating who are not fully motivated to use their loans productively. 
Self-motivation is provided through rules that offer a benefit for repayment - 
usually access to ever-growing loans and, eventually, graduation into formal 
finance.
By creating an incentive framework that emphasises self-selection of the 
candidates and strong, appropriate incentives for continued participation with 
good repayment standing, an innovative lender should be in a position to reduce 
overall costs of lending significantly in comparison with both traditional rural 
finance and group credit organisations. Providing the right incentives does not 
require personal borrower contact, and credit delivery could be rationalised. If 
default rates remain reasonably low, such a lender has a good chance of being a 
more efficient provider of micro-loans than a staff-intensive, group-based 
organisation.
7.2 The Start-Up Fund
The Start-Up Fund is a lending scheme located in Durbanville, near Cape Town. It 
‘operates a phased and incentivised micro-credit programme in conjunction with 
various training organisations, using electronic administration for large-scale 
delivery of small business loans through the banking system to emerging 
entrepreneurs in the informal sector throughout South Africa* (Start-Up Fund,
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1995, p. 1). The first loans were issued in October 1993 and at the end of 
December 1996 more than R5.8 million had been disbursed to 5418 borrowers. 
Since September 1995, the accounts of Start-Up Fund show a net monthly surplus 
(see Table 7.1).
The Start-Up Fund makes loans available to individual borrowers. In order to 
qualify for a loan, prospective borrowers must participate in an approved small 
business training programme offered by several partner organisations. The courses 
cost approximately R400 per trainee, and the training institutions are funded 
separately from the Start-Up Fund. These training programmes provide basic 
business skills, such as identifying market opportunities, preparing a business 
proposal, marketing, stock-taking, and basic accountancy. Following the 
successful completion of the course, and thus acquiring the “Township MBA”, the 
trainees may ask the Start-Up Fund, through their trainers, for start-up capital. 
There is no further selection, but applicants have to pay an initial deposit of R100, 
attend a credit-familiarisation session, during which the rules and obligations of 
the Start-Up Fund are explained, and open an account with a major South African 
bank, First National Bank, into which all loan disbursements are made. The loan 
programme is phased so that new borrowers receive R500. On repayment of their 
loan, borrowers qualify for another, larger loan. There are five stages, and the 
largest loan level offered is for R2000.8 Repayment of loans takes six months; 
following full repayment, the next loan is automatically disbursed.
8 The levels o f the initial deposit and the respective loan stages have frequently been reviewed 
since inception o f the programme. The deposit was originally set at R60. Until 1995, there were
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Table 7.1 - Start-Up Fund core indicators, March 1995 - December 1996
total number of 
loanees
net loan book 
(Rand)
net monthly 
surplus (Rand)
Mar-95 1707 609,313 -7,197
Jun-95 2117 832,288 -9,901
Sep-95 2630 973,484 1,988
Dec-95 3129 1,378,455 454
Mar-96 3503 1,563,646 1,513
Jun-96 4147 1,744,204 12,835
Sep-96 4796 2,524,077 70,700
Dec-96 5418 3,191,679 22,888
note: net monthly surplus excludes donations, but includes funding costs.
The Start-Up Fund also offers life insurance and savings accumulation and may 
pay a bonus for reliable repayment records at the end of each year. All these 
services are packaged into the loan programme, thus only one “product” is 
available from the Start-Up Fund. The various features of the Start-Up Fund 
package are explained in detail in the credit-familiarisation session, where both 
obligations and entitlements of loanees are discussed. Borrowers pay for the 
package through their loan repayments. The effective “price” for the package at all 
stages is 105% of the respective loan amount per annum, including the interest on 
the loan, life insurance, annual performance bonuses, and accumulated savings to 
which they have access when exiting from the scheme.9 Borrowers effectively
four loan stages ranging from R200 to R1500. Since early 1997, loan stages range from R500 to 
R12,000. It is hoped that graduates of the loan programme will find other, more mainstream 
sources of credit, helped by the fact that the Start-Up Fund programme has given them a track 
record of loan repayment.
9 When joining the programme, borrowers pay a deposit that will be refunded when they decide to 
withdraw from the scheme, having repaid all liabilities in full. When loans are disbursed, 16.7% of 
the amount are deducted and channelled to the Group Indemnity Trust, so that borrowers receive 
only 83.3% of the nominal loan amount. This is a default insurance premium and is not refundable. 
Repayments have to be made monthly, starting a month after disbursal, for six months. Monthly 
repayments are equal to 20% of the nominal loan amount. On the basis of net disbursals to the 
borrowers, the repayment schedule implies an interest rate of 105% per annum. As long as 
borrowers are up-to-date in their repayment schedule, they are entitled to end-of-year bonuses, 
depending on the surplus of the Group Indemnity Trust, and they receive life insurance. As all
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reduce the interest rate when paying late, yet this ‘tactic’ will also delay the 
disbursal of new loans, reduce the pay-out of life-insurance, and preclude access 
to annual bonuses.10
Both loan disbursal and repayments are made through the electronic payment 
mechanisms of commercial banks. The Start-Up Fund has an arrangement with 
First National Bank for using its transfer mechanism. Further, all transfers, both 
loan disbursements and repayments, are accessible almost instantly through the 
computer link between the Start-Up Fund and First National Bank. Borrowers are 
issued with a ‘loan book’ in which all transactions are recorded, in order to 
facilitate transparency from both sides.
During its existence a number of changes have been made to the loan scheme. 
Most importantly, the scheme insured against the direct risk of defaults by 
creating an indemnity fund, the Group Indemnity Trust, in 1995. This fund is 
financially separate from the Start-Up Fund, but constitutes an integral part of the 
Start-Up Fund’s lending operation and will therefore be included in the analysis.
services are packaged as one product, it would be misleading to understand the ‘interest rate’ as the 
cost of credit alone.
10 It is not possible to distil the ‘pure’ interest rate of the loan, excluding the costs o f all other 
benefits. For the life insurance, there is no alternative market to which reference could be made; 
further, it is designed as an incentive for repayment and linked to repayment performance, 
therefore no independent insurance contract exists. Insurance pay-outs from the group Indemnity 
Trust thus far have been almost negligible (R720 from inception to end of December 1996). Bonus 
pay-outs were substantial: for the year ending 31 December 1996, the Group Indemnity Trust paid 
out bonuses amounting to 27 percent of the eligible loanees’ gross annual repayments in 1996. 387 
loanees qualified and benefited from bonuses ranging from R90 to R1500.
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Further, the loan sizes at the various stages are frequently revised. Data in section
7.3 use monthly data from January 1995 to December 1996, both on the income 
and cost development of the Start-Up Fund, and on income and default liabilities 
of the Group Indemnity Trust. Section 7.4 uses cross-section data of borrowers* 
details of April 1995; hence loan stages, loan sizes and respective liabilities refer 
to the structure as it existed prior to the inception of the Group Indemnity Trust.
The analysis presented here can only be a snapshot of the Start-Up Fund as the 
organisation is undergoing continuous change, both through organic growth that 
could enhance or threaten the institution as it matures, and through explicit 
changes in the lending scheme. Some future plans of the Start-Up Fund are 
ambitious; notably, plans are finalised to make borrowers pay for their own 
business training, so that the complete model, from training to loans, could 
become independent of subsidies. However, as borrowers would pay for their 
training together with the loan repayments, the effective interest rate would 
become even higher. Hopefully, this will not overstretch the repayment ability of 
marginal entrepreneurs with immature business ventures. If it did, this 
development could lead into the abyss of mass default. Further, another danger is 
that - for whatever reason - larger than expected default threatens the ability of the 
Group Indemnity Trust to compensate the Start-Up Fund for the defaults it 
experiences. In this case, the cost structure of the Start-Up Fund would experience 
severe set-backs and possibly threaten its financial sustainability. However, the
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data available, and the development discussed here, show that it possesses more 
favourable characteristics than many comparable group lending schemes.
7.3 Financial Performance and Sustainability
This section will demonstrate that the Start-Up Fund has made strong progress 
towards achieving financial self-sufficiency. The analysis will focus on the cost- 
revenue streams generated from each individual borrower, as the ‘mass-minimalist 
approach’ should manifest itself in a low-cost structure and predictable income 
streams. Typically, the costs of lending are then comprised of default costs and 
operational costs. Group credit achieves almost zero default costs at the expense 
of high operational costs. Individualistic credit, especially in the absence of 
monitoring and enforcement, would be expected to experience substantial default 
costs.
The analysis will exclude funding costs of the Start-Up Fund. This approach is in 
line with the methodology applied in the study of the Small Enterprise Foundation 
in chapter 6. Micro-credit institutions are invariably financed by a combination of 
grants, subsidised credit and, in South Africa, “guilt money” from major “white” 
corporations.11 The actual costs of funding do thus not adequately reflect the
11 Most major South African firms now operate ‘social conscience’ funds with which they support 
worthy projects through equity investment, concessionary loans and grants. The apparent objective 
of these funds is to improve their parents’ social acceptability by blurring the memory of their 
collaboration with the Apartheid regime. However, neither donors nor recipient organisations like 
acknowledging the nature of these funds. Most participants prefer to maintain the notion that these 
are ‘market-oriented’ financial instruments.
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social costs of their capital, nor any inherent strength of the institution. I assume, 
therefore, zero capital costs which, although this implies a subsidy, allows ready 
comparisons in the cost efficiency of various suppliers of micro-credit.12
Monthly interest income of the Start-Up Fund per loanee has grown steadily from 
R11-R12 in the early months of 1995 to around R18 in late 1996, which includes 
both interest received from micro-borrowers and from other investments (see 
Table 7.2). This development reflects both increased loan amounts, due to 
revisions of the loan stages, and a larger number of mature borrowers at higher 
loan levels. However, the return from micro-lending has grown more rapidly than 
these figures suggest. Like other micro-credit institutions, the Start-Up Fund 
invests surplus funds on established financial markets. During the financial year 
ending September 1996, total interest income was R694,101 of which interest 
received from loanees constituted 69.4 percent. Invariably, during the start-up 
period, when loan repayments only started to gain momentum, loanees’ interest 
payments constituted a much smaller share of total interest income. At the present 
level, the Start-Up Fund would be able to cover all operational costs from interest 
received from loanees alone.
12 This could also be justified using the infant industry argument, as both the lender and its clients 
are hoped to mature and become independent of subsidy. It should be noted that the Start-Up Fund 
is now profitable.
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Table 7.2 - Monthly cost and income per loanee in Rand
total costs per 
loanee
interest income profit per loanee 
per loanee
Mar-95 12.44 12.94 0.50
Jun-95 12.20 12.22 0.02
Sep-95 7.72 11.67 3.95
Dec-95 9.71 13.40 3.69
Mar-96 11.07 16.04 4.97
Jun-96 10.26 17.61 7.35
Sep-96 9.47 18.17 8.70
Dec-96 8.71 19.41 10.70
note: total costs exclude the costs of funds
Defaults have been very volatile and, in some months, very high. Their average 
level, however, does not give reason for concern. Most importantly, since July 
1995 the default costs have been borne by the Group Indemnity Trust, insulating 
the Start-Up Fund from all direct implications of default. This Trust is a partner 
organisation founded to absorb the default costs of the Start-Up Fund. It is run as 
a non-profit organisation, although it aims at achieving surpluses. The separation 
of the risk-bearing part of micro-lending accelerated the attainment of profitability 
of the Start-Up Fund and enhanced its access to commercial finance. The Group 
Indemnity Trust is financed by the loanees through deductions - effectively an 
insurance premium - of 16.7 percent from the nominal loan amounts paid out by 
the Start-Up Fund. The Group Indemnity Trust indemnifies the Start-Up Fund 
against default and death of borrowers, and also extends life insurance to all 
borrowers, depending on the level of recent repayments.13 Both contributions to
13 The audited annual financial report states the ‘(i)n view of the fact that the Group Indemnity 
Trust was comfortably able to cover all bad debts incurred by defaulting borrowers during the past 
year, resulting in zero bad debt impact on the Start-Up Fund, and the likelihood of this continuing 
in the future, it is not considered necessary for the Start-Up Fund to have a provision for bad 
debts.’ (Start-Up Fund, 1996) Default risk has thus been successfully removed from the Start-Up 
Funds operations, at the cost of lower interest income.
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the Group Indemnity Trust and defaults vary strongly from month to month, but 
contributions have averaged around R ll and defaults just under RIO per loanee 
since the inception of the Trust.14
The Start-Up Fund further argues that default costs are significantly reduced by 
self-selection through the staging of loan amounts. Most defaults occur in the first 
loan stage, where the exposure of the Start-Up Fund is low (Informal Business 
Training Trust, 1995). Those borrowers who progress rapidly to higher loan stages 
not only generate most income, but are also least likely to default. This claim is 
weakly supported by the analysis of default probabilities in Section 7.5.
Operational costs have increased significantly over the observation period, 
contrary to expectation. However, the data are misleading here, since during the 
early years of the observation period the Start-Up Fund received sizeable indirect 
subsidies as it made use of office accommodation and clerical support of another 
firm. These subsidies were phased out over time, and only in recent months have 
they been withdrawn completely.15 The cost calculation also excludes
14 These figures reflect the deductions from loan pay-out of 16.7 percent and an average default 
rate of around 14.0 percent.
15 More detailed information on the subsidies made available to the Start-Up Fund and their 
subsequent removal is not available on a monthly basis. However, a comparison of the financial 
years 1994-5 and 1995-6 illustrate the effect: Several cost items have risen reflecting both inflation 
and increased business volume: audit fees rose by 12%, and bank charges by 25%. In contrast, 
previously subsidised items rose much more rapidly: salaries and staff related costs rose by 141% 
to R91,183, printing, postage and stationary rose by 313% to R66,130, expenses for 
telecommunication, travel and accommodation by 354% to R40,888. These costs are all incurred at 
the headquarter, located on the premises of the independent Trident Institute. The rapid rises 
represent mainly the removal o f subsidies as no new staff were hired. Management fees rose from 
zero to R65,044 as the management had not been paid previously. Miscellaneous items showing 
strong growth, such as consultancy fees up by 71% and depreciation up by 157% arise from one-
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depreciation of capital assets, because depreciation costs may not always be 
comparable across institutions and countries. However, depreciation costs are a 
relatively minor cost component and their inclusion in total costs would not alter 
the cost development significantly. Depreciation has been relatively stable at 
around R1 per loanee per month during 1996.16
In summary, the costs of providing a loanee with the micro-loan services of the 
Start-Up Fund, including operational and depreciation costs, are around R11 per 
month but falling as the client base expands (see table 7.2). If default costs are 
included - which are now covered by the Group Indemnity Trust - total costs per 
loanee rise to around R21. Interest income per loanee stands at just over R12 - or 
around R18, if interest income from institutional sources is included - and each 
loanee contributes another R11 to the Group Indemnity Trust per month.
In comparison with other micro-credit institutions, it is a major achievement to be 
able to cover costs, excluding capital costs, from credit income. Notably, in direct 
comparison with a group lender such as the Small Enterprise Foundation, the 
‘competitiveness’ of individualistic credit becomes clear. Both institutions lend in 
similar markets in South Africa, both use electronic transfer mechanisms, and 
both have a high proportion of female borrowers. After three years of operation, in
off needs; depreciation is up strongly because of high expenditure on information technology 
(Start-Up Fund, 1996). See also note 16.
16 Depreciation costs are relatively high in 1996 because the Start-Up Fund acquired computer 
equipment and software for R116,808 which are depreciated at 33% and 50% respectively.
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July 1995, the Small Enterprise Foundation had 2051 borrowers, while the Start- 
Up Fund had 4393 after three years. At this time, the Small Enterprise Foundation 
incurred monthly costs per borrower of R46.38. In the micro-loan business, it 
would be difficult to raise monthly income per borrower to this level. Yet, as a 
group lender, the Small Enterprise Foundation does not provide loans to each 
borrower, but to groups of five. The income per borrower is therefore even lower, 
amounting to only R3.23. The large cost-income gap appears almost impossible to 
overcome, and it was shown in chapter 5 that reasonable projections do not 
provide plausible scenarios of self-sustainable group lending for the Small 
Enterprise Foundation.
However, it should also be noted that the Start-Up Fund’s lending scheme relies 
on the screening function of a training programme. Although there is no active 
selection of potential borrowers by the trainers, the requirement to participate in 
the course is an important element of borrower self-selection.17 This feature may 
be seen as an implicit subsidy, as the Start-Up Fund does not pay for the training 
of its borrowers. Initially, all training was done by one partner organisation, the 
Informal Business Training Trust in Cape Town, but in the process of expansion 
other training institutions became involved. Currently, the costs of training stand 
at about R400 per person.18 Although training has its own rationale, it should be
17 Potentially, a lending scheme could use business training and examinations for filtering out less 
promising candidates and selecting the most able entrepreneurs. This is not the function of training 
and examination in the Start-Up Fund.
18 This figure refers to the costs of the Informal Business Training Trust in Cape Town. This is a 
partner organisation founded with the single purpose of providing the ‘Township MBA” training.
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remembered that the Start-Up Fund’s success depends, for the moment, on the fact 
that informal business training is subsidised by foreign aid and domestic welfare 
organisations. In future, this will not be the case. The Start-Up Fund has now 
become highly profitable and is introducing changes so that future training will be 
paid from interest income.
7.4 Self-Selection and Defaults
Above it was shown that the Start-Up Fund succeeded in containing default rates. 
It was argued that the relevant mechanisms were self-selection of borrowers and 
motivation once they have climbed beyond the initial loan level. In this section, 
cross-section analysis of the Start-Up Fund’s borrowers will be used to attempt to 
ascertain to what extent the lending structure can explain the default behaviour, 
and whether it is possible to determine high-risk groups. If self-selection was seen 
as a powerful tool for containing defaults, then more specific targeting towards 
low-risk groups may improve the repayment rate.
A large data-set was analysed, containing information on 459 borrowers who 
originally trained for the “Township MBA” in Cape Town and 1182 borrowers 
who trained in Johannesburg. The data were copied from the Informal Business 
Training Trust’s records in April 1995 and contain all borrowers of the Start-Up
Other training institutions, which offer the “Township MBA” course, are multi-purpose, such as 
trade unions and welfare organisations. Therefore, training costs may depend on the type of 
institution offering it.
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Fund who, at that time, had been expected to have at least one loan repaid. The 
data-set contains eight explanatory variables, including borrowers’ loan standing 
and loan level at the time, and further details about themselves and their 
businesses (see Table 3). These variables were chosen because they describe the 
criteria through which micro-lenders view the social and business characteristics 
of their clientele, and because relevant and reliable data are usually available in 
micro-credit schemes. A Probit estimation was carried out to determine their 
relative importance for repayment probabilities. It is assumed that repayment 
probabilities can be expressed as a function :
(1) Prob(REPAY) = F(a + b GENDER + c EDU + d LEVEL
+ e DURATION + f  BUSOWNER + g SPAZA + h AGE65 
+ i LOCATION)
Of the coefficients, those for GENDER, LEVEL, AGE65 and LOCATION are 
significant at the one percent level, while EDU is significant at five percent and 
DURATION at ten percent. The coefficient for BUSOWNER and SPAZA are 
found not significant at reasonable levels (see table 7.3).
As expected, and often reported in other studies, women are shown to be more 
conscientious with their repayments. Almost 60 percent of the borrowers in the 
sample were women, and the results suggest that the average repayment rate may 
be improved if women were to participate in greater numbers. Maybe contrary to
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intuition, higher levels of formal education are associated with reduced repayment 
probabilities. This result suggests that it is not ability that determines repayments, 
but the dependence on self-employment and, therefore, future access to loans. 
Borrowers with higher levels of education may find it easier to find alternative 
sources of finance or wage employment, while those with more limited alternative 
opportunities value highly continued participation in the loan scheme.
Table 7.3 - Coefficient estimate results of Probit analysis
(REPAY = 1 if borrower in good standing, otherwise = 0)
Variable Definition Coefficient Standard Error
constant .7118 .1438
GENDER = 1 if  male; = 0 if  female -.2431 .0724
EDU standardised index indicating highest school 
level attended (OsEDUs 1)
-.2510 .1131
LEVEL = 0 if borrower is at the R200 loan level, 
or has defaulted at that level, = 1 otherwise
.2588 .0880
DURATION = 1 if  borrower joined the scheme before 
1 January 1994, = 0 otherwise
.1289 .0731
BUSOWNER = 1 if borrower owned a business before 
joining the programme, = 0 otherwise
.0101 .0744
SPAZA19 = 1 if borrower did not intend to operate a 
spaza shop, = 0 otherwise
.0701 .0980
AGE65 = 1 if borrower bom before 1 January 1965, 
= 0 otherwise
.2091 .0766
LOCATION = 1 if  borrower trained in Johannesburg; 
= 0 otherwise
.2830 .0816
Spaza shops are small ‘comer’ shops in South African townships (Rogerson, 1991). They 
typically sell some food, notably bread and tinned food, simple consumer items such as matches, 
soap and batteries, and sometimes beer. Many spaza shops offer less than ten different products. 
While many spaza shops are operated from wooden shacks, some are located in their owners’ 
homes; here the category also includes hawkers operating from mobile ‘premises’ - usually a table 
or cardboard boxes - in public spaces.
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DURATION is only weakly significant with a relatively small coefficient. Those 
who stay in the programme longer, thus presumably showing more commitment 
to the programme, are less likely to default. Neither BUSOWNER nor SPAZA is 
significant, and the coefficients do not warrant interpretation. Therefore, the 
results here do not support the often-held notion that spaza shop-owners and 
hawkers have exceedingly high failure and default rates because their sector is 
overtraded (see footnote 18). However, the initial self-selection of participants 
may contribute to this result, and less than 16 percent of borrowers in the sample 
borrowed for simple retail activities. Young borrowers, ie those under the age of 
30, are found to be significantly less likely to repay their loans. Possibly, young 
borrowers continue to scan the labour market and are also more employable than 
their older peers. Further, older entrepreneurs often have acquired relevant work 
experience in previous jobs, which benefits their own enterprise.
The strongest result was received for LOCATION; borrowers in Johannesburg are 
much more likely to repay than their peers in Cape Town. Possibly, the 
demographic and socio-economic particularity of Johannesburg could explain 
some of the difference. Johannesburg attracts more rural-urban migrants than 
other cities in South Africa and social instability and crime are at record levels. 
However, additional motives may be found in the different quality of business 
training and therefore the effectiveness of the self-selection mechanism.
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The most notable result, in light of the Start-Up Fund’s lending strategy, is the 
effect of the loan level on repayment rates. If self-selection and motivation works, 
than defaults should decline significantly as borrowers progress towards higher 
loan stages. In the sample, borrowers with loans above R200 account for only
25.3 percent of all borrowers, yet they are holding 48.3 percent of the loan 
volume, as their average loan size is R553. Therefore, if their default probability is 
significantly lower than that of borrowers on the first loan level, half the loan 
portfolio could be considered relatively ‘safe’. Of all borrowers in the sample,
79.3 percent remain in good standing. However, of those at the R200 loan level 
only 77.2 percent have duly repaid, but at the higher loan levels 85.1 percent are 
in good standing.
In fact, borrowers on a higher loan level are less likely to default. The strong 
results of the Probit estimation for LEVEL indicate that the self-selection 
mechanism works, as defaults are most likely to occur on the first loan level. 
Controlling for all other variables, borrowers at loan levels above R200 are almost 
six percent more likely to be in good standing with the Start-Up Fund. Therefore, 
there is significant and noticeable self-selection leading to declining default 
probability as borrowers move upwards through the programme; on the other side, 
the effect is not as large as one could have hoped, as an estimated default rate of 
15 percent among mature borrowers remains relatively high.
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Cape Town not only has a higher default incidence, but the patterns are less 
discernible there as well. A separate run, containing only Cape Town borrowers, 
found only duration significant.
7.5 Spreading and Expanding the Model
The discussion on financial sustainability centres on the objective of becoming 
independent from continued subsidisation by donors. Based on the analysis of 
data up to the end of 1996, I have shown that the Start-Up Fund is about to 
achieve its aim. However, aiming even higher means reaching profitability, ie 
covering the real costs of capital and achieving commercially viable returns on 
capital. The rationale of striving for profitability is based on the objective of 
micro-finance to reach as many deserving beneficiaries as possible.
Following its impressive track record in raising net income, the management of 
the Start-Up Fund decided to establish the Micro Business Development 
Corporation, an investment vehicle for capitalising the Start-Up Fund’s lending 
portfolio on commercial principles. The Micro Business Development 
Corporation was incorporated in January 1997 with an authorised capital of 20 
million ordinary shares, of which 5 million were offered to investors at R2 per 
share. Promotional material predicts pre-tax earnings per share of 62.0 cents in 
1999, a dividend of 20 cents, rising to 40 cents in 2001.
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The management of the Micro Business Development Corporation has targeted 
institutional investors with a long time horizon; the offer has been taken up 
enthusiastically mainly by pension funds, insurance companies and investment 
management companies. It was clear that these investors were attracted by the 
ethical image of investment in micro-finance and may have been willing to 
overlook some of the associated risk. A further inducement was found in the fact 
that for the next few years, the Start-Up Fund can still draw on concessional 
development finance, mainly from the Development Bank of Southern Africa. 
Leveraging private investors’ capital with low-interest development loans 
enhances the earning capability of the Start-Up Fund. However, investors needed 
to be convinced that the Start-Up Fund had the potential to produce commercially 
acceptable returns in the long-run.20 The controlling shareholder of the Micro 
Business Development Corporation is the Coronation Group, an aggressive and 
successful young investment management firm. Their engagement would suggest 
that the potential of the Micro Business Development Corporation is being viewed 
exceptionally positive by the private sector. However, the Start-Up Fund remains 
a foundation dedicated to micro-enterprise lending and controlled by trustees. The 
owners of the Micro Business Development Corporation have only limited 
influence on its policies.
20 In the final quarter of 1996, the months preceding the formation of the Micro Enterprise 
Development Corporation, the Start-Up Fund had total assets o f about R1,000 per borrower. At 
the same time, it generated net income (interest revenue less costs, excluding the costs of funds) of 
just over RIO per month. The implied rate o f return on assets o f 12 percent was above the prime 
lending rate at the time (and rising quickly), but below open market funding costs.
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Internationally, the Start-Up Fund’s model starts to attract imitators. Plans are 
being developed to set-up franchised operations in various neighbouring 
countries, including Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. In the course, 
adjustments have to be made to the Start-Up Fund’s model in order to deal with 
the absence of a highly developed electronic banking infrastructure. These 
approaches are being viewed positively by private investors and will be financed 
solely from private investors’ capital, leveraged by the International Finance 
Company, the private sector arm of the World Bank. Once the Start-Up Fund’s 
lending model is fully financed by private investors, its obligation to justify its 
existence in developmental terms ceases, although it will continue to lend to poor 
entrepreneurs without collateral.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter has argued that efficient institutional design can succeed in making 
‘mad’ lending - uncollateralised, impersonal, and without enforcement - 
financially sustainable. It does so by establishing a framework of incentives that 
entices borrowers to behave predictably and show relatively high levels of 
financial prudence. Through self-selection and appropriate incentives the lender 
passively promotes the right people to join, and to see their interest not opposed 
to, but in parallel with that of the lender. Therefore, opportunistic behaviour is 
kept within limits and does not undermine the viability of the lender. Efficient 
operational procedures compensate for default losses.
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Contrary to the current paradigm postulating a ‘grass-roots approach to 
development’, the scheme analysed here is consciously non-participatory. 
Borrowers have little contact with the lender and no influence on its business; 
terms and conditions of borrowing are determined, on technocratic grounds, by a 
small group of managers who see cost-efficiency and outreach as dominant policy 
objectives. The borrowers are provided with a standard product, on pre­
determined terms, with the aim of helping their graduation out of the informal 
sector, and possibly becoming bankable with more conventional institutions. Such 
a scheme is unusual in that it does not involve ‘community’ participation, and 
eschews softer, more socially oriented objectives. Development, in this context, is 
through business success and financial discipline, not ‘empowerment’.21 This case 
study has argued that this orientation is one of the reasons for the financial success 
of the ‘mass-minimalist’ approach, but it will surely be viewed critically by many 
members of the development community.
The analysis presented in this chapter excludes questions concerning the social 
return. On the basis of operational efficiency, however, the individual ‘mass 
minimalist’ lending technique is feasible and viable, and appears preferable to 
other, more mainstream forms of organisation.
21 In fact, it could be argued that this approach ‘empowers’ borrowers more than die participatory 
principle o f group lending schemes, which tend to limit personal responibility and are sometimes 
seen as paternalistic (Brett, 1996).
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8. Hear the Grassroots Grow! The Start-Up Fund on the ground
Micro-credit is motivated by social and developmental considerations. Micro­
lending schemes are implemented in order to achieve goals which are viewed as 
politically or morally desirable. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to base 
decisions about micro-credit delivery on financial performance alone. The 
efficiency with which micro-credit institutions achieve the social objectives, thus, 
is a function not only of repayment rates and operational costs, but of employment 
generation and poverty eradication. Such successes are invariably more difficult to 
measure than purely financial performance. Further, the evaluation of social 
change is also more subjective and contentious than the assessment of financial 
data. While this thesis focuses on the assessment of lending technologies from a 
financial perspective, plausible indications of the positive social return of low-cost 
lending could strengthen its argument.
This chapter reports and discusses empirical results stemming from a small survey 
of present and former clients of the Start-Up Fund, in townships around Cape 
Town. Section 8.1 introduces the survey method, section 8.2 summarises the 
aggregate survey data and assesses its evidence on social impact, and section 8.3 
discusses the influence of geographical setting on business success and repayment 
rates. Section 8.4 characterises ‘types’ of entrepreneurs and illustrates them with 
several cases, section 8.5 analyses the contribution of various ‘types’ of
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entrepreneurs to the Start-Up Fund’s financial and social return, and section 8.6 
concludes.
8.1 Methodology and Objectives of the Survey
The intention behind the survey discussed in this chapter was to develop an initial 
insight into the real effects of the Start-Up Fund programme and to assess its value 
in the environment of micro-entrepreneurs. Due to practical constraints, the size of 
the survey had to remain limited. This chapter illustrates the development of 
informal enterprises and discuss their owners’ success in gaining economic 
independence.
The interviews were conducted in March 1995 over two weeks in three locations 
in the vicinity of Cape Town. All interviewees had been trained by the Informal 
Business Training Trust, the partner organisation of the Start-Up Fund. At the 
time of the interviews, the Informal Business Training Trust was fully funded by 
donations; the One-Up Training course costs approximately R400 per person.
Generally, the interviews were conducted at the homes of the Start-Up Fund 
clients. As most interviewees operate their small business from home, the visit in 
most cases included a tour of the business premises or section. Only two 
interviewees operate their enterprise from separate premises, and the interviews 
were held there. All interviewees were met individually except three women in
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Mitchell’s Plain, who met to be interviewed jointly. The length of the meetings 
varied according to the interviewees’ ability and willingness to provide detail. On 
my tours, I was always accompanied by interpreters, but these were rarely needed 
for translation as most interviewees spoke some English, but more often for 
navigation and negotiation. Except one interviewee, all Start-Up Fund clients I 
met were open and willing to share their experience with me. All instantly agreed 
that I could make their history public; in fact, many were glad to have an 
opportunity to air their views and grievances.1
From the list of all programme participants, 35 were selected on grounds of 
accessibility - living in one of the three townships selected and with a complete 
and potentially traceable address - and length of programme participation -
•y
preferably at least 2 years. On 24 borrowers sufficient information could be 
gathered for an evaluation of their experience with the business training and loan 
programme, and about their businesses; a summary of this is included in the 
following section. In addition, on a further nine borrowers some scant evidence 
was found about their history, and whether they had ever had a business. They 
were either interviewed personally or, in a few cases, information was sought
1 Twice I had to dispel the hope that my study would lead to increased levels o f assistance. I 
asserted that I had no power to sway donor aid their way, and also that I was independent of the 
Start-Up Fund and thus could not influence decisions affecting their programme. I had the 
impression that all interviewees understood my independence and talked openly about their 
experience with their businesses, their expectations and their relationship with the Start-Up Fund.
2 I was equipped with data sheets from the Informal Business Training Trust’s data base. These 
sheets provide information on the borrowers’ names, their address, their prospective type of 
business, and their loan status. However, the data was originally entered when the clients had 
joined the programme. Except for data on clients’ loan status, the data base is never updated.
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from family or neighbours because several borrowers had moved, some were 
away working, and one had died.
The business activities pursued by the interviewees ranged from hawking clothes 
to running shebeens. Most clients had already passed into higher loan stages, 
although several interviews were conducted with defaulters. While this survey 
claims no statistical significance, its open-ended, unstructured nature led to 
insights which are probably of interest in the context of this analysis.
8.2 Impact Assessment
The survey suggests that participation in the Start-Up Fund programme made a 
substantial change to the productivity and viability of the small business in about 
half the cases in the sample. In these cases, the business volume had increased 
substantially, often more than doubled, or a seemingly successful business had 
been set up with the first loan. Further, the management appeared to have 
improved, and therefore the danger of a liquidity crisis of the enterprise, and its 
abandonment, had decreased. Both business training and access to loans had 
contributed important shares. Training led to improved intertemporal decision 
making, notably heightened awareness of future liabilities and the importance of
3 Many informal activities illustrate the new opportunities - and previous suppression - of 
economic life in the non-white section of South Africa’s population. Shebeens are informal bars in 
townships which were illegal under Apartheid, but thriving, and thus acquired an aura of 
subversion and vitality. Recently, fashionable ‘shebeens’ have opened in the well-off parts of 
Johannesburg, providing the opportunity for politically correct entertainment to culturally 
challenged whites. Hawking was also prohibited, but experienced a boom from the mid-1980s.
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appropriate capitalisation. Therefore, the risk of financial crisis was reduced. At 
the same time, most successful entrepreneurs needed capital (and continue to need 
capital, if they are on low loan levels) in order to make more effective use of their 
skills. The ability to buy bulk and receive discounts for inputs was a priority for 
many.
Others, who were not so successful as entrepreneurs, often had a business that 
would probably survive and earn some income, but did not seem to thrive and 
could not support their household. Several borrowers had found wage 
employment that they thought preferable to entrepreneurship, although one 
borrower combined formal sector employment with a thriving informal business 
activity. Only three respondents had not found a reliable source of income and 
continued to depend on their families. These results should be seen in the context 
of South African townships, where most adults are unemployed, but most 
participants of the Start-Up Fund programme had their own enterprise, or another 
source of reliable income.
Most respondents claimed that the loan had been either crucial to getting started, 
or helpful in consolidating their business. Many who were involved in 
manufacturing activities, however, claimed that the loans were not large enough, 
as important pieces of capital equipment - usually a sewing machine - could not be 
purchased during the lower loan stages. This, so they argued, impaired their 
ability to make punctual repayments during the early stages.
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Table 8.1 - Summary of results from interviews with borrowers
R200
Loan Level 
R480 R960 all levels
borrower had business when joining 1 3 4 8
borrower had business when interviewed 4 5 7 16
borrower found alternative employment 4 1 1 6
borrower has defaulted 6 1 1 8
business is developing very successfully 1 1 4 6
business is stable and major income earner 2 3 1 6
business exists but is unlikely to prosper 1 0 2 3
total number of borrowers interviewed 9 6 9 24
There are several problems with deriving conclusions from these interviews: first, 
the sample was small; second, it presents a biased selection of all Start-Up Fund 
clients, due to the inevitable problems of tracing borrowers in poor townships and 
informal settlements; and third, Start-Up Fund clients are probably a biased 
selection of average township entrepreneurs. It seems plausible to assume that 
more successful entrepreneurs are less likely to ‘vanish’ from their 
neighbourhoods; however, I often heard that those who had moved had found 
formal sector employment or attended institutions of further education. As was 
pointed out in chapter 6, the Start-Up Fund’s lending scheme relies on the self­
selection of its clients; therefore, the group interviewed does not constitute a 
representative cross-section of South Africa’s poor. The self-selected individuals 
who decide to participate in this training and loan scheme may also have had 
above-average success without the help of Start-Up Fund; therefore their township 
peers are not an adequate control group for statistical purposes.
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Also, there is another potential source for bias in the sample: some interviewees 
could have considered it impolite to answer questions about the Informal Business 
Training Trust or the Start-Up Fund negatively. This bias, though, could be more 
easily controlled. All interviewees affirmed that the training course had been 
helpful, but some could neither specify the most helpful elements, nor had they 
made visible use of the knowledge they had gained. This was most evident when 
interviewees identified as benefit from the course skills such as ‘how to run a 
business’ and when they had not set up a business nor identified a market 
opportunity. Most interviewees, however, could indicate quite precisely which 
sections of the training course had proved most valuable.
Almost all borrowers stated that the financial management and planning parts 
were the most important components of the training course. Also, those who had 
established their business prior to the training course could generally point very 
precisely to the gains stemming from the course. On several occasions I was 
shown financial records as proof. However, the township MBA training course 
contains other important elements such as identifying market opportunities, 
advertising, and choosing suppliers. None of these were mentioned as specifically 
helpful elements of the course. Speculatively, it could be concluded that capital 
constitutes the biggest obstacle to entrepreneurial development: this would not 
only relate to credit availability, but the entrepreneurs’ ability to plan financial 
matters, and to maintain sufficient working capital while meeting current 
liabilities.
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8.3 Location: Does Geography matter?
For these interviews, three locations were selected, partly for practical reasons, 
partly for the diversity they offered. Mitchell’s Plain is a vast township for 
‘coloureds’,4 Gugulethu is one of the oldest ‘African* townships around Cape 
Town, while Mbekweni is a mixed township outside Paarl, about 60km from Cape 
Town. The survey allowed me to collect qualitative data on both the interviewees’ 
living circumstances, and also on location-specific factors. As a result, it appears 
that the location explains some of the variation of income, business development 
and repayment behaviour found in the sample group. To understand the reasons 
for the location-specific differentiation, it is necessary to consider the history and 
social characteristics of the three locations.
Mitchell’s Plain
Mitchell’s Plain is a large and rather homogeneous township. It was created when
i
ihe coloured people were forcibly moved out of ‘white’ Cape Town. While it 
contains pockets of middle-class wealth, most inhabitants are poor. On the other 
hand, Mitchell’s Plain contains less squalor, and fewer make-shift huts and 
squatter camps than many other townships, such as Gugulethu. Possibly, this is 
accounted for by the fact that Africans were often forcibly moved to the
4 In broad terms, the apartheid race legislation differentiated between white and black people. The 
black category included Africans, coloured people and Indians. In terms of the apartheid race 
classification, coloured people are non-African blacks o f mixed race origin, with Asian ancestry, 
but separate from Indian descendants. Afrikaans is the main language within coloured 
communities.
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homelands, and returned from there illegally to the Cape Town area. In contrast, 
Apartheid administrators considered the coloured native to the Cape Region. 
Therefore, Mitchell’s Plain is a planned township with a large number of 
Apartheid-era low-cost houses. All interviews in Mitchell’s Plain took place in 
solid, stone-built houses in extensive residential areas.
Mbekweni
Mbekweni, near Paarl, is a more diverse township and not easily classified as 
‘coloured’ or ‘black’. It contains an older section that was established under the 
Apartheid settlement planning. In this section, solid stone houses with tended 
gardens dominate. However, most people in Mbekweni live in sections that were 
added later through previously ‘illegal’ and more recently informal settlement. 
There is a form of ‘rolling’ formalisation of informal settlement, and thus older 
squatter areas are turned into acknowledged quarters, while people who moved to 
Mbekweni more recently erect new squatter settlements, to be formalised in a few 
years’ time. During my visit to Mbekweni, roads were being paved and electricity 
connected in areas where temporary buildings made of plastic lining and old tyres 
had already given way to more permanent tin huts.
Gugulethu
Gugulethu is one of the oldest ‘African’ townships around Cape Town. More 
recently, especially after the abolition of the Group Areas Act, it has grown 
rapidly through migration from rural areas, and especially the former homelands.
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Therefore, overcrowding of formal housing and the sprawling of squatter 
settlements are now urgent problems in Gugulethu. As the township is now almost 
completely surrounded by squatter camps, the initial impression of Gugulethu is 
one of endless rows of shacks made of plastic bags, tyres and metal scrap. Many 
international visitors to Cape Town come away with the impression that such 
oceans of squatter dwellings are the typical look of South African townships 
because Gugulethu displays them with great effect along the motorway from the 
airport into town. However, like all old townships, Gugulethu also has a relatively 
well-built centre, and a good number of established houses with well-tended 
gardens. Finally, there are also many hostels, originally intended to house single 
migrant workers from the homelands. These hostels, usually extremely crowded, 
have become hotbeds of violence as in other parts of South Africa.
Geographical variation o f micro-economic activity
Across the three locations, noticeable differences occurred relating to both 
circumstantial factors as well as business success and repayment behaviour. 
Poverty seemed less acute in Mitchell’s Plain than in the two other townships. In 
Mitchell’s Plain, all meetings were held in solid stone houses, while in Mbekweni 
and Gugulethu most were held in significantly less comfortable environments. 
However, the sample group in Mbekweni contained the greatest income diversity 
and a large group of desperately poor squatters. The sample in Gugulethu 
contained generally very poor people, some living in overcrowded hostels, but few 
squatters.
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Defaults were most prevalent in Mbekweni and least in Mitchell’s Plain, while 
Gugulethu assumed an intermediate position. In Mbekweni, almost all defaults are 
attributable to current or previous squatters. This may suggest that borrowers with 
a fixed and formal address are less likely to default.5 Possibly, squatters tend to 
default because they often lead an economically less secure life and cannot afford 
the luxury of long-term financial planning when immediate needs are 
overwhelming. In Gugulethu, sluggish repayment behaviour, including 
consistently late payment, was more often found than default.
On average, the most successful entrepreneurs - in relation to their social and 
economic starting position - seemed concentrated in Gugulethu. The wealthiest 
entrepreneurs were found in Mitchell’s Plain, although this owes more to their 
pre-participation income than to recent micro-enterprise activity.
8.4 The Entrepreneurs: Profiles
The interviews were carried out partially to develop an understanding of the 
characteristics of entrepreneurs participating in the Start-Up Fund programme, and 
to determine who stands to gain from participation and which factors influenced 
the lending costs of the Start-Up Fund. While carrying out the interviews, six
5 The Start-Up Fund requires township MBA finalists to produce a formal address before 
admitting them to the loan programme. However, such addresses are not checked, so they may 
change or may never have existed.
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categories of participants became evident. All but two interviewees fell 
unambiguously into one of the following groups:
• Clients coming from social groups outside the Start-Up Fund’s target group, 
due to their wealth and economic independence from micro-enterprise 
activities;
• former ‘survivalists’ who had found other means of living and left the informal 
business sector;6
• true survivalists who operate a micro-enterprise out of economic necessity, but 
would prefer other forms of income if these were available;
• young and ambitious entrepreneurs with initial success and growth potential;
• owners of stable enterprises with several years of experience and reliable 
income earnings, but without further ambitions; and
• growth-oriented, success-seeking and well-skilled nascent entrepreneurs with 
high potential.
The two exceptions were cases of unintentional ‘fronting’ where the programme 
participant, for some reason, had failed to set up an enterprise but used loans and 
skills to support the enterprise of a family member. The entrepreneurial relatives,
6 The term ‘survivalist’ is frequently used by practitioners and researchers in the micro-enterprise 
field. According to Hulme and Mosley (1997), survivalists’ ‘income-generating activities are 
usually for the purpose of short-term sustenance, few entrepreneurs are in a position to develop 
their businesses for longer-term growth and capital accumulation’ (p. 299). Rogerson (1996) 
argues that ‘circumstances within the informal economy militate against the transition of the vast 
mass of survivalist enterprises into fledgling small businesses with the potential for long-term, 
sustainable employment creation’ (p. 30).
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though, were a true survivalist and a nascent capitalist, respectively.7 In the 
following, these six categories are explained with more detail and supported by
g
typical examples, before some general conclusions are drawn.
Off-Target: Hobby-Entrepreneurs and Polito-Entrepreneurs 
The members of this group are generally better off and economically independent 
from micro-entrepreneurship, although most run a micro-enterprise and may 
contribute to household income, or run an established, informal small (not micro-) 
enterprise. The motive behind participation in the Start-Up Fund scheme for 
members of this group is not business development but some forms of self- 
fulfilment. Some in this group are elderly and treat entrepreneurship as a pensioners’ 
pastime. While the old constitute a small group in the sample, they were a noticeable 
group. Others run a successful business, but they already had significant success 
prior to joining the Start-Up Fund programme. They have probably benefited from 
the programme, especially the training component, but this was not the decisive 
contribution to their business achievements. One interviewee in this group - Mr 
Fredericks - joined the programme explicitly for political reasons, in order to gain 
credibility as a spokesperson for micro-enterprise entrepreneurs. Others seem to gain
7 There was no indication for intentional fronting in the sample. As the Start-Up Fund does not 
differentiate amongst its clients according to criteria such as gender or business activity, there is 
no reason for fronting as in other micro-lending schemes (Goetz and Gupta, 1996). It is interesting 
to note, however, that in one case a women had participated in the Start-Up Fund programme, but 
made this support as well as her own labour available to her husband’s shoe-making enterprise. 
Due to his outstanding economic success, and the domination of shoe-making over the household, 
she seemed extremely unlike to ever start her own enterprise. In the other case, an elderly 
participant made his advice and credit line available to his son.
8 These examples are shortened transcripts drawn from my interview notes.
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status in their neighbourhood as ‘serious’ business people due to their participation 
in the programme. Although this group is not part of the target group, support to 
them may well increase their business growth and employment capacity for the 
poor.
Mr Frank Gabriel Fredericks
Mr Fredericks, who lives in Mitchell’s Plain, joined the loan programme in 1993 
and has now reached the R960 loan level. He owned a business prior to joining the 
loan programme. Having been in the construction industry for 14 years, he set up 
his own firm in 1988. At the time of joining, his firm had two employees besides 
himself and has now grown to a workforce of 8. In 1993, annual turn-over was 
R110,000, growing to R300,000 in 1994. For 1995, he anticipated annual turn­
over of R560,000. His profit margin was 20%.
Mr Fredericks is divorced with five children. He has three brothers who help out 
with work and finance. He claims to have extensive family obligations, paying 
R3,000 per month per child to their mother. He started his career in the building 
industry as an employee at a larger, formal sector firm, where he rose from clerk 
to managing director. When the firm went bankrupt, he established his own, 
informal company in 1988 with R25,000 of own capital. The Small Business 
Development Corporation helped out with bridging finance in 1990, but its loan 
procedure entails lots of red tape and clients are often unwilling to accept the
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delays. Mr Fredericks has negotiated a standing loan agreement with Community 
Bank. Other banks consider builders too risky.
Mr Fredericks quotes for construction contracts from R500. His largest contract so 
far was the construction of a complete house for R240,000, but most contracts are 
in the region of R30,000. He does not keep separate books for business and 
private expenses, but maintains weekly and daily schedules for income and 
expenditure. He claims to have assets worth R270,000 and liabilities, mainly a 
bond on his house, of R100,000, plus a car loan. He regularly quotes for an 
estimated 30% profit.
He considers his obligation towards employees as one of ‘upliftment’. He lends 
money to them and pays their doctor’s bills. All employees have 3 weeks’ holiday 
leave and 10 days’ absence. Artisans - he employs two - are paid R120 per week, 
the 6 labourers R50. All are eligible for bonuses. However, he thinks that 
upliftment is not for him but for ‘people that hasn’t got money’. He feels 
adequately labelled as a ‘micro-business’ owner, and even used the term 
‘survivalist* to describe himself. However, he also emphasised that ‘you are not 
out there to make money, that is only the cherry on top - what you really want is 
job satisfaction’.
Mr Fredericks is rather critical about the Start-Up Fund. He said that the training 
helped especially in money management, but the loan programme was too small.
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A second course would not interest him although he felt it might help other 
people. His finance needs were rather for R30,000 bridging loans to start work on 
specific projects. He participated for acquiring a track record, not for the loan 
itself. He is aware that the Informal Business Training Trust saw him as a role 
model, because he is a successful entrepreneur, but his success was ‘not for what 
they did’.
He criticised the Start-Up Fund for not looking after the individual. He said ‘they 
sit with millions’ and that the ‘money should go out to the people that needs it’. 
He felt he should be given a grant, as the Start-Up Fund was given the money by 
donors. Also, they should start with loans of R1500 and they should screen the 
borrowers. Equally critical about the Small Business Development Corporation, 
he argued that they should ‘clean the plate’ and start anew. He said they should 
‘clear the history’ of their operation under apartheid.9
Mr Fredericks was a surprising candidate. He owns a business that, although 
informal by legal status, is large enough to be regarded as ‘established’, and he 
was the only interviewee in the sample employing non-family members. His 
business is too large to benefit in any significant way from the Start-Up Fund 
loans. Also, as a relatively successful business, the training is not only ill-suited,
9 The Small Business Development Corporation was set up under the Apartheid regime with 
support from the private sector. Initially, its assistance was focused mainly on small, formal 
enterprises with traceable assets and good records, thus benefiting mainly white-owned 
enterprises. The allegations about racial biases of the Small Business Development Corporation 
are still pervasive.
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but the time for participation must have led to lost earnings larger than the loan 
amounts. Equipped with cell phone and a language mixing Cape coloured 
expressions with the terminology of the development set, he seems on the way to 
establishing himself as a lobbyist.10
Mr Mawonga Alfred Reza
Mr Reza completed his business training in February 1994 and received his first 
loan in March that year. He is a very reliable and punctual repayer and has now 
reached the R960 loan level. He operates a small business selling goods in his 
neighbourhood in Gugulethu. He first ventured into part-time selling in 1993, 
before he joined the business training programme, and since January 1993 he sells 
only one good - first linen, then, from January 1994, vitamin tablets.
Mr Reza found that linen was too expensive and his business volume not large 
enough. Therefore, he opted to drop linen-selling after a year when he heard of 
Sportron International, a company marketing vitamin products in South Africa. 
Mr Reza is an agent for that firm, selling only their products. He orders his 
merchandise from Sportron International through a toll-free telephone number and 
the goods are delivered to him within 48 hours. He receives a discount of 23% of 
the list price and sells his goods to his customers at the full price. He buys for 
about R250-350 per order, and he orders two or three times a month. His 
customers are friends and neighbours who have health problems. Sportron
10 In fact, he showed me his air ticket, paid by another NGO, for his participation at a conference 
on small business development.
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International offers several different products for different uses; a simple table 
instructs selling agents like Mr Reza which products should be promoted for 
which ailments.
Mr Reza said he would like to expand but is constrained by money for buying 
stock. He would happily take credit from sources different from the Start-Up 
Fund. His preference is not for bigger loans, but for more frequent loans. All loans 
he receives are used for buying stock, and all repayment is made from sales 
proceeds. He has not had any problems repaying credit. He would, he said, be 
interested in selling other products as well, but he has not yet inquired about such 
possibilities. He said he found the business training very helpful because of ‘the 
way they teach you how to buy goods, how to price them, how to do your books, 
how to approach customers and how to promote your business’. However, he 
apparently did not notice that, as an agent for Sportron International, he has little 
autonomy in the management of his ‘business’ and little scope for implementing 
his knowledge.
He lives in a comfortable three-room house with his family - his wife and 
daughter and two grandchildren. His family does not help him run the business, 
but they are supportive of his business activities. The interview took place in a 
bleak but neat living room which featured a private telephone - a rare asset but 
important for ordering new stock of vitamin tablets.
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Ex-Survivalists
The members of this group are economically active, but do not make specific use of 
the skills learned from participation in the Informal Business Training Trust’s 
training programme. Many of them defaulted after the first loan. Most are now 
either formally employed or opted for further training to qualify for wage 
employment. Many members of this group could be classified ‘survivalist’ in that 
they may have participated in the Start-Up Fund scheme in order to widen their 
options of income sources to self-employment, but they preferred alternatives once 
these became available. Some members of this group may have benefited from the 
training, though, in a more indirect way, and some have used the first loan to pay for 
tuition fees for further education.
Mr Tatane William Bonga
Mr Bonga defaulted after the first loan. He is now formally employed driving a 
truck. As he was away working, I could only speak with his family. He never had 
a small business and, as far as his family knew, never seriously contemplated one. 
He lives with an apparently large family in a small but proper stone house, built 
by himself and his family, in a ‘medium’ section of Mbekweni. I could not 
determine why he had decided to participate in the One-Up business training. 
With regular income from formal sector employment and irregular contributions 
of other family members, participating in the informal economy, the family now 
considers itself comparatively well-off.
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True Survivalists
The members of this group live from the income generated by their micro­
enterprise, but they are entrepreneurs through necessity, and they are not attached to 
their enterprise or their activity. If the opportunity arose, they would rather choose 
alternative forms of employment, especially formal sector wage employment. In this 
regard, this group seems similar to the ex-survivalists, only that its members have 
not yet discovered alternatives to their present economic activity. Most members of 
this group are very poor, but a small minority could be thought of as ‘high level 
survivalists’, as their income level is low, but well above survival level.
Ms Estraneta Timotheus
Ms Timotheus joined the Start-Up Fund programme in August 1994 and received 
the first loan in November. She is still at the R200 level and in good standing. 
When joining, she did not own her own business but planned to set up her own 
tailoring business. She owns a sewing machine which she has bought from income 
of casual labour prior to joining the programme. However, she does not make 
clothes at the moment as she has no cash for raw materials. She would like to 
continue, though. She is looking forward to larger loans, but even R480 ‘sounds a 
little bit little’. Material suppliers give discounts for purchases above R500, and 
she thinks she could get started again if she could buy material for that amount. 
Making repayments for the Start-Up Fund loans ‘is a problem’; she specifically 
mentioned the timing, as the Start-Up Fund repayments need to be made before 
the end of month.
292
Her sister helps selling clothes, which are purchased from a clothing factory. 
However, when she starts sewing again she will be doing this all by herself, while 
the sister may continue to sell. The sister sells in front of factory gates to workers. 
Ms Timotheus could make 15 jackets per month, selling for R35-45 each. 
However, she does not know the costs of material for those jackets, nor the profit 
she could make. At the moment she uses her sewing machine for making clothes 
for the family, but she does not sell any of them at all. She finds the programme 
helpful. The business training told her not to spend business proceeds on private 
expenditure, and she learnt about the need to advertise. The major obstacle she 
faces for setting up her tailoring business is money.
Ms Timotheus emphasised that it was important the Start-Up Fund did not insist 
on repayment in mid-month, but that repayment should be due only at the end of 
the month. If the end of month fell in mid-week, repayment should be extended to 
the end of the week. Changing the repayment structure was rather important to 
make the loans more useful to her.
Ms Zameka Remona Duka
I met Ms Duka in front of her house in the squatter part of Mbekweni. Although it 
is a tin shack, the house looked relatively well built in such a poor environment. 
Several naked small children played on the plot. She was surprised by my visit
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and, at first, not keen on discussing her business with me, but reluctantly answered 
my questions.
Ms Duka has defaulted after the first loan. She claimed that she has never checked 
the account that she had to open to qualify for the Start-Up Fund’s loan scheme. 
Somewhat improbably, she claimed not to live in the house any more, but to have 
moved to the Transkei. She had tried to establish a spaza shop, but did not 
succeed, as there was too much competition.
Because I developed doubts about her story, I decided to make further probing 
enquiries. It transpires that she commutes between the Transkei and Cape Town, 
dealing in Marihuana (dagga). She asserted that this line of business was much 
more profitable than her spaza. Having divulged her illegal activity, she was now 
more confident and criticised, mockingly, the Informal Business Training Trust 
for not making its trainees aware of such good business opportunities. She also 
said that she was not afraid of legal consequences of her illegal trade because ‘the 
police don’t care’. My guide on that day, a former bible teacher, was visibly not 
amused, and probably horrified that the good work of the Informal Business 
Training Trust had supported such improper activities. Ms Duka received his 
admonishments with some amusement, and she appeared unlikely to forsake her 
lucrative business.
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Young Successes
In this group are entrepreneurs who stand out as very young and with little prior 
experience. However, they are highly motivated, agile and ambitious. They own 
potentially viable enterprises and often make good profits, but need to achieve 
stability over time. With experience, some of them may well turn out to become 
successful entrepreneurs, while others will fail or change their ideas and preferences 
later. It is noteworthy that in the group of young participants all interviewees seemed 
exceptionally committed to their enterprise and motivated well above average.
Mr Luvuyo Oliphant
Mr Oliphant completed his business training and received his first loan in early 
1994. He is now at the R960 loan level and is a good and punctual repayer. He 
runs a business hawking clothes. He started his business in 1992 but it was very 
small until he joined the programme. Now he buys men’s and kids’ clothes worth 
R1000 per month while previously, on a lower loan level, he managed to buy only 
for about R600 per month.
All stock is purchased in Belhar, a ‘coloured’ suburb of Cape Town, at a discount 
store at factory prices, and he sells primarily at busy places like taxi ranks 
(referring to kombi taxis) and at railway stations where commuters pass through in 
large numbers. He only sells in the evenings, working from 5-9 pm on weekdays, 
to capture the largest flow of customers in the evening rush hour. During the day 
he goes buying stock when necessary. Occasionally, a friend helps him and gets
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paid for his work. He cites the lack of transport facilities and pricing his goods as 
his major problems.
He decided to approach the Informal Business Training Trust and to participate in 
the training after reading an advert in a local paper which he still keeps in his 
room. The training was helpful, he said, as it helped him to control his money. He 
would also like to do a second course in order to improve his book-keeping. The 
loans also help as they allowed him to increase the volume of his business. 
However, now that he is on the R960 loan level, the intervals are too long. He has 
thought about applying to the Small Business Development Corporation for a 
loan, but realises that his business is too small and lacks all documentation to 
support a loan application. He would like to continue his business, but hopes that 
in the future he can be really successful in business.
Mr Oliphant is a young and energetic man; he is single and came to Cape Town 
from the Transkei. He does not have to support anyone else and he also has no 
other income. He shares a large but run-down house in a long-established but now 
very rough part of Gugulethu. The house appears decrepit from the outside and in 
the shared spaces inside. His room, where the interview took place, is neat and 
well organised, the walls are adorned by posters of flash women and fast cars.
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Stable Earners
In this category, entrepreneurs run a business with good success and stable income, 
but without much motivation or intention for further business growth. Most 
entrepreneurs in this category are content with self-employment and occasional 
family labour; some, however, seek to improve their profits by moving their 
business up-market or by increasing their ‘volume’ of customers. They do, in 
contrast to ‘high-level survivalists’, value their economic independence, feel 
committed to their enterprise and would not prefer alternative employment. 
However, stable earners are rarely the prime income earner in their family.
Pauline Margarete Lefatsa
Ms Lefatsa joined the programme in September 1994 and has reached the R480 
loan level. Prior to joining the programme, she had been in business for 9 years, 
owning and operating a hair salon. She lives in a comfortable, if small, house in a 
long-established section of Mbekweni. The style of her house and its decoration 
are reminiscent of conservative, suburban or rural homes, with heavy wooden 
furniture and dark textiles.
Ms Lefatsa reported that she found the Informal Business Training Trust business 
training helpful, notably the classes on costing and pricing, financial planning, and 
‘how much to put aside’. Since participation in the programme, the business has 
improved. Ever since, she has more customers, and she has much more efficient 
stock-taking. The business is seasonal, as customer flows vary strongly according
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to the time of the year. Now, since participation in the programme, she typically 
serves 25 customers per month. Previously, she had about 10 customers per 
month. Her prices vary from R8 for hair wash to R250 for ‘fancy* hair-do. She has 
a husband, who is permanently employed at a government department (clerk at the 
Department of Labour), and three children. The eldest daughter, who is 16, 
occasionally helps in the hair salon, but only when she ‘feels like*. According to 
her mother, she views it as a social event rather than income-earning opportunity.
The loans received from the Start-Up Fund have helped Ms Lefatsa. When she 
received R480, she used half for plans to build a separate salon. Previously, she 
had to work in her living room. Loans of R200 were not enough, so she had to use 
her own money for purchases, but even the small loans did help. She would be 
interested in follow-up business training. Also, she is looking forward to larger 
loans, but giggles as she confirms that she plans to use loans for business. She 
relates the story that she had once applied to the Small Business Development 
Corporation but never received a reply. However, her husband helps occasionally 
with finance. Ms Lefatsa is proud of running a good salon. Customers have to 
make a booking before they come. The business takes in about 2000-3000 Rand 
per month, the costs of inputs are approximately 400-500 Rand. She buys inputs 
mainly from one brand (Black Like Me) and purchases them from a warehouse in 
Cape Town. She normally travels to Cape Town by train or car, but has to take 
someone with her for carrying all stock. The daughter uses some of her earnings to 
finance school.
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Ms Nomvula Ruth Martin
Ms Martin joined the programme in February 1994 and received her first loan in 
March that year. She is now at the R480 loan level and although she tends to have 
sluggish repayment behaviour, she remains in good standing with the Start-Up 
Fund. Ms Martin started her business in 1990 selling soft drinks and cigarettes 
from her home in the old part of Gugulethu.
Ms Martin said that her turn-over is below R500 per month. She buys fortnightly 
12 cases of soft drinks and 60 packs of Rothmans cigarettes. Since reaching the 
R480 loan level, she has also started selling chips and sweets, but she finds that 
‘there is more money in the old lines’. Her income, she said, is less than R200 per 
month. Her little sister helps her in the business, answering customers when she is 
busy, but she does not get paid. Repayment is frequently a problem for Ms Martin. 
She said she would want to expand, and she wants to get bigger loans, but she 
cannot repay. She also said that she was looking forward to receiving R960 from 
the Start-Up Fund in July.
Her customers are local people, living in the neighbourhood. Ms Martin lives in a 
large old house. She has a large, if somewhat damp living room with a number of 
comfortable, well-used sofas where customers can rest while being served. Also, 
in front of the house is a small porch overlooking a football field. Next door, her 
brother runs a shebeen whose customers tend to buy cigarettes from Ms Martin.
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Therefore, she thinks she will be able to attract enough customers to expand her 
business. She once had a clerical job in Cape Town but she now prefers her own 
business and does not look for employment elsewhere.
Florence Ntombentsha Mbarane
Ms Mbarane completed her training and received her first loan in 1990. Because 
she often experiences problems and delays her repayments, she is still only at the 
R480 loan level. She operates a sewing business which she started in 1989 when 
she bought a sewing machine with her own money.
She said that she found the training course ‘OK* and generally helpful, but her 
biggest problem was finding money and the loan level offered by the Start-Up 
Fund was a ‘joke*. She uses her loans to buy material. She wants to stay with the 
Start-Up Fund to reach higher loan levels. At the time of our meeting, she 
experienced problems with her sewing machine which slow down her work. She 
could have the machine repaired, but this would cost R130 and would still leave 
her with an old and unreliable machine. She reckons that she would need an 
overlocker sewing machine, but a second-hand overlocker costs R2000 and that is 
way beyond her means.
Still, she earns about R5-600 a month, and she is so proud of her independent 
business that she would not go into formal employment even if she could earn 
more. She is confident that her business, already five years old, will improve over
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time. Her husband works in the informal economy, and he frequently helps her 
buying material when she is short of cash, or finds the Start-Up Fund loans 
insufficient for taking advantage of discount or for accepting more jobs. They 
have two children.
Ms Mbarane does not operate her business from home. Together with another 
woman entrepreneur, also sewing, she has rented a small room in a hostel. The 
hostel, like most in Gugulethu, looks grim and lies in a crime-ridden area. 
However, this one is somewhat safer than many others. Also, there is a small shop 
next to the entrance run by its owner, an ethnic Chinese. The interview took place 
in the room rented by Ms Mbarane and her fellow sewer. It is crowded with a 
cutting table, two sewing machines and stacks of material as both women keep left 
over material for later use, even small patches. However, good spirit seemed 
evident. The ability to work away from home helps Ms Mbarane to work longer 
hours, in co-ordination with her obligations at home and her husband’s work time. 
Previously, at home, she had to finish work at 4pm, but now she can continue to 
10pm. She lives close to her business.
Nascent Capitalist
This group consists of enthusiastic entrepreneurs with the required skills to succeed. 
Most of them have already several years of experience both in running a small 
enterprise and in their specific trade, and their enterprises look well-organised, if 
rather small. Nascent capitalists, in contrast to stable earners, see their enterprise as
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their route to significant social and economic improvement, and they were always 
the primary source of income in their families. Their enterprises are stable and often 
experience healthy rates of growth. However, they face increasingly external 
constraints such as security and lack of adequate premises.
Ms Beauty Nqumse
Ms Nqumse joined the programme in November 1993 and received her first loan 
in February 1994. Now at the R960 loan level, she is in good standing. She started 
her sewing business with the first loan, although the start-up costs were more than 
R1,000 and she had to supplement the loan with her own money. She thought the 
course helpful, as she learned how to save money. Also, the loan programme is 
helpful as she can buy material.
Ms Nqumse does not advertise explicitly; customers just hear about her by word 
of mouth. She produces 5 dresses per week and charges twice the costs of material 
for them. Material is typically R100-200 per week, but can be much higher when 
she receives orders for wedding dresses or other fancy products. She regularly 
takes money to the bank for savings. Her business premises are separate from her 
home, although both are located within the same hostel in Gugulethu. One of her 
biggest problems is security, and she had a break-in a few weeks before our 
meeting, but luckily only her books were stolen. Therefore, she thought about 
moving to a container, but is not sure about security there either.
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Ms Nqumse lives with three children, a sister, two cousins and other family 
members who are all supported by her. A total of nine people share one room. She 
had some other on-the-job training as waitress and works the nightshift at a Spur 
restaurant, a large South African chain of steak houses. Every day, she leaves 
home at 4.30 pm by train and kombi taxi, paid for by her employer, and returns 
late at night on a bus provided by her employer. Her most serious constraint on 
expansion at the moment was, she reported, lack of space. She would consider 
giving up the job at Spur if her sewing business was able to provide secure 
permanent income, and if she could be assured that her business was safe from 
crime. Her workshop, where the interview took place, is crammed with material, a 
cutting table, the sewing machine and a few other items of basic furniture. It 
appears neat in an otherwise squalid environment. The hostel is overcrowded; 
rotting animal carcasses and waste lie around in the sewage-filled central open 
area.
Mr Thomas Manene Martin
Mr Martin, the brother of Ms Nomvula Martin, completed the business training in 
March 1993 and received his first loan in the following month. Motivated by his 
own success as the owner of a shebeen, he had recommended the Start-Up Fund 
programme to his sister.
Mr Martin is now at the R960 loan level. He started his business in 1990. When he 
started, he used to buy cases of beer for R200 at a time, by the time he had
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received the first loan from the Start-Up Fund he bought for R600, and now he 
buys for R1500, receiving bulk discount as a volume buyer. At the time of our 
meeting, he usually has one order for 30 cases of beer of R1500 per week. In 
addition, he buys ‘wine* (he insisted on calling it wine, although the bottles are 
labelled as ‘cider’) every 2 weeks for about R1400, and four cases of Brandy for 
R800 every fortnight. He also offers several other spirits, but orders them only 
infrequently depending on demand.
He affirms that he can easily sell his purchases as he has about 40 guests each 
night, more on the weekends. His prices are at par with bars in down-town Cape 
Town and the tourist areas of Sea Point. He charges R3.20 for beer and R4.00 for 
‘wine’, while Brandy and other spirits are R8.00. He is sure to make a profit, but 
cannot estimate how much, as he has to ‘pay things all the time’. However, he is 
very careful to set money aside for orders and loan repayment, and he has never 
experienced any problems in meeting his commitments to suppliers or the Start- 
Up Fund. He cites as his major problem the financial family commitments as he 
supports four children and his mother. However, his sisters also help him cleaning 
the glasses. They are not paid an explicit wage, but receive ad-hoc financial 
support when needed.
Mr Martin thinks that the business training has helped him as he learned ‘how to 
operate money’. In fact, he took pride in showing me his books with which he 
plans the business expenditure for the next few weeks, and where he keeps all
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invoices. The books are maintained with skills he learnt from the Informal 
Business Training Trust. Also, he added, the training helped him to relate to 
customers. The loans were helpful, but too small. However, he also said he would 
be afraid to take on larger loans from somewhere else as the responsibility may be 
too big. Yet he was looking forward to reaching the next higher loan level.
The interview took place in and around his shebeen. As we met in the early 
afternoon, there were no guests, but the shebeen was sparkling clean and ready to 
receive the first customers in a few hours’ time. The guest lounge was a relatively 
comfortable if bare room with basic chairs and simple tables, the walls were 
decorated with beer advertisements and colour photos taken from news journals. I 
imagine the shebeen to be rather crowded with 40 guests in attendance, but some 
customers may always sit outside. Attached was a small area separated by a 
wooden bar, which Mr Martin had constructed himself, from where customers 
could be served, and a separate room where supplies were kept and glasses and 
other equipment were cleaned. By township terms, Mr Martin’s shebeen is a well- 
established and attractive place.
Ms Yoliswa Magobolo
Ms Magobolo completed her business training in mid-1993 and received her first 
loan in October of that year. She is now at the R960 loan level and, although 
sometimes slow in repaying, remains in good standing with the Start-Up Fund. 
Initially, she had intended to set up a spaza shop, operating from her residential
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property in Gugulethu. But when she received her first loan, she decided to set up 
a business selling baby clothes. She emphasised that she set up her business only 
in 1993, with her first loan, although she had started selling clothes in 1991 on a 
less permanent basis.
When she receives a loan, she phones the factory shop and makes an appointment 
for purchasing her merchandise. She buys from a factory in Constantia, Cape 
Town, fortnightly for about R800. Before she reached the higher loan level, she 
was able to buy for only about R400. Selling the goods, she travels through the 
Western Cape region, selling in places like Worcester and Paarl, but also in the 
Cape Flats. She estimated that her net earnings can be as high as R200 per week, 
but they fluctuate ‘quite a bit*.
She did find the business training helpful as she learned how to keep money and 
how to prepare for the week. She would also like to attend a further, second course 
and has in fact already inquired about it. The loans were also valuable to her as 
they allowed her to buy regular stock. She will also take the larger loans as soon 
as she is eligible for them. However, she cited as a problem that she has no place 
to sell the goods; she would like a shop in Gugulethu in addition to her selling 
trips. Her mother often helps her out in her business and she could take care of the 
shop while Ms Magobolo travels to sell in other places. However, she said it was 
difficult to find the right premises and that she was concerned about security in 
Gugulethu.
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Ms Magobolo lives in a solid stone house in one of the older and more established 
areas of Gugulethu. The house has two rooms and a kitchen blackened from the 
use of coal and wood for cooking. The family of 13 shares the house, including 
five children who took great interest in the interview and in showing me around 
the house.
8.5 The Effectiveness of Intervention
The Start-Up Fund does not, as a matter of principle as much as of practical 
considerations, screen credit applicants by social or economic criteria; hence, it 
does not target credit by exclusion. In so far as better targeting cannot be achieved 
through indirect methods and without exclusion, the conclusions of this survey are 
relevant mainly as an assessment of the Start-Up Fund’s contribution to business 
development and poverty alleviation.
The six categories of borrowers in section 8.3 are intended to provide a ranking by 
‘social creditworthiness’, stated in the order of ascending social desirability of 
lending to each category of client. However, the ‘value’ of lending to a client 
depends both on the social return that a loan is likely to cause - along the lines set 
out by the lenders ‘mission’ - and the costs of serving this client. Although the 
Start-Up Fund covers its costs from internal revenue, the costs of micro-lending 
vary between different clients. This variation is caused primarily by clients’
307
repayment behaviour. The rest of this chapter will try to draw some broad 
conclusions about the expected social return - or ‘social creditworthiness* - and 
private costs of lending to clients from various categories.
Off-target group members are unlikely to promote the social change that underlies 
the rationale for micro-finance. However, off-target group members appear to be 
good clients from a financial view. None of them have defaulted and they had 
exceptionally good repayment records. Hence, they contributed to the viability of 
the Start-Up Fund programme by implicitly cross-subsidising lending to other 
groups of clients. Supposedly, non-target group members constitute only a small 
group of the Start-Up Fund’s client base and therefore their impact on the lending 
programme’s social impact or financial performance is small. Due to their prolific 
character, however, this group may well be overrepresented in media coverage 
and popular images about the Small Enterprise Foundation and similar micro­
lenders.
Lending to survivalists is an important part of most micro-finance programmes. 
Survivalists, supposedly, benefit from micro-finance services because they are 
notoriously short of capital, but by necessity inventive and energetic. As 
survivalists are among the poorest in society, they are seen as exceptionally 
deserving in terms of development services, including micro-finance. The sample 
seemed to confirm this view; especially ‘true survivalists’ appeared to have 
improved their income as a result of their participation in the Start-Up Fund
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programme. However, they also constitute a difficult clientele due to the 
unpredictability of their own economic circumstances, and subsequently of their 
financial commitments to a lender. In the sample it was found that all ex- 
survivalists had defaulted, as well as about a third of true survivalists. This means 
that a large share of all defaults suffered by the Start-Up Fund programme is 
traceable to the survivalist sector.
However, the classification of clients as survivalists or any other type of 
entrepreneur becomes possible only after clients have been given a chance through 
participation in the Start-Up Fund programme. Prior to their joining the 
programme, many nascent capitalists, but especially many young successes and 
stable earners would have shown social characteristics typical for survivalists. 
Hence, the differentiation visible after the first few loans is potentially caused by 
participants’ responses to the opportunities arising from the Start-Up Fund 
programme, and may not be detectable before participation. In conclusion, while it 
may be desirable from a financial perspective to reduce the participation of 
survivalists, this seems neither practical nor socially desirable.
The last three categories all represent micro-entrepreneurs who have achieved 
above-average success, in ascending order. I was pleased to note that these three 
groups constitute more than a third of the total sample. Young successes probably 
have the best chances to leave poverty and to move up significantly, because they 
have a vastly greater time horizon and fewer family commitments. Stable earners
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are important agents for poverty alleviation, especially as many of them contribute 
important resources to their families. Because stable earners are usually not 
responsible for feeding their family, the additional household income they create 
is often spent on ‘upliftment’ items, such as education, and often benefits children. 
Both groups are generally reliable repayers. Nascent capitalists are, of course, the 
best clients from a developmental perspective. They typically were very poor 
when entering the programme, achieved high income growth and established 
promising enterprises, many with the potential to offer non-family employment in 
the future. Also, they are financially reliable. Perhaps predictably, nascent 
capitalists are a small group.
Some micro-finance proponents have argued that poverty alleviation and business 
development are two potentially conflicting objectives of micro-finance (Cotter, 
1996). However, it is not surprising that the Start-Up Fund receives its highest 
return - both social and financial - from the more successful entrepreneurs. Its 
involvement with survivalists seems still a measured success in terms of poverty 
alleviation.
8.6 Conclusion
This survey, unfortunately, does not permit to draw definite conclusions about the 
Start-Up Fund’s contribution to poverty reduction and employment generation. As 
was pointed out earlier, the Start-Up Fund’s lending scheme relies on the self-
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selection of its clients; therefore, the group interviewed does not constitute a 
representative cross-section of South Africa’s poor. The self-selected individuals 
who decide to participate in training and the loan scheme may have had similar 
success without the help of Start-Up Fund. In no rigorous way, therefore, can the 
marginal contribution of the Start-Up Fund’s work be deduced from the average 
success of its clients.11 Further, the sample was small and probably biased, due to 
the inevitable problems of tracing borrowers in poor townships and informal 
settlements.
However, the lack of conclusive evidence should not be construed as a failure of 
the Start-Up Fund to produce the intended social effects. In fact, the evidence 
presented in this chapter suggests that the Start-Up Fund has assisted poor people 
in becoming economically self-reliant, while the previous chapter has shown that 
this was done in a cost-effective way. Further, as the work of the Start-Up Fund is 
not reliant on high subsidies - and appears determined to eliminate any subsidy 
element in the future - it is not competing in the market for development funding 
in the same way and with the same claims as most others.
11 In the assessment of one of its partner organisations, the Start-Up Fund was found to make a 
valuable contribution to the establishment of new enterprises (Informal Business Training Trust, 
1995).
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9. Conclusion
This thesis has analysed the economic efficiency of micro-lending, comparing two 
alternative models. It has concentrated on aspects of economic efficiency and 
viability, and it has argued that group credit is not the safe route to sustainability 
that many see in it. Below, I point out the relevance to development policy in 
South Africa and show that international evidence seems to confirm my results. 
Some final comments on the future role of micro-credit point to the market- 
creating role of micro-credit, but caution against over-stretched expectations that 
micro-credit could deliver on redistributional development objectives. In the final 
pages, I will discuss the implication of the findings of this thesis for development 
policy and identify three fields in which further research is called for: on 
appropriate delivery mechanisms for financial services, on social effects and 
impact assessment, and on the role for participation in non-financial development 
projects.
Subsidies, minimalism, and the contradiction o f micro-finance 
Micro-finance development emerged from the minimalist debates at the end of the 
1980s to dominate debates on poverty alleviation and small enterprise 
development. It has cast itself as a movement that is politically and morally 
desirable as well as financially sustainable. Arguably, the micro-finance 
movement has stolen the limelight from traditional development NGOs by laying 
claim on social effectiveness and, especially, economic efficiency. Micro-finance
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has also achieved the feat of attracting both policy-makers’ goodwill for, inter 
alia, its supposed independence from public subsidies in the long-run and, at least 
to some extent a contradiction, policy-makers’ support for sharply rising levels of 
subsidy.
Chapter 5 has shown that redistributive objectives of macro-economic policy, a 
priority of the ANC before 1994, were abandoned for the sake of fiscal prudence 
once it led the government. Land reform, housing development, education reform 
and numerous other policy areas produced fewer benefits for poor people partially 
because policy debates became increasingly concerned with fiscal constraints. 
Resources were limited because the South African government sought to follow 
relatively conservative macro-economic policies, and because external funding - 
aid - for development is limited. At the same time, micro-finance institutions 
received funding as needed, and sometimes in excess of their lending capacity. 
Their funding stems mainly from central government sources, through the 
government-owned Development Bank of Southern Africa, and from external aid. 
The trends of scarce, and often declining, funding for redistributive causes and 
excess funding for micro-finance institutions continues in South Africa as well as 
many neighbouring countries.
This thesis has examined two contrasting approaches in micro-finance. A ‘radical’ 
minimalist approach such as that by the Start-Up Fund can, in fact, reach its 
objective of financial sustainability within a short time and wean itself off further
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subsidies. Its expansion, both domestically and in neighbouring countries, will not 
burden funds available for other forms of development intervention. However, this 
approach, being minimalist, makes only limited help available to its clients who 
probably deserve more. An ostensibly minimalist, but in effect indecisive 
approach such as that by the Small Enterprise Foundation does not succeed in 
freeing itself from subsidy dependence. But its claim of potential sustainability 
helped to secure abundant funding, to which non-credit, non-sustainable 
institutions such as the Triple Trust Organisation and the Informal Business 
Training Trust had only limited access.1
Hence, some hard choices are to be faced by policy-makers and donors in South 
Africa. A truly minimalist, ‘Fordist’ approach to micro-finance as mass- 
production offers the possibility of financial sustainability, at the cost of 
sacrificing what some would see as important characteristics of a development 
institution. But training, mentoring, and social intervention for empowering poor 
people - any form of development work with a redistributive agenda - remains 
costly. Long-term subsidies for micro-finance institutions, given in the vague 
hope for financial sustainability in the future, has opportunity costs as these 
subsidies cut into the available resources for other, equally desirable forms of 
intervention. Micro-finance is no panacea, and should be made to account for the 
support it receives.
1 A good example is Tony Davenport, chairman of the Start-Up Fund and former board member 
of the Informal Business Training Tmst, who said on several occasions that finding funding for 
the credit organisation has always been much easier than for the training organisation.
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The costs o f solidarity - international evidence
Results similar to those presented in this thesis are borne out by the experience of 
other group lenders worldwide. The adverse relationship between transaction costs 
and group lending technology has also been noticed by Hossain in his analysis of 
Grameen Bank. He notes that 'elements like taking the bank to the people and 
intensive interaction of bank staff with borrowers may not be appropriate and 
could become too costly for sparsely settled environments' (Hossain, 1988, p. 81). 
Concluding on the applicability of Grameen's technology in various developing 
countries, he asserts that the 'Grameen Bank approach has a fair chance of success 
in densely settled, poverty-stricken areas of Asia, but for Africa an appropriate 
delivery mechanism has to be worked out through trial and error' (ibid.).
Population density may only be a rough indicator of the costs of communication 
and connectedness: Bangladesh, where the solidarity credit scheme model 
originated, has 759 inhabitants per square kilometre, while Transvaal, where the 
Small Enterprise Foundation applies the technology with little success, has only 
28 inhabitants per square kilometre.2 Also, political instability and high levels of 
violence are rampant in South Africa. The countryside has not been spared; 
indeed, former homelands, where many micro-lenders operate, are among the 
most affected areas. Social instability has a negative impact on group cohesion
2 The respective population densities of Bangladesh and Transvaal are calculated from The Times 
(1993, pp. ix, xii).
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and economic stability and thus indirectly disadvantages South African micro­
lenders in comparison with institutions in less volatile regions.
Hence several obstacles encountered by micro-lenders in South Africa are specific 
to their special circumstances, but the inadequacy of contemporary understanding 
of solidaristic lending technology is not. The fundamental characteristic, the 
costliness of group credit, is common to all group lenders, even those operating in 
more conducive environments. Both the Grameen Bank and BancoSol are popular 
models among the community of proponents of solidarity credit schemes, yet the 
literature is suspiciously thin on the subject of their financial stability. Statements 
about 'financial sustainability' abound, yet the contribution of grants and 
subsidised credit often remains a mystery.3
Like the Small Enterprise Foundation, the Grameen Bank relies on investment in 
formal money markets for most of its income. It receives large grants and 
subsidised loans which are reinvested in local money markets. In 1988, about 50 
percent of its assets were funds lent from international agencies at concessional 
rates (via the government which borrows at 1 percent and re-lends to the Grameen 
Bank at 2 percent for twenty years) and invested in Bangladesh as time deposits 
with returns of 14 percent (Von Pischke, 1991, p. 243). Through this channel, the
3 See Glosser (1994) on BancoSol; Fuglesang and Chandler (1988), Berenbach and Guzman 
(1994) on the Grameen Bank; Manuel (1992) on both PRODEM and Grameen; Christodoulou et 
al (1993) on the Small Enterprise Foundation.
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Grameen Bank received up to US$125 million in 1988 annually from various 
sources (Thomas, 1990).
Also, the Grameen Bank's ratio of cost to the size of the loan portfolio is lower 
than that of group lenders in South Africa but higher than with comparable non- 
participatory lenders: it had costs of 27.4 percent of loans outstanding in 1984, 
while the individualistic lender Badan Kredit Kecamatan in Indonesia, with a 
comparable customer profile, had 12.9 percent (Biggs et al, 1991, p. 44).
The FINCA group credit scheme in Costa Rica was found to make good use of 
social capital for improved ‘informational efficiency* and reduced default rates 
(Wenner, 1995). Although Wenner does not primarily inquire about operational 
efficiency, he notes high administrative costs and concludes that ‘group credit is a 
cost-sensitive institutional design’ and ‘may not be immediately viable’ {ibid., p. 
278).
BancoSol experienced revenue shortfalls similar to the Small Enterprise 
Foundation. Its projection of profitability, too, rest on assumptions of rapid 
expansion. Yet costs are projected to remain largely stable. It is unclear whether 
the cost and revenue structure will remain favourable. There is considerable 
pressure from the bank's employers for wage increases and it is unreasonable to 
assume that the bank's management would be in a position to placate those in a
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phase of expansion. Considering the staff-intensive technology, the wage is an 
important determinant of the bank's financial performance (Glosser, 1994).
Micro-credit and development - the current euphoria and the long-term trend 
Micro-credit has taken over from the previous movement of ‘cheap credit’. As its 
critics argued, cheap credit is incapable of achieving its social and economic 
development goals, and credit as a vehicle for redistributional policies was found 
inefficient. In the field of micro-credit, few institutions are sustainable in the strict 
sense of being self-financing. However, the debate about subsidised interest rates 
does not seem to capture that problem well, as most micro-credit institutions 
charge interest rates which are significantly above prime interest rates in their host 
countries. The relatively high interest rates of micro-credit effectively dispel many 
of the criticisms levelled at ‘cheap rural credit’; in fact, both monetary and non­
monetary costs of accessing micro-credit limits the distorting effects that 
bedevilled ‘cheap credit’ programmes. In micro-finance the focus is not on 
subsidised interest rates but on subsidised lending institutions. As the credit 
delivery in many mainstream finance programmes remains dependent on 
subsidies, micro-finance remains vulnerable to the critique that credit is an 
inefficient tool for achieving redistributional objectives.
In addition, most reasonable observers now agree that micro-credit is 
overburdened with expectations extending to gender equality, poverty alleviation, 
and addressing the employment crisis brought about in developing countries by
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structural adjustment programmes, the legacy of apartheid, or other calamities.4 
These objectives go far beyond the original desire to address credit rationing - or 
exclusion from credit markets. Overcoming credit rationing has in itself welfare- 
enhancing effects for the poor, but neither is it directly redistributive nor efficient 
in achieving rather specific social objectives. Self-financing micro-credit schemes, 
such as the Start-Up Fund, will be least affected when the development 
community finally discovers the weaknesses of the micro-credit euphoria. Self- 
financing micro-credit schemes benefit the poor by moving the frontier of credit 
markets. However, specific redistributional policy objectives could alternatively 
be addressed by the provision of goods such as education, training and health care 
to disadvantaged groups. Indirectly such measures may even benefit micro- 
finance institutions and micro-enterprise development: educated and healthy poor 
people are more likely to achieve upliftment, and they are more likely to be in a 
position to repay business loans. Further, the provision of infrastructure - roads as 
well as telecommunication - could often be a boost as much for service providers 
in micro-finance as for the poor people they are targeting.
Delivery mechanisms
The 'cost of solidarity', which is the focus of my critique of group-based micro­
finance, is likely to differ between countries and locations. The costs involved in
4 In Malawi, micro-credit is used to counter the socio-economic effects of the AIDS epidemic. In 
Mozambique, both returning exiles and fishermen who had suffered from natural disaster enjoyed 
specific micro-credit programmes. In Botswana, unemployed youth, who are seen as a threat to 
the hegemony of the ruling party, gave the impetus for the development of national micro-credit 
policy. In effect, micro-credit is often used as a general cure to diverse problems involving loss of 
income.
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group communication are invariably higher where population density is low, 
society fragmented, infrastructure poor and the cost of loan officers* time high. 
These factors seem to disadvantage Southern African countries, and the more 
rapid development of micro-lenders in Asia and Latin America seems to bear this 
fact out. However, one could argue that this disadvantage helps to identify a 
universal problem of micro-lending: viability is seen excessively to lie in high 
repayment rates, while the operational costs of lending - except in rare cases of 
obvious waste - have been out of focus for two decades.5
However, in Southern Africa, many micro-lenders operate with tolerably high 
repayment rates. Most major lenders experience default rates of 0-20% of 
advances, with the majority at the lower end of this band. However, none of them 
is viable - except for the Start-Up Fund which has an above-average default rate. 
Therefore, the level of cost-recovery cannot significantly be improved by focusing 
on defaults and repayment rates. Following the stabilisation of acceptably low 
default rates, the most important step towards achieving viability is the 
development of cost-efficient delivery mechanisms.
In South Africa, micro-lenders are in the fortunate situation of being able to use 
highly advanced electronic transmission systems for sending and receiving
5 A point in case is the Women’s Finance House Botswana. Although not one of the more efficient 
micro-lenders in Southern Africa, it is Botswana’s largest by far and enjoys robust support by 
major donors. Their core lending programme shows a historical repayment rate o f 93%; their 
lending costs stand at about 800 percent. Their chosen way to viability is to improve the 
repayment rate by adopting administratively expensive policies.
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money. However, even in South Africa, parts of the rural population are difficult 
to reach through bank branches and ATMs. In several neighbouring countries, 
financial sectors are even less in the position to provide for the needs of micro­
lenders. This would undermine the adoption of a mass-minimalist approach 
exactly like the Start-Up Fund. Solidarity, in the Grameen-type form, is a rather 
costly method for controlling default and for handling cash. In various parts of 
Africa, mixed forms are being tried out; many of these rely on the use of large 
groups, which reduces the costs of participation. Schemes similar to the village 
bank model are operated, inter alia, by World Relief in Mozambique, FINCA in 
Malawi, and K-REP in Kenya. All these involve the use of commercial banks’ 
facilities, according to local availability. Further research should explain the role 
of ‘cheap’ solidarity in large groups and the potential for linkage development in 
the context of underdeveloped banking systems. This could also provide a link 
between the development of the overall financial system in African countries and 
the incorporation of micro-finance institutions.
Social impact assessment
The analysis has shown that the individualistic Start-Up Fund is more efficient in 
making loans to poor entrepreneurs than the solidaristic Small Enterprise 
Foundations. This is an important insight since many proponents of group credit 
argue that this approach reduces transaction costs, both default costs and operating 
expenses. The data presented here refute this belief. The costs of creating an 
environment suitable for group lending, namely community-oriented, staff­
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intensive operations, vastly outweigh the savings. However, the strict efficiency 
comparison, based on the costs incurred from lending a specific amount, 
implicitly assume that individualistic and solidaristic credit are essentially the 
same financial product and thus close substitutes of each other. Indeed, in this 
thesis I represent them as different production technologies aimed at producing 
the same good: micro-credit. Yet this assumption is contentious. Many group 
credit activists would strongly reject the idea that their services could be replaced 
by Fordist, mass-minimalist forms of micro-credit.
This view may not be pure Luddite sentiment.6 Agu (1986) writes that
'most financial institutions offer heterogeneous services each with different 
ratio of cost to value, so that operating cost/total asset ratio often depends 
far more on the mixture of services offered by each institution than on its 
overall efficiency. This aspect of the problem will very much be 
experienced in comparing efficiency of financial institutions such as a co­
operative bank and a commercial bank charged with rendering completely 
different services in different forms and circumstances' (p. 74).
6 A Luddite is ‘a member of a gang of English craft workers led by Ned Ludd in the period 1811- 
13 who showed opposition to the introduction of textile machines in Nottingham [...] and the 
consequent loss of employment by smashing the machines at night’ (Rutherford, 1992, p. 276). 
Today the term is used to describe those who follow or preach atavistic ideals ‘in an attempt to 
prevent technical change’ (ibid.) and its social effects. Luddism therefore has a strong anti- 
innovative flavour.
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The same injunction applies to the comparison of individualistic and solidaristic 
credit. If it could be shown that group credit schemes are in some way superior in 
achieving the developmental goal of credit, then their costs may well be justified 
even on efficiency grounds.
The institutions underlying both case studies - each representing an alternative 
model of micro-lending technology - intends to initiate change beyond pure credit 
delivery; their raison d'etre is the enhancement of independent entrepreneurship 
and the creation of livelihoods for the economically disadvantaged. Credit 
extension may be an insufficient measure for their success. Group credit schemes, 
as was argued in chapters 4 and 5, always provide other, complementary services, 
often including business advice, to their clients. While solidarity imposes costs it 
also facilitates interaction between lender and borrower. The creation of solidarity 
and the institution of regular meetings may support the social dimension of 
development lending. What appears as the disadvantage of group lending for 'lean 
lending' might also be construed as an advantage for collective action and forum 
for support. However, such a view is in conflict with the current paradigm that 
holds that redistributional and soft, compassionate support structures are best 
established as institutionally separate from lending.
This thesis has chosen to address the question of economic efficiency in micro­
lending, focusing on the production of services and the generation of revenue 
from serving members of the target group. This should ideally be complemented
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by an analysis - to stay with the analogy - of the consumer surplus, the benefit 
derived by the target group from participation in a lending programme. Research 
on impact assessment of micro-lending is not advanced, and decision-makers in 
development are keen to find appropriate, workable assessment methods. These, 
though, are unlikely to yield objective, value-neutral insights. The desirability of 
social changes is extremely difficult to measure as it is as subjective as individual 
utility functions and the quality of life. The assessment of micro-credit, therefore, 
remains dependent on the political and moral values of the assessor; changes in 
the political paradigm - in donor or recipient countries, or in the community of 
development professionals - are likely to lead to a different view of micro-credit. 
Especially the waning of the current prominence of participation and grassroots 
democracy in development thinking would probably have profound influence on 
the perception of alternative micro-credit designs.
Participation in development projects
Participation is fashionable in development, not only in micro-finance. 
Participatory project designs are widely used and advocated by major donors; 
projects ranging from livestock development, water supply, to AIDS prevention 
and sexual empowerment of women use participatory methods. Effective 
ownership in development projects, achieved by involving beneficiaries in project 
conception and planning, is argued to contribute to its reliability and 
sustainability. The involvement of beneficiaries should then comprise discussion,
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the identification of priorities, but often also contribution of labour and other 
resources in kind or money.
Notably, it needs to be recognised that projects with a non-economic focus - for 
example, participatory schemes for the provision of safe drinking water - have a 
differing logic from micro-credit. Participation, and its costs, may be a desirable 
component in such schemes; otherwise no costs would arise for the beneficiaries. 
Imposing costs arguably helps to identify relevant projects, because beneficiaries 
would be reluctant to contribute to projects which they perceive as misguided, and 
to establish the value of its products in the perception of its beneficiaries. None of 
this is necessarily relevant to micro-credit. Sufficient repayment rates and the 
attainment of full cost-recovery demonstrate valued services are rendered to the 
target group on a sustainable basis.
While recent literature has pointed out the benefits of participation in development 
project design, there is a noticeable tendency to forget its costs. It seems plausible, 
though, that the conclusions of this thesis may also be applicable to non-financial 
development projects. Such costs may then be undesirable if they undermine the 
efficiency of achieving project aims as a large part of resources is used for 
maintaining participatory structures, rather than service provision. However, 
further research needs to establish in which way participation supports the non­
economic objectives of projects, and what role participation costs play in non­
finance development projects.
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